Significance: A large-scale arrest and detention of supporters of the Turkish army earlier this week has raised tensions between pro- and anti-government forces. Although the prime minister has commented very little on the spectacular arrests, all fingers point in his direction, reinforcing the brittle government-army ties.

Implications: Emboldened by its parliamentary majority and support of international organisations such as the European Commission, the Turkish government is keen to turn on its head the balance of power between the government, the army, and—to a lesser extent—the judiciary.

Outlook: The government is not afraid to confront, and even humiliate the army in public in its quest for supremacy in Turkish politics. A coup would inevitably make businesses, the government, and the army worse off by lowering investor confidence and thus worsening Turkey's economy and room for public expenditure. However, should the government continue in this vein, a coup cannot be ruled out during 2010 and 2011.

Risk Ratings: Turkey's political risk rating is already fairly high, at 2.75. IHS Global Insight is closely monitoring how the latest incident is panning out, and may raise the political risk to 3.00 in the near future should relations between the army, executive, and judiciary worsen in the coming months.

The Turkish government is not afraid of showing its distrust for the Turkish military. Prompted by findings from the criminal investigations department of the Turkish National Police Department, police forces raided buildings in the country's three largest cities, confiscated material, and arrested over 40 active and retired officers of the Turkish army on 22 February (Monday). The men were interrogated yesterday in relation to two alleged plots to overthrow the ruling Justice and Development party (AKP): the so-called "Sledgehammer plan" and the "Cage Operation Action Plan". A Turkish newspaper recently disclosed details of the former; drafted in 2003, one year after the AKP came to power, it was allegedly intended to injure and kill a raft of Muslims, government officials, and journalists through the bombing of a large mosque in Istanbul during the Friday prayers, and by bringing down a Turkish jet and pinning it on the Greek army in order to launch a military standoff with neighbouring Greece. The second plot allegedly aimed to scare secular and non-Muslim residents of Turkey through violence and assassination. Both plots should have brought down the AKP by discrediting it both abroad and at home, and returned the army to power with the ability to usher in a more secular government and return to a more secular state system.

Touching the Untouchables

Turkey has seen a raft of spectacular arrests of military members in the recent past, in relation to the alleged clandestine, anti-democratic, and anti-government organisation Ergenekon. Yet the ones earlier this week were unprecedented in size and visibility, almost as if the police wanted to demonstrate its courage in facing up to one of the most powerful institutions in Turkey. Critics warn that the seemingly "devil-may-care" approach of the police will have serious repercussions. Indeed, the arrests show that the police and state prosecutors are not afraid to provoke the "untouchables" as Turkish media refer to the powerful members of the military, which include the arrested retired air forces commander Ibrahim Firtina, former naval forces commander Ozden Ornek, and former deputy chief of general staff General Ergin Saygun. There is a clear pattern developing: as the investigations into Ergenekon widen, the boldness of the judiciary increases. Sceptics of the arrests—amounting to hundreds, targeting journalists, academics, and military staff alike—blame the government's attempts at consolidating power in its hands for the arrests, and depict them as a means of intimidating critics of the AKP.

New Turkey

The AKP pledged to soften the clout of secularism in Turkey when it came to power in 2002. Turkey, it argues, would be better served by a more inclusive approach to religion and by a more powerful executive, a curtailed army and judiciary that would have less leeway in the political arena. In the AKP's model, the parliament and government are the supreme power of Turkish policy-making, the judiciary stays clear of political affairs and has far less rights to ban a party, and the army is confined to supporting the ministry of defence and the interior in keeping Turkey safe and attractive for investors. This vision is backed by the European Commission, with whom Turkish officials are holding European Union membership talks; it is also backed by international donor organisations such as the International Monetary Fund. Yet the army and many members of the judiciary oppose the vision as dangerous, giving the government too much power and offering too little control to the executive.

Plan B

The level of distrust between Turkey's highest institutions runs deep; secularism has so far been the glue that held the state together, allowing any of the three powers—first and foremost the army—to step in and restore order (meaning secularism), should it be threatened. The AKP has been trying with comparatively little success to remove this glue; the constitutional reform is still in its infancy due to the opposition of smaller parties in parliament. It looks highly unlikely that the next Turkish government will operate under a civilian constitution come 2011, something even the government-friendly president Abdullah Gül has acknowledged. Hence "plan B" resurfaces: a highly visible standoff with the army in order to show the government's determination to sideline the army increasingly in Turkish policy-making. The government is already locking horns with secular judges in the fight for supremacy.

Outlook and Implications