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03/12/2009 | New U.S. Afghan Strategy Elicits Mixed Reactions

Global Insight Staff

U.S. president Barack Obama finally unveiled his new Afghanistan strategy yesterday, the key elements of which are a 30,000-strong increase in troop numbers and an exit strategy of sorts.

 

IHS Global Insight Perspective

 

Significance: There was an extended build-up to yesterday's eagerly-anticipated speech; U.S. president Barack Obama resisted pressure to act quickly in favour of a careful examination of the huge and complex challenges facing Afghanistan.

Implications: The strategy represents a compromise, reflecting widely divergent opinions on how to move forward. It has run into immediate domestic and international criticism, but this has been generally muted in comparison to the reception that former president George W. Bush's Iraq strategies received. 

Outlook: Under the strategy, U.S. troop withdrawals would commence as early as mid-2011; the timetable may offer some domestic reassurance, but even in the best-case scenarios insecurity and political instability will continue to haunt Afghanistan for the foreseeable future.

After months of deliberations over the way forward in Afghanistan, U.S. president Barack Obama announced his new Afghan strategy at the prestigious U.S. military academy at West Point today. His announcement did not contain many surprises, given that vital details were already leaked in the week prior to the announcement, but it effectively ended weeks of speculation over the exact number of troops that Obama would add to those already serving in Afghanistan. While the new strategy contains a number of new edges and cornerstones compared with the old Af-Pak strategy that was adopted only in March this year, the core objective remains the same: the defeat of al-Qaida in the region, to turn the tide against the Taliban and to build up domestic security forces and institutions.

Contours of the New U.S. Strategy

  • Elimination of Al-Qaida Safe Havens: Obama once more stressed that the core objective of U.S. engagement in the region remains the defeat of al-Qaida, which includes fighting those Taliban that support al-Qaida ideology. A new component to this strategy is his announcement that the United States would support Afghan efforts to integrate so-called "moderate" Taliban fighters that are willing to renounce violence.
  • Additional Troops: Obama's decision on troop levels is the one component that has aroused most attention. While U.S. top commander in Afghanistan, Stanley McChrystal, in a comprehensive strategic review warned that the war against the Taliban could well be lost unless there was a troop surge of at least 40,000 coupled with a "radically different" war strategy, Obama only committed 30,000 additional troops. Given opposition to any further troop reinforcement within his own party and among the general public, this number can be seen as a compromise with Obama putting additional pressure on key allies to supply the remaining ones. Obama said that the pledged troops would arrive in Afghanistan within six months to "seize the initiative". The additional troops will bring total U.S. troop contributions to around 98,000.
  • Urging Allies to Contribute More: Having announced a troops surge just short of what McChrystal demanded, Obama apparently expected the international community to step up their efforts. In his address he stressed that "this is not just America's war", and he is expected to significantly up his pressure for key allies to contribute additional troops and resources.
  • Withdrawal Beginning Mid-2011: Given waning public support for the Afghan war effort and his numerous critics in his own Democratic Party, Obama decided that the new Afghan strategy would constitute an "end-game" for U.S. troop engagement in the country. While no timeline was given for a complete withdrawal, he promised to commence the withdrawal by July 2011, just one year after the planned completion of the troop surge announced just now. This is predicated upon significant progress to be achieved within the one year of "full involvement" against the Taliban as well as in building up a viable Afghan security force.
  • Reinforced Training of Afghan Security Force: A withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan is vitally dependent on the ability of Afghan security forces to maintain security. Not surprisingly, Obama made the training of security personnel a key priority, saying in particular that the planned U.S. troop surge "will allow us to accelerate handing over responsibility to Afghan forces".
  • Civilian Surge: Obama also vowed to reinforce U.S. efforts to aid the building of civilian capacities in Afghanistan. Given that this depends much on the performance of the Afghan government, and its past hesitance to clamp down on corruption, Obama stressed that "the days of the blank cheque are over". Any aid given to the government will be dependent on performance.
  • Partnership with Pakistan: Not new in itself, Obama has made the nexus between Afghanistan and Pakistan a key component in his previous Af-Pak strategy. This came out of the realisation that the resurgent Taliban in Afghanistan since 2006 were in part due to them having been able to resort to "safe havens" across the border in Pakistan's lawless tribal areas. In addition to massive civilian and military aid bills that were passed in October this year, Obama vowed an "expanded partnership" with the nuclear-armed country, involving less criticism and more support for its operations against militants.

