Iraqi National Alliance

With the focus set on Iraq’s January 2010 parliamentary elections, Iraq’s main Shi’a parties announced yesterday the formation of a new—or revamped—Shi’a alliance. Dubbed the ''Iraqi National Alliance'' the new grouping consists of the Islamic Supreme Council for Iraq (ISCI), Shi’a cleric Muqtada al-Sadr’s followers, as well as a number of independents and high-profile figures, including former prime minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari and Ahmad Chalabi, a former U.S. ally in Iraq. Absent from the list, which is effectively a revamp of the former United Iraqi Alliance formed in 2004 ahead of the 2005 parliamentary elections, is prime minister Nuri al-Maliki who heads the Islamic Dawa party—a post formerly held by Ibrahim al-Jaafari. Maliki’s absence from the alliance comes after months of negotiations between the Shi’a parties for the revival of the depleted United Iraqi Alliance (UIA), which effectively began following Iraq’s January 2009 provincial elections. Early negotiations had certainly included Maliki, who briefly looked set to possibly lead the revamped alliance. For that reason at least, yesterday’s announcement is somewhat surprising. Other interesting elements is the Sadrist faction’s earlier refusal to join a new Shi’a alliance which saw a prominent role still held by the ISCI; the two groups have held radically opposing political stances, with the ISCI favouring a strongly federalist Iraq while the Sadrist bloc has been more in line with Maliki’s centralist preference—they have also been involved in a bitter power struggle in parts of the Shi’a south.

Maliki’s Exclusion

The presence of former prime minister and Maliki rival, Ibrahim al-Jaafari, is also interesting. The former Dawa leader was put forward by the UIA in spring 2006 for the premiership; however, his closeness to Iran, perceived preference for an Islamic state, and allegations of mismanagement caused Kurds, Sunnis, and the United States to push for a reversal of the decision. At the time Maliki was preferred for his secular stance and his perceived ability bridge sectarian divides. Jaafari’s subsequent withdrawal from Dawa and establishment of a new party (the National Reform Movement) in 2008 has made him an unquestionable rival of the incumbent for the leadership of Iraq’s Shi’a community. Maliki meanwhile has had relatively free range in putting his stamp on Iraqi politics over the past couple of years. The effective absence from the political scene of terminally-ill ISCI leader, Abdel Aziz al-Hakim, who resides in Iran, has further cleared the way for Maliki’s policies over the past year. Muqtada al-Sadr, the fiercely anti-American religious leader, is also believed to be in Iran and has been for some time. The Iraqi National Alliance is in some ways a reassertion of the political role of Maliki's fellow Shi'a leaders.

Maliki’s absence from the Iraqi National Alliance has naturally raised questions over how he will proceed. Over the past couple of years Maliki has proved himself to be more of a political strongman than many had predicted when he first took office as Jaafari’s replacement. He gained ground with Sunni groups in spring of 2008 when he approved a military onslaught in the Shi’a south on Shi’a militias, including Sadr’s Mehdi Army and the ISCI’s Badr Corps. He has since wooed Sunni tribal leaders in Anbar, parts of the former ruling Ba’ath party of ousted dictator Saddam Hussein; he has attempted reconciliation with Shi’a parties and Sunni factions alike, all while continuously refining what has certainly emerged as a strongly centralising, nationalist political agenda. Maliki’s support for the newly created State of Law list in the provincial elections certainly testified to that. During the unveiling of the Iraqi National Alliance yesterday, Ibrahim al-Jaafari signalled that the door would be open for Maliki and his camp, saying: ''To the brothers who are not joining us today, for any reason, we want their participation and we want to share responsibilities with them''.

Outlook and Implications

However, Maliki appears to have weighed his chances of re-election to the premiership by the Iraqi National Alliance correctly. With both Jaafari and ISCI’s Adel Abdul Mahdi and Ahmad Chalabi in its ranks the INA would not be a safe bet for securing another term in office. A statement yesterday by Sami Askari, a Shi’a MP who is close to the premier ran: ''If he runs alone, he feels he will have more success''. Maliki is now expected to make more of his alliances with Sunni tribal leaders, particularly in Anbar province to prove his commitment to a cross-sectarian nationalist agenda. While calculating his next move the prime minister will also face increasing pressures over recent security lapses in the face of a U.S. military withdrawal from the country. In some ways Maliki’s keenness to take over responsibility from the United States and even possibly speed up U.S. withdrawal has been viewed as imprudent given the continued security concerns, as seen by the devastating twin bombings last week which killed nearly 100 people in the capital.

The Iraqi National Alliance says its guiding principles are Iraqi unity and adherence to the constitution. However, elements of the new alliance, including hints at greater respect for religious authorities and the constituent groups’ undeniable closeness to the Islamic Republic in Iran will raise concerns. In the meantime it is important to stress that it is as yet unclear how strong the Iraqi National Alliance will be, what type of support it may conjure and whether indeed its perceived closeness to Iran will result in at least a partial backlash in the legislative elections. The wider implications for Iraqi politics are still unclear; the parliamentary elections are still some time away and the results could certainly shift in unpredictable ways, although the divide could certainly break up the Shi’a vote and weaken the majority group in the elections.

Global Insight (Reino Unido)