Inteligencia y Seguridad Frente Externo En Profundidad Economia y Finanzas Transparencia
  En Parrilla Medio Ambiente Sociedad High Tech Contacto
Frente Externo  
 
02/10/2009 | Iran Offers Concessions at Landmark International Meeting

Global Insight Staff

After a week of heightened tensions and dampened expectations, yesterday Iran agreed in principle with the so-called P5+1 group of nations to a number of promising concessions; this has defused an escalating row over its nuclear programme at a time when domestic shortages risk wrecking havoc with its economy.

 

IHS Global Insight Perspective

 

Significance: Optimism over the outcome of yesterday’s landmark meeting in Geneva was most certainly cautious; nevertheless, it appears that the talks were held in a professional and cordial atmosphere, allowing for what has been described as ''constructive'' steps in forwarding a diplomatic resolution to Iran’s nuclear saga. Despite warnings otherwise, Iran did actually discuss its nuclear programme without compromising its ''inalienable rights''.

Implications: Iran agreed to three steps which could become important concessions: firstly it agreed in principle to sending its stockpile of low-enriched uranium to a second and third country for further enrichment; secondly, to almost immediate access for UN inspectors to its newly revealed nuclear fuel plant; and finally, to further talks with the P5+1 states within the month. This measure could potentially defuse—or at least delay—the threat of further sanctions, which would risk hitting Iran as it faces its own domestic gas and power shortage later this year.

Outlook: These principles must now be turned into constructive action by the United States and its allies in order to continue a resolution of the nuclear spat along the diplomatic route.

Confidence Building?

Iran met yesterday with the group of six powers—the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Russia, China, and Germany—in landmark talks overseen by European Union (EU) foreign policy chief Javier Solana in Geneva, Switzerland; this meeting resulted in more than most observers had predicted only days before. Coming on the back of last week’s bombshell revelation that Iran was constructing a secret nuclear fuel plant, Iran’s limited concessions—and the P5+1’s apparent cautiously positive response to these—has reduced the fear of an immediate escalation over Iran’s much-suspected nuclear programme. The meeting brought together representatives from the six powers along with Iran’s top nuclear negotiator, Saeed Jalili, who crucially also held a 45-minute bilateral meeting with U.S. representative William Burns, the first such bilateral meeting between the two sides in three decades. Reading from statements after the meeting it appears that the talks were generally perceived as productive and promising; a ''constructive start'' as U.S. president Barack Obama said to further talks and to an eventual diplomatic resolution to the nuclear saga. Given that last week’s revelation that Iran was building a secret nuclear plant in a mountain area within a base controlled by the regime’s Revolutionary Guards near the religious centre of Qom seriously dented already-frail trust between Iran and Western powers. Yesterday’s meeting was a small step towards building some degree of confidence.

Iran’s ''Concessions''

Although Iran had vociferously denied that it would discuss the nuclear programme at the talks yesterday, the nuclear issue was of course the focus. In principle Iran agreed to three significant issues. The first, and perhaps the most controversial, is that Iran agreed to send its stockpile of low-enriched uranium abroad, to Russia and France, for further enrichment. Iran is believed to have produced enough low-enriched uranium, at 3—5%, to build a nuclear bomb if enriched to highly enriched uranium (weapons grade). In sending its stockpile of low-enriched uranium to a second and third country for enrichment (up to 20%) Iran would be able to feed its small research reactor in Tehran which requires uranium enriched to 19.75%, still far below the degree of highly enriched uranium needed for a nuclear bomb, around 93%. In theory this agreement would significantly reduce Iran’s ability to rapidly build a nuclear bomb and allay international fears that its existing stockpile of low-enriched uranium would be used to build a bomb. Nevertheless, this agreement builds on great degree of trust which Iran has actually declared all its uranium stock, and of course that it does not have yet more undisclosed nuclear facilities. Furthermore, given that the imported uranium would be designated to the Tehran research plant, the proposal would not solve Iran’s need for production of uranium on an industrial scale, nor is it clear whether all of Iran’s stockpile of uranium, once highly enriched, would be needed for the research plant. Not to mention that Iran would continue the enrichment of uranium at home. Furthermore, there is additional scepticism to how far this agreement will be adhered to in practice; however, given that Iran’s president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, earlier this week stated Iran’s preparedness to sending the country’s home-produced uranium for further enrichment abroad is a sign suggesting otherwise.

