The Thai parliament has elected Somchai Wongsawat as new prime minister, replacing Samak Sundaravej who was removed from office by a constitutional court ruling on 9 September. He received 298 votes while his opponent, Democrat Party leader Abhisit Vejjajiva, won 198 of the votes. This makes Somchai the 26th prime minister of Thailand, a post he will take up as soon as he has received endorsement from the King. The vote had been delayed from 12 September as the PPP tried to agree on a candidate .

Somchai: A New Chapter for Thailand?

Somchai is the brother-in law of ousted prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra. His wife, Yaowapa Wogsawasdi, is the younger sister of Thaksin and was a very influential MP in his Thai Rak Thai party until it was disbanded under military rule. Somchai is a former judge, having served as justice permanent secretary from 1999 to 2006, and later acted as education minister in Samak’s cabinet.

His supporters argue that his key strength lies in his conciliatory nature, which is seen as a key asset in his foremost task to bridge the divide between the People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD) protesters and the government. To this end, when he was acting prime minister last week, he teamed up with the country’s powerful military to end the state of emergency that was imposed on Bangkok. A key faction of the ruling People’s Power Party (PPP), comprising 73 lawmakers, had initially opposed his candidature due to his links with Thaksin, but after negotiations with the remaining party members decided to support him, probably in return for high-ranking positions in the new cabinet.

However, Somchai’s election also poses a few serious concerns. First and foremost is his close link to Thaksin, which was the key motivation for the PAD to demand the removal of Samak in the first place. While Somchai has vowed to distance himself from the former premier and to allow the corruption trials to go ahead unhindered, many believe it will be virtually impossible for him to cut his ties with him completely. Thaksin is still a very dominant and polarising figure in Thailand. He remains a key PPP financier and reportedly several phone calls took place between the party leadership and Thaksin in London on the question of Samak’s successor. His ongoing court cases also continue to deepen divides in the country between his urban-based opponents and his rural-based supporters. A Supreme Court verdict expected today on a controversial land acquisition by Thaksin’s wife was delayed until 21 October after a second arrest warrant was issued against the couple demanding them to appear in court.

Concerns have also been raised over questionable dismissals that have taken place under Somchai, when several justice officials he clashed with lost their jobs. Also, Somchai continues to maintain links with big business, the very issue that brought down Thaksin. His family maintains a majority share in MLink Asia Corp Plc, a handset distribution company, and the family is a former major shareholder in Wyncoast Industrial Park Plc, a logistics company. On a day when markets all around the world fell in response to the bankruptcy of investment bank Lehman Brothers, the two companies’ stocks soared by 20.74% and 32.39% respectively. This indicates that investors believe Somchai may have the standing to influence these companies.

Ultimately, the election of Somchai is not likely to solve the standoff with the PAD, as he embodies all the same perceived flaws that characterised Samak. The behaviour of the PAD does not aid matters, as the group is continuously shifting the goalposts. When they first laid siege on Government House, they indicated they were willing to negotiate with Somchai as prime minister, provided he signed up to a four-point list of demands. This included a vow not to amend the charter, the cessation of major infrastructure projects, an implementation of a court ruling on the Preah Vihear temple dispute with Cambodia and a commitment to political reform, which referred to the idea of making 70% of the parliament appointed with only 30% elected. Since then, the PAD has reverted from that position, saying they will not accept any prime minister from the PPP. Most recently, the group has proposed a “People Revolution Government” which will not have 100% elected parliamentarians, but there was no indication what the split should be. Moreover, PAD leader Chamlong Srimuang yesterday stated that they would not accept Somchai as he was more obviously a nominee of Thaksin than Samak was. He said, “he has the image of being a crook. His record showed his intention to side with evil”. And Somchai’s biggest asset, that he is a conciliatory politician, may also be his biggest weakness as he may fail to stand up to the PAD.

Outlook and Implications

The political crisis in Thailand is not yet over. This latest bout of turmoil was brought about by two concurrent strands, one social and one judicial, neither of which has been significantly reduced as a threat to the PPP-led government. The social issues remain, with the PAD adamant that they will continue their protest until the PPP and Somchai are out of office. However, the judiciary also continues to pose a threat. It has in recent months already led to the ousting of three key ministers and last week the prime minister. But the Constitutional Court has yet to rule on the possible dissolution of the PPP altogether, after one of its members was found guilty of fraud in the December 2007 elections.  Many observers had speculated the government would now call a snap election to renew their mandate. However, the PPP finds itself in an impossible quandary. If it is dissolved, it could only contest a new election under a different name after 90 days have passed. If it calls a snap election now, and it is dissolved shortly afterwards, the election will take place before the party can regroup. As such, until the case is resolved, it may well be too risky to call such an election. The judiciary is also set to issue more verdicts in cases against Thaksin, which will no doubt further polarise the two opposing sides of this divide.

Political instability is thus set to continue. Institutional permanence remains highly fragile. The constitution is highly flawed, giving the judiciary too much power over elected governments in defence of the old bureaucratic elite. The bias of the judiciary has been apparent for their willingness to strip a prime minister from office over a cooking show, while it was unwilling to serve arrest warrants to the PAD leaders for illegally occupying a government building. However, the government finds it is impossible to amend the constitution without provoking a backlash from anti-government protesters, as Samak’s bid to do so sparked this round of protesting back in May.

Representativeness and internal political consensus also remain elusive. As the situation stands, a minority—albeit a powerful and vocal one—is managing to negate the will of the majority of the population that voted for the PPP. The crisis also has more deeply polarised Thai society, with the rural population becoming increasingly angry at the perceived arrogance of the Bangkok-based elite, and the PAD and their supporters becoming increasingly frustrated with their inability to remove the PPP.

Somchai may be able to hold the fort for a short while, and an imminent new cabinet formation may briefly ease tensions. However, the long-term structural problems that have led to this crisis are far from resolved.