Global Insight Perspective

On 8 November, parliament adopted a revised constitution that limits the powers of President Kurmanbek Bakiyev, and puts an end to opposition protests in the capital Bishkek organised by the For Reforms movement. They had called for the government and Bakiyev to resign for failing to carry out promised reforms, and amid accusations of cronyism and corruption in the regime that betrayed the 2005 Tulip Revolution that removed the former regime.

Eight days of mostly peaceful protests resulted in the concession being made by the government, after a series of meetings with For Reforms.

This constitution is a hybrid of three drafts; one agreed in mid-2005, following the revolution that led to the election of the current government and Bakiyev to power; one drawn up by Bakiyev in recent weeks, augmenting the powers of the executive and at odds with the initial draft; and one drafted by parliamentarians. The compromise was quickly sought from a joint commission, with the previous day having seen violent clashes and concerns violence might escalate. Approval came as swiftly, with less than an hour of a late-night session seeing 65 votes in favour, to one objection and one abstention.

The compromise allows the executive-heavy system to be a hybrid of parliamentary and presidential systems. It:

• Provides for a new legislature with 90 mandates (rather than the present 75), half from party lists and half from single member districts.
• Limits the president's power to dissolve parliament.
• Preserves the parliamentary right to declare no confidence in any or all cabinet members, with a simple majority vote.
• Awards the parliament the right to appoint a government, and leaves the President to approve their choice.
• Allows the party with the most parliamentary seats to name the prime minister and oversee appointments.
• Leaves the president with control over key economic, security and administrative bodies.

Outlook and Implications

The echoes of the Tulip Revolution left the crowd prepared for the protests, and the suggestion that many of the participants were professional or at least seasoned protestors. It must be to their credit that little unrest was seen, and there is a sense that no one wishes to see the mobilisation to unrest that was experienced in 2005.

The current government and executive will remain in power until the natural expiration of their mandate, and For Reforms was required to drop its demands that they step down as part of the agreed compromise. It is not clear whether Bakiyev will still press for a referendum on the constitution; there is some public support for such a move but Bakiyev was only really interested in public consultation at the earlier stage when it appeared he would see almost all his powers removed or reduced. Bakiyev was forced to accept the constitution as creating "balance" in the republic, but it was a far cry from his accusations in recent days that the opposition was attempting a power grab. This leaves the way open for an assault on the opposition by Bakiyev and the government. Bakiyev also has some commitments in the elites that helped him to power, and that control the bulk of economic and administrative resources. The opposition remains weak and lacking in parliamentary influence, or access to these resources. The need to invoke public support for the opposition demands is an indicator of its failure to engage in the parliamentary process and its shortage of elite backing (although it has its fair share of shady business links that are a must for success in politics).

The outcome is a constitution widely supported, but a government no longer able to call upon the Tulip Revolution for its legitimacy. In addition, flashpoints remain, particularly over whether the promised change to the state television channel will be converted to a public channel, and how easily Bakiyev adapts to his de jure reduced powers. An added danger is an opposition seeing it has nothing to lose; its temperate protests this time round could be wound up if reforms do not continue, placing importance on developments in the coming months.

Contact: Raul Dary

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