Secondly Iran agreed to open up its nuclear fuel plant in Qom to inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) within two weeks, much sooner than many had expected. Throughout the past week Iran’s full cooperation with the IAEA with regards the Qom plant was presented as the single most important immediate demand on Iran. In agreeing to open its doors to nuclear inspectors Iran has certainly diffused further pressures and perhaps stricter sanctions in the immediate term. There are still questions regarding whether Iran will indeed allow IAEA inspectors access to the documents, blueprints, and to scientists at the site as the United States had so strongly demanded over the past week. Nevertheless, in a sign that time is of the essence, it was announced today that IAEA chief Mohammed El-Baradei will travel to Iran in the next few days to meet with Iran’s nuclear chief, Ali Akbar Salehi, to discuss the inspection of the Qom plant.

Finally, Iran also agreed to meet with the P5+1 group within the end of the month, a further sign that the talks yesterday could lead to some progress.

Domestic Pressures

Apart from facing the remaining waves of unrest from oppositionists following the contested June presidential election and the deep rift it exposed within the Iranian revolutionary elite, the government is increasingly having to prepare for a worsening energy situation during the coming peak electricity and heating demand winter season (roughly from December to March). As IHS Global Insight has written over the past years, stalling foreign investment, a lack of Iranian funds for capital expenditure, excessive red tape and difficulties in importing advanced oil and gas technologies due to the increasing international isolation, have all contributed to creating an increasing energy crisis within the country. Over the past years this has mostly been evident during the peak demand winter season, but it has also been evident in constant Iranian failures to meet its oil production capacity boosting targets and to develop any significant and sustainable gas export capacity.

Unusual admissions of the Iranian energy sector's weakness came from the Islamic Republic's new oil minister, Masoud Mir-Kazemi, himself earlier this week, in what looked like an effort to avoid for the shortcomings of previous policies at a later point. In a frank warning, Mir-Kazemi said Iran would face a shortfall of 200 mmcm/d of gas during the coming winter season, despite Iran having secured imports of significantly higher volumes of gas from Turkmenistan from the end of the year. Iran has normally been exporting gas volumes to Turkey similar to those imported from Turkmenistan, although export outages during times of domestic shortages have been frequent in the past. This week's admission indeed puts the reliability of Iran's very limited pipeline exports in doubt over the coming months.

For having the world's second-largest gas reserves, Iran is indeed in a very peculiar predicament, showing to what extent its policies have failed to resolve its development needs and how hurtful—albeit not instantly recognizable—the international isolation has been. Detailing the Iranian funding shortfall, Mir-Kazemi told media "there are around US$19 billion worth of incomplete projects in the gas industry for which there are only US$3 billion of budget allocated", just in its gas sector. Although Western oil and gas companies have been openly reluctant to invest in Iran due to the sanctions situation, closer scrutiny of the multitude of deals signed with Russian and particularly Chinese companies, show that those too hasty to secure places at future Iranian projects through the signing of memorandums and letters of intent later stall on their investment commitments in fear of breaking sanctions damaging their businesses elsewhere in the world.

Outlook and Implications

With domestic energy consumption rising about 10% per year, Iran's wasteful per capita consumption patterns are fuelled by the generous subsidy regimes which are many throughout the region. With the population having come to view cheap electricity, heating, and fuel as a right, attempting to constrain the subsidies has proved to be a very explosive political issue. With no immediate solution in view for Iran to scrap sanctions and restore investor confidence, this issue will in itself be a challenge to address, without Iran also having to deal with further sanctions targeting its refined products imports. These pressing challenges may certainly have factored into Iran’s more conciliatory approach yesterday for all its belligerent talk over the past week reflecting perhaps the potentially disastrous domestic political effects which fuel and electricity shortages would have on the country. As for Iran’s future engagement with the group of six states is concerned, it is important to stress that cautious optimism, if even that, is the phrase of the day as many uncertainties remain and the road ahead is by no means clear.

