The Independent Election Commission (IEC) of Afghanistan published first preliminary results yesterday (25 August), five days after the country conducted its second-ever presidential and provincial council elections. The preliminary results are based on a sample of 10 per cent of the votes cast, and suggest that incumbent Hamid Karzai and former foreign minister Abdullah Abdullah are in a head-to-head race, with a tally of 40.6 and 38.7 per cent respectively. According to the figures released, Ramazan Bashardost comes in third with 11 per cent of votes, while former World Bank official and finance minister Ashraf Ghani has slightly more than three per cent. Over the last days both Karzai and Abdullah have claimed victory, and Abdullah has repeatedly pointed out irregularities and widespread fraud in the elections that were marred by numerous Taliban attacks throughout the country. This has deterred many from voting, particularly in Taliban strongholds in the south and east of the country, where voter turnout in some areas has been reported as less than five per cent. Preliminary statistics also show that out of an estimated 15 million eligible voters, only about five million actually participated in the elections.

Meanwhile, the deteriorating security situation continues to dominate news headlines after the elections. Today, a series of five powerful bombs in Afghanistan's southern city of Kandahar killed at least 41 and wounded dozens others.

Preliminary Results to Be Treated with Caution

While the preliminary results suggest that Karzai is likely to miss a simple majority of votes (51 per cent), which would mean that elections would go to a second round in October, it should be pointed out that the preliminary results as published should be treated with caution. Indeed, there is a multiplicity of issues that could significantly alter the tallies, most likely in favour of Karzai.

The preliminary tallies are based on a sample of only 10 per cent of all votes cast, equalling the votes of roughly 500,000 eligible voters. While meaningful extrapolations would in theory be possible even from such a small percentage of votes, this would require a sound sampling technique that does justice to the country's ethnic and demographic make-up, as well as taking into account actual voter turnout. However, the sample used appears to be a rather arbitrary one, and it could indeed be argued that it favours those provinces in which Abdullah was tipped to be the strongest candidate. While districts adjoining Kabul (eParwan, Bamian, Wardak, Kapisa) as well as a number of northern districts (Kunduz, Bamangan, Juzjan) were comparatively well represented in the sample (with more than 20 per cent of all votes cast within each of these provinces), southern provinces were much less so. The southern provinces of Nimruz, Helmand and Urozgan were not represented at all, while less than two per cent of all votes cast in Kandahar, Zabol and Paktika figured in the preliminary results. While this is understandable given that levels of violence in these provinces are higher and the government's writ does not extend to all areas within these provinces, this is likely to significantly skew preliminary estimates. In fact, it is evident that most of those provinces with a majority Pashtun population are heavily under-represented, and it is Karzai that draws most support from there. As a result, it can be expected that Karzai's tally will increase once all votes from these provinces have been counted in.

Run-Off Elections or Small-Margin Victory Likely to Bring Legitimacy Issue to the Fore

Apart from problematic preliminary results, fears are justified that the final results are skewed due to fraud. Indeed, the single most important issue on most observers' minds now is that the elections produce results that are accepted by the majority of Afghans. However, widespread violence, flawed electoral processes and a generally violent political culture have bred fears over results being perceived as illegitimate. Fears that legitimacy becomes a major issue before and after results are officially declared are spurred by the expectation of Karzai missing a simple majority of votes and the prospect of run-off elections.

Firstly, rampant insecurity especially in the south and east of the country has resulted in no voter turnout in some, and very low turnout in most areas in the south and east of the country. In these areas, Taliban attacks and threats to cut off fingers or even slit throats of those who have voted, seems to have paid off. This has important implications for the representativeness of results, with Pashtuns likely to feel under-represented. Apart from increasing the dangers of post-election political violence, this could also move people to once more support the Taliban insurgency. Widespread violence has also limited the numbers of observers at polling stations, thus limiting possibilities for monitoring. Sure enough, there have been reports of ballot stuffing in some polling stations.

Secondly, flaws in the current system of Afghanistan's electoral institutions, ranging from a problematic legal framework upon which the existence and conduct of these institutions is built, to the registration process of candidates and allegations of being politically biased, are likely to have skewed the final results. With estimates that up to three million voting cards out of a total of about 17 million registered cards were fraudulent, such fears have been confirmed with children (minimum age to cast a ballot is 18) and a disproportionately high number of women voting. One issue that has specifically been criticised by one candidate, Ramazan Bashardost, was that the allegedly "indelible" ink with which voters' fingers were marked came off easily by using a domestic detergent, prompting him to demand the elections to be halted immediately.

Thirdly, in the likely event that Karzai wins the elections, however small the margin, his contenders are likely to point out his incumbent advantages. Under current constitutional provisions Afghanistan's president enjoys significant advantages in contesting elections, which many have argued go well beyond the usual advantages of incumbency. This includes the power to appoint IEC officials, provincial governors, gain disproportionate media coverage and access to state resources.

Outlook and Implications

While a simple majority for Karzai and the retaining of the status quo still remains a possibility, the most likely scenario now is that Karzai misses a simple majority of votes, forcing him into run-off elections with Abdullah. There are two broad scenarios of how this could play out.

Scenario I: Small-Margin Victory or Run-Off Elections Spark Violence

In this scenario the successful candidate wins by only a small margin, either during the first round or through run-off elections. The most likely winner is Karzai, although Abdullah, Bashardost and/or Ghani could succeed if they formed an alliance, particularly in the case of run-off elections. In this scenario the elections produce results that lack, or are perceived to lack, legitimacy among wide parts of the population. Tajik voter turnout rates have been higher than those of Pashtuns. Tensions would ensue, culminating in demonstrations and violence. A significant loss of trust in the entire democratic process would become evident. Political violence will add significantly to the general climate of instability in this scenario, and would also affect the country's cities. In such a situation the Taliban would be able to further gain strength, as efforts to counter their movement become increasingly diluted. This scenario could also see Karzai impose a state of emergency. The international community would face severe additional hardships in carrying out their mandate.

Scenario II: Small-Margin Victory or Run-Off Elections Force Winning Candidate to Co-Opt Challengers

This scenario sees the winning candidate co-opting one or more of his challengers, most likely by offering attractive positions in his government. Depending on the overall context in which such a move takes place, this could provide for more stability. Furthermore, the fact that Abdullah, Bashardost and/or Ghani have a say in government opens the door for more substantial reform moves in political, economic and social terms. The government's writ increases as its legitimacy is enhanced in the eyes of the public (although regional commanders are likely to retain control over much of their traditional territory). The international community is provided the opportunity to extend unprecedented moral and material support to a government that enjoys widespread legitimacy, which not least means enhanced public trust in government institutions that in turn are strengthened and slowly rid of rampant corruption. This would help counter-insurgency measures against the Taliban, thus enhancing security throughout the country. Furthermore, a reversal of the tide in the fight against the Taliban also enhances leverage power to initiate peace talks with "moderate" elements among insurgents, as proposed by Karzai for some time.

Global Insight (Reino Unido)