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19/08/2009 | Election 2009: Much at Stake as Polling Set to Begin in Afghanistan

Global Insight Staff

Afghans are set to head to the polls for the country's second-ever presidential and provincial council elections tomorrow, amidst a deteriorating security situation that has sparked fears over the perceived legitimacy of the results.

 

IHS Global Insight Perspective

 

Significance: Afghanistan’s second-ever presidential and provincial council elections are set to take place in an environment of increasing insecurity tomorrow.

Implications: Pre-poll violence and flawed electoral processes have sparked justified fears that the legitimacy of the elections may be contested after polling closes.

Outlook: Overall the elections present Afghanistan both with the opportunity to deepen democratic processes as well as the dangers of slipping back into violence. Should the legitimacy of the elections be contested on charges of fraud, most likely in a small-margin victory or after run-off elections, this could well lead to massive demonstrations and political violence, a scenario that unfortunately appears increasingly likely at the present stage. Another plausible scenario is Karzai winning by a simple majority vote, and politics in Afghanistan continuing by and large as before. It should be noted, however, that the complex political environment of Afghanistan could well hold surprises, as there are a multitude of uncertainties (distracting factors) that could steer Afghanistan into a wildly different direction.

Afghanistan is set to conduct its second-ever presidential and provincial elections tomorrow (20 August), completing its first full election cycle. While this in itself is good news, the stage for the elections is everything but favourable, with the general public seriously disenchanted by central state institutions and their hesitance or failure to achieve significant progress in the Afghan political landscape.

Perhaps most importantly, the government as well as international forces failed to contain the Taliban insurgency that has made a resounding comeback since 2006, and violence levels in June and July 2009 were the highest ever recorded since 2001. There has been a particular hike in violence just days prior to the elections, including attacks on the presidential palace, on NATO headquarters, and various other highly strategic locations throughout the country. Indeed, Afghanistan's deteriorating security situation constitutes the single most important threat to the 2009 elections, and the country's premier electoral institution, the Independent Election Commission (IEC) has said that this is likely to restrict or prevent more than 10 per cent of the population from participating. The Taliban have repeatedly vowed to boycott and disrupt the electoral process. As a result, election results are likely to be skewed, fuelling concerns over the legitimacy of results. Concurrently, insecurity also potentially limits the ability of observers to prevent or detect fraud, an issue that will play a crucial role in Afghanistan's post-election landscape as it is estimated that up to three million voting cards among the 17.5 million registered are fraudulent. All these issues put at risk the (perceived) legitimacy of the election results.

Apart from insecurity, the issues at stake are numerous, and include severely underdeveloped institutions, limited reach and acceptability of the central government, rampant corruption, unemployment, and a flourishing drug trade (Afghanistan produces more than 90 per cent of the world's illicit opium).

While the administration under Hamid Karzai has been unable and/or unwilling to address any of the above issues, and while Karzai's popularity figures have shown a marked decline over the past years, he is widely expected to retain his office. This view pertains to Karzai's keen ability to negotiate strategic alliances with possible contenders, as well as to a rather disparate field of rival candidates. With a few exceptions, most of the 40 presidential candidates that will stand against Karzai have been criticised for not being sufficiently qualified to become the country's president and/or have a history of war crimes. Karzai's fiercest contender is former foreign minister Abdullah Abdullah, although former planning minister Ramazan Bashardost and former finance minister Ashraf Ghani could also be in a position to reap large shares of votes from Karzai. This is particularly true if, as expected, many Pashtun (and pro-Karzai) voters in the south of the country are unable to vote due to the precarious security situation there, with Tajiks in the safer north (many of whom are pro-Abdullah) likely to be disproportionately well represented.

Importance of (Perceived) Legitimacy of Results

Of immediate importance is an electoral process that produces results accepted by the majority of Afghans. However, the deteriorating security situation, weak electoral institutions and processes, incumbent advantages as well as a generally violent political culture have bred fears over results being perceived as illegitimate.