Mixed International Reactions

Obama's new strategy won both praise and criticism from state leaders around the world. Traditionally the strongest U.S. ally, U.K. prime minister Gordon Brown called on NATO members and other key U.S. allies to support efforts in Afghanistan, himself offering the deployment of an additional 500 troops to Afghanistan by early December, despite waning domestic popularity of the Afghan war effort. The Secretary-General of NATO, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, said that he was "confident" that NATO members would come forward to become more engaged in Afghanistan, with Italy and Poland in particular having pledged an undisclosed number of additional troops already. While also signalling support for the broad strategy, reactions from Germany, France and Australia were less enthusiastic, with Germany and France holding back any decision on additional troops until after an Afghanistan conference on 28 January, while Australia bluntly ruled out any further reinforcement of its contingent. Japan also expressed broad support, and reiterated its promise of pouring US$5 billion of civilian aid into Afghanistan. Other countries that welcomed the strategy and pledged more troops include South Korea and Macedonia. The Afghan government also welcomed Obama's decision.

Reactions from Pakistan were more critical, with concerns growing that the additional U.S. troops in Afghanistan could flush more militants into the country, thereby further destabilising the already extremely volatile security situation there. Iran maintained that the new Afghan strategy did not reflect a critical departure from the policies of the previous U.S. administration under George W. Bush. Top United Nations official Kai Eide criticised the finality of the approach, stressing that a transition strategy should be favoured over an exit strategy.

A Difficult Balancing Act at Home

The decision to increase troop numbers was always going to be a tough sell back in the United States. The military is badly strained after eight years of conflict in Afghanistan and Iraq, the costs are enormous at a time when public finances are already in colossal deficit, and an escalation of military action runs counter to the instincts of many in President Obama's Democratic Party. In this context, he elected for a sombre, thoughtful tone as he addressed cadets at the elite West Point academy, drawing a contrast with his predecessor's eternal optimism and, at times, premature triumphalism.

Obama cannot afford to ignore the political reaction to his new strategy, not least because Congress will have to agree to finance it. On the face of it, one would expect the Republicans, rather than the Democrats, to be the strongest supporters of the increased troop deployment. After all, it carries strong echoes the last administration's Iraq "surge" that prompted a huge partisan battle in 2007. Most Republicans do indeed prefer a tough military strategy in the "war on terror", but they have such a jaundiced view of Obama's presidency that endorsements will be grudging. Before the announcement, Obama was denounced for "dithering", particularly by former vice-president Dick Cheney, and the insinuation that Obama is somehow too academic and pragmatic to run a war will continue to hang over him. On the Democratic side, there will be substantial support for the strategy, however reluctant, but there will undoubtedly need to be some Republican votes too in order to pass the required finances. Members of the Democrats' liberal wing warned yesterday that Obama's strategy risked repeating the mistakes of Vietnam.

Obama's emphasis on an exit strategy was clearly aimed at sceptical Democrats, but at the same time it risks alienating Republicans and Democrats' more conservative wing. One of the more moderate Republican senators, John McCain, warned yesterday that "The way that you win wars is you break the enemy's will, not announce when you are leaving."

Outlook and Implications

Obama's new Afghan strategy is effectively a compromise that is less aimed at pleasing anyone rather than averting the massive criticism that would have ensued if he went for more radical solutions. Given the widely diverging opinions on whether and how the Afghan war can yet be won, it is clear that there are no good options on the table, and perhaps Obama's middle path is the only viable option to be pursued at the moment. Now knowing the broad contours of the new U.S.–Afghan strategy, it remains to be seen in the coming weeks what the more fine-grained details are. More broadly, while the U.S. public may be somewhat quietened knowing that there is an exit strategy on the table, the withdrawal of international forces will not necessarily mean that Afghanistan's extremely complex conflict has come to an end. Even if Afghan forces will be ready to take over the fight, insecurity and political instability are set to haunt Afghanistan for some time to come.

Global Insight (Reino Unido)

 


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