Global Insight (Reino Unido)

 


Otras Notas Relacionadas... ( Records 1 to 10 of 999 )
fecha titulo
19/01/2014 U.S.-Iran: Two Countries in the Iron Grip of Conservatives
16/01/2014 Iran is losing the battle of modern culture
21/12/2013 Iran’s hard-liners resist nuclear deal
08/12/2013 Time to Let Iran Prove Itself
26/11/2013 Obama se queda solo en la defensa del acuerdo con Irán
25/11/2013 Los puntos principales del acuerdo entre Irán y el Grupo 5+1
25/11/2013 Curbing Iran's nuclear programme - Modest, but still historic
09/11/2013 Cambio esperanzador
09/11/2013 Netanyahu denuncia que Irán va a lograr 'el acuerdo del siglo'
19/10/2013 China and Iran: Destined to Clash?


Otras Notas del Autor
fecha
Título
03/04/2011|
26/03/2011|
20/03/2011|
26/02/2011|
18/02/2011|
18/02/2011|
15/02/2011|
12/02/2011|
10/02/2011|
10/02/2011|
07/02/2011|
03/02/2011|
01/02/2011|
29/01/2011|
26/01/2011|
26/01/2011|
26/01/2011|
25/01/2011|
22/01/2011|
20/01/2011|
20/01/2011|
18/01/2011|
18/01/2011|
17/01/2011|
17/01/2011|
15/01/2011|
14/01/2011|
12/01/2011|
12/01/2011|
10/01/2011|
06/01/2011|
06/01/2011|
01/01/2011|
31/12/2010|
31/12/2010|
25/12/2010|
25/12/2010|
25/12/2010|
18/12/2010|
14/12/2010|
10/12/2010|
26/11/2010|
26/11/2010|
20/11/2010|
17/11/2010|
17/11/2010|
17/11/2010|
15/11/2010|
13/11/2010|
13/11/2010|
12/11/2010|
12/11/2010|
05/11/2010|
04/11/2010|
04/11/2010|
31/10/2010|
09/10/2010|
02/10/2010|
02/10/2010|
17/09/2010|
10/09/2010|
10/09/2010|
10/07/2010|
10/07/2010|
08/04/2010|
05/04/2010|
18/03/2010|
17/03/2010|
16/03/2010|
09/03/2010|
09/03/2010|
05/03/2010|
05/03/2010|
04/03/2010|
03/03/2010|
01/03/2010|
26/02/2010|
26/02/2010|
24/02/2010|
23/02/2010|
22/02/2010|
20/02/2010|
20/02/2010|
17/02/2010|
17/02/2010|
16/02/2010|
15/02/2010|
12/02/2010|
11/02/2010|
10/02/2010|
09/02/2010|
08/02/2010|
05/02/2010|
04/02/2010|
04/02/2010|
04/02/2010|
02/02/2010|
01/02/2010|
31/01/2010|
31/01/2010|
22/01/2010|
21/01/2010|
20/01/2010|
19/01/2010|
19/01/2010|
15/01/2010|
14/01/2010|
13/01/2010|
12/01/2010|
11/01/2010|
08/01/2010|
07/01/2010|
07/01/2010|
05/01/2010|
04/01/2010|
31/12/2009|
31/12/2009|
30/12/2009|
24/12/2009|
23/12/2009|
22/12/2009|
21/12/2009|
18/12/2009|
17/12/2009|
16/12/2009|
15/12/2009|
15/12/2009|
14/12/2009|
14/12/2009|
13/12/2009|
13/12/2009|
11/12/2009|
11/12/2009|
10/12/2009|
10/12/2009|
08/12/2009|
08/12/2009|
08/12/2009|
08/12/2009|
04/12/2009|
04/12/2009|
04/12/2009|
04/12/2009|
03/12/2009|
03/12/2009|
01/12/2009|
01/12/2009|
01/12/2009|
01/12/2009|
27/11/2009|
27/11/2009|
26/11/2009|
26/11/2009|
25/11/2009|
25/11/2009|
24/11/2009|
24/11/2009|
23/11/2009|
23/11/2009|
22/11/2009|
22/11/2009|
16/11/2009|
16/11/2009|
13/11/2009|
13/11/2009|
11/11/2009|
11/11/2009|
