Significance: Even though the verdict on Tunisia's "Jasmine Revolution" is still out, the significance of Ben Ali's fall is hard to overstate. Much remains uncertain for Tunisia's political future, but for the region the fall of one of the most stable regimes has made already wary leaders more concerned about potential social and political unrest at home.

Implications: The Tunisian uprising will no doubt affect the regional psyche considerably, crushing the previously held understanding that authoritarian regimes cannot be overthrown by popular revolt. Several countries have taken steps to prevent unrest from spreading, putting in place fresh price control mechanisms and vowing to strengthen subsidies regimes.

Outlook: Events in Tunisia are unlikely to result in a regional domino effect, even though many of the region's countries share defining characteristics with the Tunisian political system under Ben Ali. However, opposition groups, dissidents, and activists have already been emboldened by the Tunisian experience.

The First Revolt?

The fall of Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali in Tunisia will probably forever be recognised as a watershed moment in the modern history of the wider Middle East and the Arab world. His ouster, which took place under rare circumstances, will continue to send shockwaves across the region. The images of popular revolt and socio-political unrest in December and January were not dissimilar to the scenes of widespread protests that broke out in Iran in June 2009 following the fraudulent re-election of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. However, Iran is not an Arab state. In similarity with Turkey and Israel, its modern political fate has to some degree been separate from the Arab-majority Middle East. Furthermore, the Iranian regime successfully quelled the unrest through sheer tenacity and use of indiscriminate force, thus confirming widespread regional and international beliefs regarding the limits of popular revolt in an authoritarian Middle Eastern state. Elsewhere, the Lebanese Cedar Revolution in 2005 ousted Syria's three-decade presence in the country. It did not, however, fundamentally change the Lebanese political system. Furthermore, Lebanon has an inherently unstable system and is prone to unrest. Iraq is the only other actual change of regime seen in recent years, but Saddam Hussein was ousted by a foreign invasion, and not by popular revolt—despite previous attempts by Iraq's Shi'as and Kurds to depose the Iraqi dictator.

Long-Term Regional Challenges

The Tunisian experience has set an entirely different example. Ben Ali's regime was, after all, perceived by observers as being one of the more stable and secure of the regional states until very recently when Ben Ali fled the country after 23 years of rule. Neighbouring states across the region, and not just in North Africa, stood nervously by as events unfolded in Tunisia. Many of them share some of the key long-term socio-economic issues that converged to trigger the Tunisian revolt: a bulging youth population, high unemployment levels, particularly among the young and graduates, rising costs of living, an emerging middle class population, lack of future prospects, and inadequate economic growth combined with high population growth, amongst other issues.

Furthermore, many share key political characteristics with the Tunisian regime, including authoritarian measures, limits on many fundamental rights, suppression of dissidence and opposition, high levels of corruption, effective rule by a single-party/dynasty/leader, and pre-eminence of the army and/or other security forces used to suppress the population.

Perhaps one of the most important shared characteristics is the lack of opportunities for peaceful political transition, with elections strictly regulated, sometimes, if not rigged outright, geared towards near total victory for a single party or group. This means that fundamental and deep-rooted change can seemingly only come from popular revolt or a military or political coup. In most Middle Eastern states, legal opposition groups are restricted to a limited platform, while some agree to being co-opted for the sake of survival. Illegal parties, meanwhile, are forced into exile, or in some cases choose to take to extreme or militant measures. The possibilities for peaceful political transition are hindered in some countries by the fact that the most able opposition groups are Islamists—meaning that political liberalisation potentially opens the scope for such groups to gain considerable power.

