Significance: Tunisia's president Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali has effectively been ousted after a month of intense protests. His departure has left Tunisia in the hands of an interim government that is struggling to impose order amid continued chaos.

Implications: Tunisia's political future remains unclear. Interim Prime Minister Mohammed Gannouchi is set to present a new unity government, but it is unclear how far this can satisfy Tunisia's enraged population.

Outlook: In the immediate term stability will suffer dramatically. The so-called "Jasmine Revolution" may have ousted the president, but it has not rid the country's institutions of decades of single-party rule, deeply penetrated corruption and undemocratic institutions.

Risk Ratings

IHS Global Insight is downgrading Tunisia's Political, Security, Operational and Economic Risk Ratings to reflect the dramatic events over the past several days and the considerable level of uncertainty that lies ahead. The Political Risk Rating has been downgraded from 2.25 to 3.25, the Security Risk Rating from 2.25 to 3.0, the Operational Risk Rating from 2.25 to 3.0, and the Economic Risk Rating from 2.25 to 3.0.

A Leader Falls

On Friday (14 January) Tunisia's former president Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali imposed a state of emergency and handed over interim presidential powers to his prime minister, Mohammed Ghannouchi. The government had attempted to quell several weeks of unrest through a combination of brutality and attempted co-optation. However, Ben Ali's promises of new jobs, fresh investments and even a pledge to step down from the presidency in 2014 failed to satisfy protesters' demands. As the unrest continued, the overall demand was for the president to step down. Shortly after a state of emergency was declared, reliable reports emerged that Ben Ali had in fact fled the country with members of his family, ending 23 years of unchallenged presidential rule. Later Saudi Arabia confirmed that it had received the former president.

On Saturday (15 January) the interim presidential post was handed over to parliamentary speaker Fouad Mebazaa as per Tunisia's constitution. Ghannouchi remains in place as prime minister and has been charged with forming a new "unity" government that is expected to be announced imminently. Little reliable information has emerged regarding the future government. Opposition figures speaking to the international press have made contradictory claims, some saying that parties close to the former government would be excluded, while others claimed that the government will include previous cabinet members. The exact way forward is unclear, but Tunisia's constitution stipulates that fresh elections must be held within 60 days.

Ben Ali's ousting represents a monumental break with Tunisia's history and has left the country's immediate future in great uncertainty. The "Jasmine Revolution"—as the revolt has been dubbed at home—was successful in removing Ben Ali, but it has not put forward an alternative government. Leaderless and spontaneous, the historic uprising risks leaving an empowered population with crushed expectations.

Fights for Power

There are no obvious populist candidates to take over the political leadership. As a result a fierce political battle can be expected amongst the upper echelons of the existing political and military leadership. Hopes and demands for a more representative, open and democratic system have been expressed, but the fact remains that Tunisia's opposition parties have for decades been extremely weak and focused largely on self-perpetuation. Their agendas have not successfully resonated with Tunisians amid the ruling Constitutional Democratic Rally's (Rassemblement Constitutionnel Démocratique, RCD) dominance of the country's institutions. Furthermore, most legal opposition parties have for decades cooperated with the RCD to differing levels, as their survival has depended on the ruling party. This may weaken their appeal further. Meanwhile, banned leftist and Islamist opposition groups will remain outside the new government, although several exiled opposition leaders—including Islamist Hizb al-Nahda leader Rachid al-Ghannouchi—have said they will return home to revive their movements.

On the streets of the capital, Tunis, signs of emerging political battles are painfully evident as the police and security forces are struggling to control a chaotic situation. Looting and rioting remain pervasive amid a more serious battle between members of the presidential security forces loyal to Ben Ali, and the army. The presidential guards have been accused of seeking to foment maximum unrest and chaos in Ben Ali's absence. According to media reports, fighting appears to be taking place across the capital. Residents have been ordered not to leave their homes, but locals were in many areas said to have formed their own defence against looters, some cited in foreign media as saying that they do not trust the police to provide reliable and indiscriminate protection.

Some of the most violent fighting has taken place at the Presidential Palace in Carthage, where presidential guards have been seeking refuge from the army, which appears bent on arresting members of the several-thousand-strong guards. Over the weekend, the former head of the force, Ali Seriati, was detained amid rumours of an attempted coup. Former interior minister Rafik Belhaj Kacem who was dismissed on 12 January, was also reportedly arrested. The charges against the two men were unclear, but probably related to the severe use of force by the police and security forces against protesters. These arrests could mark the beginning of a political purge in the aftermath of the government's collapse. Meanwhile, as the army attempts to restore order, General Rachid Ammar, Chief of Staff of the army, has emerged as a possible contender for a political post. Ammar's refusal to obey government orders last week to fire on protesters may have been one of the reasons why Ben Ali's position eventually became untenable.

