Significance: Twenty-nine parties with over 3,000 candidates are running for 120 parliamentary mandates on 10 October, following the government's decision to raise security threat levels to "critical".

Implications: This historic vote will create the first parliamentary democracy in former Soviet Central Asia and is hoped to yield a solution to the narrow deep political and ethnic divisions in the country.

Outlook: There is no leading party predicted to gain an absolute majority in the upcoming election—instead, the parliament is expected to be patchwork of different political and interest groups led by charismatic party heads. Given the propensity to violent protests in recent years, Kyrgyzstan may see a surge of public disorder, particularly in the southern Osh and Djalal-Abad regions.

Historic Vote

Despite domestic and international concerns that the extra-term parliamentary election may spark political and ethnic violence in Kyrgyzstan, its revolutionary government led by interim president Roza Otunbayeva has decided to go ahead with the poll on 10 October. Over 3,000 candidates from 29 different political parties have registered to run for 120 parliamentary seats. The vote is historic as it will create the first parliamentary democracy in the region, which is dominated by authoritarian regimes. The parliamentary election is the next logical step following the constitutional referendum on 27 June 2010. It was held with one paramount objective in mind—to dismantle the highly centralised presidential structures and lay the basis for a new parliamentary democracy to prevent regular revolutions. Since 2005, Kyrgyzstan has seen two presidents ousted by popular uprisings—Askar Akayev in 2005 and Kurmanbek Bakiyev in April 2010. The constitutional amendments endorsed by 90% of the voters also increased the number of seats in theJogorku Kenesh, the unicameral parliament, from 90 to 120 seats to broaden the representation. Furthermore, to prevent any reversal back to authoritarianism, no single party will be allowed to hold more than 65 seats in the new parliament, or the qualitative majority of two-thirds critical for constitutional changes.

The new legislature is expected to be the exact opposite of the rubber-stamping parliament under Bakiyev that was dominated by the pro-presidential Ak-Zhol party and was stripped of any real power, including the right to vote on key ministerial appointments. Through the new constitution, the new parliament now has the right to form a government, and appoint the country's prime minister, although the president will still hold decision-making powers, especially in foreign policy and matters of strategic importance.

Marred Celebration of Democracy

The election, which could otherwise be a celebration of democratic changes, has been marred with the dark side of the April revolution, the violent ethnic clashes during 10-15 June 2010 which according to different sources left between 400 and 2,000 mainly ethnic Uzbeks dead. The clashes not only revealed deep-seated hatred and mistrust between ethnic Kyrgyz and Uzbeks, particularly in the southern Osh and Djalal-Abad regions, but also the inability of the revolutionary government to stop the violence. Most worryingly, Otunbayeva and her team failed to deal with the issue properly after the clashes died down. Since then, she has tried to play down the level of ethnic intolerance and conveniently blamed the ousted regime for instigating ethnic hatred. Despite repeated promises to restore justice she has been unable and somewhat unwilling to take any concrete steps but instead has allowed the nationalistic Kyrgyz rhetoric to rise ahead of the parliamentary vote. Most notably, she has failed thus far to ensure that perpetrators from both ethnic communities faced justice, as only a number of Uzbek leaders, mostly intellectuals, have been imprisoned. Furthermore, the revolutionary government has succumbed to the nationalistic pressures from the mainly Kyrgyz population and delayed the deployment in the zone of conflict of a 50-100-member police monitoring force made up of representatives of 56 members of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). The Kyrgyz president, despite an initial decision to accept the OSCE mission, changed her mind by deferring the deployment until after the election and insisting on the right to unilaterally terminate the mission. In some ways, Otunbayeva has decided to leave the difficult decisions to the new parliament, including resolving ethnic problems. This makes the 10 October election even more important as succeeding the revolutionary government, the parliament will bring together representatives of different ethnic groups and will be a forum to settle all grievances.

Key Contenders

Kyrgyzstan has the most vibrant democracy in a region dominated by authoritarian regimes. This double-landlocked country with a population of 5.4 million also stands out for hosting both Russian and U.S. military bases in Kant and Manas respectively. The fact that two previous presidents have been ousted through revolutions which has led to near-complete re-appropriation of wealth owned by previous ruling clans and oligarchs close to the corrupt presidents indicates that beside the interests of foreign powers there are also different domestic groups with vested interests in the current election. Like in other former Soviet republics Kyrgyz parties are formed around charismatic personalities rather than a particular ideology or political platform. Although there are 29 parties partaking in the race, only a handful stand out.

