Significance: The agreement comes after months of wrangling and eight months after Iraq held general election. The political factions have already been hurt by their inability to secure this deal sooner, and by the stubbornness with which negotiations have been approached.

Implications: According to the rough outlines of the agreement that are available, Nuri al-Maliki will retain the prime ministerial post, Jalal Talabani will remain as president, while Iyad Allawi's Iraqqiya bloc will have the parliamentary speaker post. In addition a strategic council, possibly headed by Iraqqiya, will be set up to balance power further.

Outlook: The deal is not set in stone and could yet break down. However, the biggest hurdle has been cleared now that Iraqqiya has actually agreed to enter a government headed by Maliki and his State of Law bloc. The next challenge will be in deciding the make-up of the government; it is as yet unclear which portfolios the factions will vie for.

"Finally, fortunately, it's done. It's finished. All the groups are in it"

After three days of intense negotiations the main Iraqi factions have agreed to form a unity government. When the discussions began on Monday (8 November) the momentum for a power-sharing government appeared high and the prospects relatively favourable. However, the next day some members of Allawi's Iraqqiya bloc boycotted talks, triggering fears that the third day of discussions would end without the critically needed agreement. A sigh of relief was no doubt heard across Iraq and internationally when it was finally clear late last night that an agreement had been reached just ahead of a Supreme Court-ordered parliamentary session today that is expected to see the Speaker of Parliament elected. Kurdish lawmaker Mahmoud Othman's comments that "all the groups are in" the new government were confirmed across the political board. Iraqqiya spokesperson Intissar Allawi said, "I can confirm that there was an accord last night but I cannot give details." State of Law member and government spokesperson Ali al-Dabbagh meanwhile said "A power-sharing agreement has been concluded and parliament will meet at 3:00 pm" today.

Outline Agreement

As it stands, the details of the agreement are vague—probably a reflection of what has so far been agreed. What appears to have been decided based on comments from officials is that Nuri al-Maliki will retain the PM post, after fighting for the position tooth and nail. Maliki's stubbornness has been one of the main defining features of the negotiations since the election. Although he actually lost the polls to Allawi's bloc, Maliki has striven for the position with the confidence of an outright winner. Despite having the odds against him—including the widespread lack of support from neighbouring states, and domestic factions including the Kurds, Sunnis and his own Shi'a partners—Maliki effectively secured the necessary support. Key to his improved fortunes was Iran's decision to back him and then lobby the Shi'a groups within Iraq and other neighbouring states, particularly Syria. This effectively broke a deadlock within the Shi'a bloc that saw Maliki put forward as their nominee for the position.

Basic power-sharing agreement:

Prime Minister: Nuri al-Maliki—State of Law

President: Jalal Talabani—Patriotic Union of Kurdistan

Speaker of Parliament: Osama al-Nujaifi—Iraqqiya

Security Strategy Council

A new security strategy council is expected to be formed, with the apparent purpose of balancing out the vast powers of the prime minister. It is unclear what the powers of the council will be and how will be formed. It would not be surprising if Iraqqiya is charged to head the council as a further pacification for their loss of the prime ministerial post.

The agreement will see the largely symbolic presidency remain in the hands of the Kurds and the incumbent Jalal Talabani. Iraqqiya meanwhile has agreed to the speaker of parliament position. While Iraqqiya spokesmpeople have refrained from commenting too widely on their position, Al-Dabbagh said yesterday that parliament will today elect Iraqqiya's Osama al-Nujaifi to the parliamentary speaker post. It is not clear at all that this will indeed be the outcome of the parliamentary session today, not least because of reports that that different factions within Iraqqiya have favoured different outcomes.

Outlook and Implications

Uncertainties Prevail

The power-sharing agreement is not set in stone and could yet break down. Iraqqiya seems to still be on the fence over its position, having clearly wanted the prime ministerial post and having insisted on actually leading a government given its electoral victory in March. Iraqqiya was effectively squeezed into a choice of joining a government led by Maliki or remaining in opposition—a move that would no doubt have had disastrous consequences for Iraq's security given the widespread support by Sunnis for the bloc. Their participation in the government is unsurprisingly highly reluctant and may be marred by internal divides between parties within the bloc that disagree on general strategy. Although the situation is a clear disappointment for Iraqqiya and even though they have so far ended up the biggest losers in the situation, the speaker of parliament is an important position to have. The speaker will be in a good position to direct the agenda for the assembly and has important powers in directing back-room bargaining. For that reason Iraqqiya's position will be a critical one to watch out for by investors and oil companies concerned that their contracts will begin to come under parliamentary scrutiny. Furthermore, if all goes to plan, this will be the first time that Sunnis have a possible important position within government and some of the more resource-nationalistic tendencies that have been strong within the Sunni constituency will be shown.

In other words, Iraqqiya could still be in a good position to exercise opposition to State of Law through the speaker position and other positions such as the possible one within the security strategy council. This is not necessarily good news for general policy-making. Given that the formation of a unity government is not a happy union but a forced and necessary one, the tone may be set for the possibility of a highly confrontational and slow-moving administration at least in the immediate term. In the longer term, alliances can be expected to shift and change and unlikely friendships struck, as witnessed over the past several years.

Other uncertainties prevail in the immediate term. Primarily, it is unclear which portfolios each faction will vie for. If all goes relatively smoothly with the election of speaker of parliament and president in the near term, the next challenge will be the actual formation of the government and ensuring that factions are distributed a fair share of the key portfolios—finance, defence, interior and foreign affairs. In addition, the details of the new security strategy council will need to be defined, and the future of the presidency which has until now consisted of a three-way presidential council consisting of a Kurd, Sunni and Shi'a. In the end factions were unable to move significantly or meaningfully beyond the divisions that formed the previous government. The defining feature of the past eight months of political wrangling has been Iraq's ethno-national and sectarian divides. Divisions have been created along these deep fault lines and now an agreement struck along the very same clefts. The irony is of course that the deeply divided government—if it is formed in the final instance—should be labelled a "unity" government.