Global Insight Perspective

Significance

The plots were at a relatively advanced stage and targets included London infrastructure, a shopping centre and a nightclub, with huge loss of life and disruption intended.

Implications

It is a credit to the security services that they dismantled this group and helped secure convictions, but there is controversy over the failure to intercept the leader of the 7 July 2005 London attacks. The investigation and trial have deepened understanding of the radicalisation process, as well as the links that exist between would-be terrorists both within the United Kingdom and in Pakistan.

Outlook

Although the case will help future investigations, it has also shown up limitations within the intelligence service and the ease with which individuals can slip through the net. It is clear that the United Kingdom continues to face a substantial terrorist threat.

Convictions Secured

Five men face imprisonment for between 17 and 20 years following their conviction yesterday of planning large-scale terrorist attacks in the U.K. capital, London. The trial and outline of the suspicions had been publicised, but there had been a media blackout on the details of the case. Only now have these been made available, creating controversy.

There are strong similarities between the profiles of those convicted yesterday and those who were responsible for killing 52 people on board London Underground trains and a bus on 7 July 2005. Four of the five are Britons of Pakistani origin, and several of them attended training camps in the latter country. Meetings are believed to have taken place with al-Qaida operatives linked to Osama Bin Laden, although it does not seem that the attacks were ordered or co-ordinated centrally. The ringleader was Omar Khyam, a 25-year-old who grew up in West Sussex, outside London. He became radicalised in secondary school and attended camps in Pakistan. Waheed Mahmood (35), Jawad Akbar (23), and Salahuddin Amin (32) had very similar backgrounds, all living in areas on London's periphery. The fifth man convicted, Anthony Garcia (24), is of Algerian rather than Pakistani descent. The five were radicalised in the United Kingdom, attending London mosques where some now-notorious preachers were based. Their initial activities focused on fundraising for jihad (“holy war”) in Kashmir, Afghanistan and elsewhere, but they later turned their attention to plotting attacks in the United Kingdom. The 11 September 2001 attacks in the United States and the Iraq war both apparently served to strengthen their resolve. Two others were acquitted—Khyam's younger brother, and Nabeel Hussain (whose credit card was used to buy the fertiliser). Another man with links to the group, Kazi Rahman, was recently jailed for nine years for trying to procure weapons. The prosecution's star witness was a U.S. Pakistani, Mohammed Junaid Babar, who had met some of the defendants in a Pakistani training camp.

The plots themselves involved the use of 1,300 pounds of fertiliser to make large-scale bombs. This was discovered in a storage facility, where the security services set up cameras to record those coming and going. A list of potential targets was drawn up, including the huge Bluewater shopping centre, the Ministry of Sound nightclub, public utilities, and an airliner. The attacks were to take place in 2003/04, although the men were intercepted before they had the opportunity to construct the actual bombs.

The Links to 7 July 2005

While the intelligence services have been commended for Operation Crevice (as it is known), they have faced strong criticism for failing to mount fuller surveillance of those responsible for the London attacks in 2005. Far from being "home-grown" and acting independently, there were known links between the ringleaders of the two groups. The intelligence services recorded various meetings between Khyam and the ringleader of the 7 July attacks, Mohammad Sidique Khan, and noted their suspicions. Khan also attended the same training camp in Pakistan as did Khyam. The authorities also noted another eventual 7 July bomber, Shehzad Tanweer, who was present at some of Khan's meetings with Khyam. However, the 7 July attackers were never deemed a high enough threat to warrant full surveillance. On some occasions Khan was present, but not identified. Relatives of the victims have accused the intelligence services of concealing their prior knowledge of the attackers in the aftermath of the attacks, and there are calls for a full public inquiry. The government has so far resisted this, arguing that there is not much to gain and that there would be heavy disruption for those involved in ongoing investigations.

Outlook and Implications

The case provides chilling evidence of the kind of threat the United Kingdom continues to face. There are hundreds of suspects still under surveillance and many known plots. Some newspapers report today that there are others linked directly to the Crevice plotters known to be still at large. Although the U.K. intelligence services have a well-deserved reputation, it is clear they have been badly stretched by the sheer number of surveillance operations required. They are having to make calls all the time about which suspects should be regarded as a high threat, and which should be ignored. This kind of calculation led to the 2005 bombers slipping below the radar. The media and opposition politicians have launched fierce criticism, but it seems that this kind of situation could always arise. What is causing most anger is the fact that the authorities were quick to claim that the 2005 plotters acted independently when they apparently knew otherwise.

The government may well need to boost intelligence resources further, but it also needs to work hard on preventing radicalisation in the first place. Many of the firebrand preachers who helped inspire the plotters are already behind bars, but mosques are under pressure to be more proactive in ensuring that moderate voices prevail. There are also difficult wider societal questions, such as the extent of integration between different groups. Some moreover blame the government's foreign policy for helping to radicalise individuals. The societal factors will take much longer to address, but there have been some promising initiatives already, and awareness of the threats is much improved.

www.globalinsight.com

www.wmrc.com