• Ar-Namys (Dignity) led by the former prime minister Felix Kulov has a good chance of winning a number of seats. It advocates strong–man policies, doubting that a parliamentary democracy can really serve to the best interests of Kyrgyzstan. Kulov seemed to be favoured by the Russian leadership as following his meeting in September with the Russian powerful PM Vladimir Putin the Ar-Namys signed a co-operation agreement with Russia's ruling United Russia Party. Kulov can also count on the support of some of the members of the security agencies and army, most of whom have warned Otunbayeva that her plans for a parliamentary democracy are dangerous and it will be nothing more than mob rule. Instead they advocate strong-man policies which will keep tight control on supporters of the old regime and prevent the country slipping into an ethnic conflict again.

• Ata-Meken is another strong candidate, headed by the former speaker of parliament and architect of Kyrgyzstan's new constitution, Omurbek Tekebayev. It is one of the oldest parties in Kyrgyzstan, founded during the national uprising in 1992 at the break-up of the Soviet Union. Ata-Meken has been the propagator for reforms and in the December 2007 election it came second after the pro- Bakiyev Ak-Zhol party, taking 9% of the total votes, although later on it was prevented from taking its seats. Tekebayev's supporters are mainly the urban population, particularly the youth who would like to see Western-style democracy and end of corruption in Kyrgyzstan. Predictably, Ata-Meken's ideas of parliamentary democracy do not sit well with the Russian leadership, which is keen to see a strong-man regime in the country. Perhaps this disapproval was behind the controversial report on Russia's NTV television channel, accusing Tekebayev of an extramarital affair that allegedly happened two years ago.

• The Social Democratic Party of Kyrgyzstan (SDPK) is currently led by former prime minister and presidential candidate Almazbek Atambayev, although until recently it was led by Otunbayeva. The SDPK has managed to galvanise public discontent and has been behind the 2005 and 2010 revolutions. It is a progressive reformist party enjoying strong backing among the northern Kyrgyz, particularly in the capital Bishkek. The SDPK is certainly well–placed to win a number of seats in the upcoming election.

• The Ata-Dzhurt (Fatherland) party has emerged as a nationalistic force led by former emergency situations minister Kamchybek Tashiyev. Ironically Otunbayeva was one of the party's co-founders back in 2004 when she fell out with then-president Akayev and crossed over to the opposition. Ata-Dzhurt subsequently became a pro-Bakiyev party and Otunbayeva left it in 2007 in opposition to the rising authoritarian policies by Bakiyev and joined the SDPK. In the wake of the ethnic clashes that had all the traits of attempted ethnic cleansing of Uzbeks, Ata-Dzhurt has been successful in capitalising on ethnic mistrust. In a controversial recent statement, Tashiyev announced that Russian, Uzbek, Turkish and other minorities cannot expect to have the same rights as Kyrgyz. His party headquarters were attacked on 6 October by relatives of those killed by security services during the anti-Bakiyev April uprising, after the news that the party has allegedly been advocating Bakiyev's return.

Outlook and Implications

Kyrgyzstan is leading the democratic movement in the region along a treacherous path. If the experiment of building a parliamentary democracy works then it will make Kyrgyzstan an oasis of democracy in largely undemocratic Central Asia. It may become an enviable example of success that many in neighbouring republics may try to replicate. However, there are a number of major obstacles to surmount. Firstly, the political leadership has to guarantee that this is democracy for all citizens of the country, and not only ethnic Kyrgyz. Secondly, a concerted effort on behalf of the major party leaders is needed to bring any disagreement to the negotiation table and avoid street violence. Thirdly, parties supporting the old regime may instigate violence should they feel sidelined. To prevent this the president has to be a more effective mediator between the parties and rather leave it to the parliament to come up with solutions. Lastly, the new government has to recognise that ethnic violence may return if the discrimination and persecution against ethnic Uzbeks is not addressed and the new government continues denying that there are deep-seated problems.

The West and Russia will be closely watching the election, but neither is likely to attempt to play an active role. Instead both will be interested in seeing permanent stability return to Kyrgyzstan as this will help them to avoid the unwanted task of intervening in case ethnic violence returns. The question is: will a parliamentary democracy deliver this stability?