To be sure, this is a generalised picture; each regional state faces its own particular circumstances. In fact, many face challenges that Tunisia has not experienced, including ethnic and sectarian unrest, external war, foreign invasions, border disputes, resource disputes, insurgencies, and militant Islamists. They may to some degree be better equipped at dealing with social unrest. Countries including Syria, Jordan, Algeria, Libya, and Egypt have developed vast and able forces to counter both internal and external threats. There, the relationship between the military and political establishment is closer and more interdependent, in some cases underpinned by previous military coups. These countries would probably be better prepared to handle a domestic revolt. Ben Ali's fate, meanwhile, was to a large degree decided by the army's refusal to shoot at protesters. Left with only the interior ministry's forces and his own presidential security forces, his position effectively became untenable.

Gulf Arab States

The oil-producing countries, particularly in the Gulf, will have additional means of pacifying their populations, the most important of which is the redistribution of oil and gas rent to raise standards of living. After gaining independence, several of the Gulf Arab states chose to limit the strength of their armies because of their small populations and to prevent the possibility of the type of military coups that toppled monarchies in Egypt, Libya and Iraq. They rely more heavily on legacies of long-term dynastic rule, their idiosyncratic social contracts and internal security forces to ensure stability. However, the Gulf states face their own long-term challenges, which will no doubt grow in intensity in the future. These include the inevitable need to diversify from oil, trim costly subsidy programmes and increase the participation of the national population in the economy. For example, for Oman and Bahrain, whose oil reserves are dwindling, these issues are more pressing in the short term. The resource-richer states—Qatar, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates—will be able to hold off painful reforms for some time. Compounding this situation are rapidly growing modernised and cosmopolitan populations, which may in the future become more forceful in demanding political representation—particularly if economic diversifications result in lower socio-economic privileges. Although admittedly this is a very long-term view, these underlying troubles will continue to linger in the Gulf.

Heartened Opposition Groups

In the immediate term, the region's opposition groups have been visibly emboldened by the revolt in Tunisia. In particular, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and in Jordan have come out with statements directly challenging the respective political systems and warning that the Tunisian example could well be emulated . In Egypt, Algeria and Sudan, young people have attempted to commit suicide by setting themselves on fire, apparently copying Mohamed Bouazizi, whose suicide attempt sparked the Tunisian protests. In Oman, a country where protests are extremely rare, several hundred people staged a rally this week against high food prices, according to Agence France-Presse. In Algeria, pro-democracy opposition party the Rally for Culture and Democracy said yesterday it would stage a rally on Sunday 23 January, despite being refused permission by the authorities.

Regional Response

Since Ben Ali's ouster, most regional states have been wary in their response. Governments have been cautious not to enrage their own populations by speaking favourably of Ben Ali. Those governments that have spoken openly of the situation have almost unanimously expressed cautious support for the Tunisian people, even though this paradoxically—and potentially dangerously—would imply respect for the wishes of their own people. By and large, the Tunisian revolt is officially being interpreted by governments as a socio-economic, not political, phenomenon. At the Arab League Economic Summit this week, pledges were made for enhanced cooperation, greater investments into raising standards and quality of living, and improving employment opportunities for youths and graduates. The actions taken by governments also reflect this. In Jordan and Syria the governments have changed temporary course on fuel subsidies. The Kuwait government has announced that all its native citizens will be given free food for the next 14 months. In addition, citizens will each receive a cash grant of US$3,572. The food distribution will amount to US$4 billion. Bahrain has also shelved discussions of reforming or cutting subsidies. These are just some of the measures taken, further similar actions are likely to be taken in the near term.

Outlook and Implications

In the near term, IHS Global Insight does not foresee a domino effect taking place across the region, with additional regimes succumbing to popular pressure. In the long term, however, popular revolts cannot be ruled out. After all, even though Tunisia's future is not known, a monumental event such as Ben Ali's fall cannot pass without fundamentally affecting the regional psyche, and potentially, the internal dynamics in some states—particularly in light of the vast challenges ahead. The key priority for governments will be to limit the immediate fallout to ensure that protests over socio-economic grievances are not triggered, as history now shows that social unrest can snowball to topple an authoritarian regime.