Regional Ramifications

As events continue to unfold at rapid speed, regional government officials are nervously holding their breaths. Whether successful in instituting an entirely new political system or not, the Tunisian uprising is nevertheless the only successful popular ousting of an Arab leader in recent history. All the countries in the Arab Middle East—with the possible exception of Iraq—share many defining characteristics with the political system in Tunisia. The fatal concoction in Tunisia was one of socio-economic and political grievances. On the socio-economic front, high unemployment rates were mixed with rapid population growth and large-scale entry of university graduates onto the labour force. Despite relatively high standards of living and stable economic growth, growth was not perceived as having trickled down sufficiently to the population. A highly educated but disgruntled middle-class population eventually had enough. However, this cannot adequately be described as a bread-and-butter revolution. Ben Ali's rule fell not on high unemployment levels, but on perceptions of extreme levels of corruption, anger over the growing arrogance and dominance of the president and his extended family, as well as on lack of freedoms and decades of political repression. These are all elements shared by many regional states. Already, opposition groups in the region are making references to Tunisia as the example to follow. In Jordan, Sheikh Hammam Said, head of Jordan's Muslim Brotherhood, hailed the Tunisians "who stood as one to bring down tyranny and injustice" as "an example for all Arab peoples," at a political rally yesterday. Elsewhere, on social media websites, support for Tunisia has poured in from people in the region.

In particular, Tunisia's North African neighbours can be expected to be fearful, not least because their political systems have experienced considerably greater turbulence in the past and have been inherently less stable than Tunisia. However, for that reason also, they are likely to be better prepared to withstand domestic turbulence of the nature seen in Tunisia. For one, all the North African countries have considerably stronger and more able armies, which in some cases have greater loyalty to the political leadership. In Tunisia the army has not yet attempted a coup, despite some such predictions by some reporters after the government's fall. This is largely because the army probably is not strong enough to hold down the security and political institutions singlehandedly, and because the political-military relationship there differs somewhat from the Algerian, Egyptian and Libyan cases. In these countries, serious political upheaval would be most likely to see the army step in with considerable force to secure the political situation, or potentially take it over completely. Furthermore, some political commentators have suggested that the reason why Tunisia "fell" at all was because of the purely secular nature of the uprising. This certainly would have affected the reaction of Ben Ali's Western former backers, including European Union (EU) states and the United States, which have hailed the Tunisian people's bid to instate a more accountable government. The fact is, in most regional states the strongest opposition forces are also Islamist, making their potential ousting of a government a far riskier prospect, and far less likely to incur the support of the Western world.

Regional governments will therefore keep an eye on Tunisia and an even closer eye on developments at home. Food price and housing unrest in Algeria, Egypt, Libya, and Jordan in recent days and weeks have stirred further concern. In Syria and Jordan the governments have announced that they will begin to reverse subsidies cuts programmes, no doubt in an effort to prevent price hikes to stir unrest. In Libya and Algeria such moves have already been taken.

Raised Risks

In light of the turbulent events of the past several weeks, and more acutely Ben Ali's ousting and the country's uncertain future, IHS Global Insight has downgraded the country's Political, Security, Operational and Economic Risk Ratings. These sharp spikes reflect the current situation in the country, as well as the uncertain near-term outlook, particularly if an interim political situation fails to settle immediate grievances. In the medium term the upheaval is likely to make the political system less predictable and more prone to disruption. Security in many areas continues to be precarious. In the longer term the political vacuum could invite groups such as al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) to attempt to enter the Tunisian scene more forcefully. Tunisia's fervently secular society and political system has effectively excluded moderate and extremist Islamist alike. Militant groups are likely to find little resonance for their agendas; however, the struggling insurgent group could seek to capitalise on the political turmoil to establish itself there and begin hunting for potential supporters. AQIM's leader Abdelmalek Droukdel was quick to issue a statement of support for Tunisia on 9 January, a possible sign of the movement's hopes for future involvement.

Risk Category	Previous Risk	New Risk
Political	2.25	3.25
Security	2.25	3.00
Operational	2.25	3.00
Economic	2.25	3.00

On the economic front, Tunisia's tourism industry has been disrupted, with major cancellations from European travellers in light of the ongoing political unrest and precarious security. The changing political environment has brought uncertainty to the economic outlook, which has contributed to the risk downgrade as well. Furthermore, days of general strikes and the precarious security situation have made the availability of food scarce. General strikes may be used more forcefully as a political tool to pressure the government in the future. As a result of this and the general unrest, the operational environment has also taken a turn. On the energy front, little actual disruption has so far been reported from the Tunisian upstream sector. Most of Tunisia's oil and gas production is located in the more remote southern and south-western desert areas, as well as offshore, mainly in the Gulf of Ghabes; hence it is relatively out of reach for mobs and protestors, as well as for any eventual political militia forming over the coming days. With Tunisia's military still seeming rather held together, threats to the strategic oil and gas assets are not seen as escalating particularly high. Prolonged unrest will, however, start to damage operations relatively soon as the smaller scale of Tunisia's oil and gas industry. IHS Global Insight will be monitoring the developments in Tunisia closely, assessing the impact of any new government on the country's risk profile.

Outlook and Implications

Awaiting the announcement of the new national unity government, Tunisia remains in limbo, having shocked and stunned the observing world. The RCD has effectively dominated Tunisia in one shape or form since the country's independence in 1956; Ben Ali was only the country's second president. It is difficult to overstate the importance of the events of the past several weeks. The country's institutions will benefit from decades of maturity and stability. However, they will suffer from the dominance of entrenched interests, making real change a highly challenging prospect. Meanwhile, Tunisia's image as one of the most reliable bulwarks of stability has been determinedly crushed, and the road ahead remains uncertain. Even if a semblance of stability is restored in the near term, the country will be grappling with big questions for some time to come.