Firstly, rampant insecurity especially in the south and east of the country is likely to result in more than ten per cent of polling stations remaining closed on election day, with those affected mainly being Pashtuns. With the Taliban threatening to cut off fingers or even slit throats of those who have voted, the number of people being barred from voting could be even higher, with important implications for the representativeness of election results.

Secondly, flaws in the current system of Afghanistan's electoral institutions, that range from a problematic legal framework upon which the existence and conduct of these institutions is built, to the registration process of candidates and allegations of being politically biased, are likely to skew results. Overall, it is estimated that up to three million voting cards out of a total of 17.5 million cards are fraudulent.

Thirdly, in the likely event that Karzai wins the elections, however small the margin, his contenders are likely to point out his incumbent advantages. Under current constitutional provisions Afghanistan's president enjoys significant advantages in contesting elections, which many have argued go well beyond the usual advantages of incumbency. This includes the power to appoint IEC officials, provincial governors, gain disproportionate media coverage and access to state resources.

Finally, the issue of legitimacy is expected to become a major issue not least due to the anticipated small margin victory of any candidate, possibly through run-off elections. This poses the inherent danger that rival candidates and their supporters would take to the streets, which in light of Afghanistan's generally violent political culture, could well lead to violence.

Outlook and Implications – Main Scenarios

Scenario I: Small-Margin Victory or Run-Off Elections Spark Violence

In this scenario the successful candidate wins by a small margin, either during the first round or through run-off elections. The most likely winner is Karzai, although Abdullah, Bashardost and/or Ghani could succeed if they formed an alliance, particularly should it come to run-off elections. In this scenario the elections produce results that lack, or are perceived to lack, legitimacy among wide parts of the population, and Tajik voter turnout rates are likely to have been higher than that of Pashtuns. Tensions would ensue, culminating in demonstrations and violence. A significant loss of trust in the entire democratic process would become evident. Political violence will add significantly to the general climate of instability in this scenario, and would also affect the country's cities. In such a situation the Taliban would be able to further gain strength, as efforts to counter their movement become increasingly diluted. This scenario could also see Karzai impose a state of emergency. The international community would face severe additional hardships in carrying out their mandate.

Scenario II: Status Quo

The winner of the elections in this scenario is Karzai, who wins a simple majority vote in the first round. Afghanistan's political economy, based on political rent-seeking and politics along sectarian and opportunistic lines, would remain unchanged in the short-to-medium term. Violent unrest over allegedly rigged election results or lack of legitimacy may occur, but only sporadically and would soon dissipate. The government's writ however would remain limited to Kabul and a few other areas, with regional commanders that have been co-opted by the government retaining control over their respective areas. Although less so than in Scenario I, this scenario also sees a significant decrease in public trust in the democratic process, as many feel wary of being governed by a regime that is perceived as corrupt and inefficient. Karzai might make attempts to convince the Taliban to participate in a Loya Jirga (grand council), but this would most likely fail to garner their support. However, the fact that the international community would have a relatively sound basis to re-commit to the support of the Afghan government (although efforts are exercised to work more through ministers and provincial councils rather than Karzai himself) means that anti-insurgency measures would be more co-ordinated and successful than in the past.

Distracting Factors

There are a number of additional uncertainties that could significantly alter the direction in which Afghanistan is heading. These factors include the creation of a prime ministerial position that would take away many of the powers of the president, thus increasing accountability. This is most likely to happen if Karzai feels compelled to co-opt his challengers. There are also a number of more uncontrollable uncertainties—"wildcards"—that include assassinations, the Taliban deciding to engage in talks, the coalition forces retreating fully or partially, or major boosts in troop numbers, changes of mind on important issues by key actors, or the emergence of new leaders.

Global Insight (Reino Unido)

 


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Center for the Study of the Presidency
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