11/11/2009|
11/11/2009|
10/11/2009|
10/11/2009|
07/11/2009|
06/11/2009|
04/11/2009|
04/11/2009|
02/11/2009|
31/10/2009|
30/10/2009|
29/10/2009|
28/10/2009|
27/10/2009|
21/10/2009|
21/10/2009|
19/10/2009|
15/10/2009|
14/10/2009|
13/10/2009|
12/10/2009|
09/10/2009|
09/10/2009|
07/10/2009|
06/10/2009|
05/10/2009|
01/10/2009|
01/10/2009|
01/10/2009|
30/09/2009|
30/09/2009|
21/09/2009|
19/09/2009|
17/09/2009|
16/09/2009|
15/09/2009|
14/09/2009|
12/09/2009|
12/09/2009|
12/09/2009|
10/09/2009|
09/09/2009|
08/09/2009|
07/09/2009|
05/09/2009|
04/09/2009|
03/09/2009|
02/09/2009|
01/09/2009|
31/08/2009|
29/08/2009|
27/08/2009|
27/08/2009|
26/08/2009|
24/08/2009|
21/08/2009|
20/08/2009|
19/08/2009|
18/08/2009|
17/08/2009|
14/08/2009|
14/08/2009|
14/08/2009|
14/08/2009|
12/08/2009|
12/08/2009|
11/08/2009|
11/08/2009|
10/08/2009|
10/08/2009|
07/08/2009|
07/08/2009|
06/08/2009|
06/08/2009|
05/08/2009|
05/08/2009|
04/08/2009|
04/08/2009|
03/08/2009|
03/08/2009|
01/08/2009|
01/08/2009|
29/07/2009|
29/07/2009|
29/07/2009|
29/07/2009|
27/07/2009|
27/07/2009|
25/07/2009|
25/07/2009|
23/07/2009|
23/07/2009|
23/07/2009|
23/07/2009|
21/07/2009|
21/07/2009|
20/07/2009|
20/07/2009|
17/07/2009|
17/07/2009|
16/07/2009|
16/07/2009|
16/07/2009|
15/07/2009|
15/07/2009|
15/07/2009|
28/03/2009|
15/03/2009|
15/03/2009|
15/03/2009|
15/03/2009|
18/01/2009|
10/01/2009|
06/01/2009|
05/01/2009|
02/01/2009|
24/12/2008|
24/12/2008|
24/12/2008|
27/11/2008|
27/11/2008|
27/11/2008|
27/11/2008|
03/10/2008|
03/10/2008|
03/10/2008|
03/10/2008|
24/09/2008|
24/09/2008|
20/09/2008|
20/09/2008|
18/09/2008|
18/09/2008|
18/09/2008|
18/09/2008|
10/09/2008|
10/09/2008|
08/09/2008|
08/09/2008|
17/08/2008|
17/08/2008|
11/08/2008|
11/08/2008|
11/08/2008|
11/08/2008|
11/08/2008|
11/08/2008|
13/05/2008|
12/05/2008|
12/05/2008|
10/05/2008|
04/05/2008|
02/05/2008|
27/04/2008|
27/04/2008|
24/04/2008|
24/04/2008|
24/04/2008|
24/04/2008|
24/04/2008|
24/04/2008|
06/04/2008|
26/03/2008|
20/03/2008|
19/03/2008|
13/03/2008|
10/03/2008|
07/03/2008|
05/03/2008|
18/02/2008|
06/02/2008|
03/02/2008|
01/02/2008|
01/02/2008|
21/12/2007|
21/12/2007|
08/12/2007|
08/12/2007|
02/11/2007|
30/10/2007|
30/10/2007|
27/10/2007|
25/10/2007|
20/10/2007|
04/10/2007|
28/09/2007|
28/09/2007|
31/08/2007|
31/08/2007|
30/08/2007|
30/08/2007|
15/08/2007|
11/08/2007|
11/08/2007|
31/07/2007|
28/07/2007|
28/07/2007|
04/07/2007|
30/06/2007|
30/06/2007|
30/06/2007|
30/06/2007|
16/06/2007|
16/06/2007|
16/06/2007|
16/06/2007|
13/06/2007|
13/06/2007|
10/06/2007|
10/06/2007|
10/06/2007|
10/06/2007|
10/06/2007|
10/06/2007|
16/05/2007|
16/05/2007|
03/05/2007|
03/05/2007|
03/05/2007|
03/05/2007|
03/05/2007|
03/05/2007|
30/04/2007|
30/04/2007|
26/04/2007|
26/04/2007|
25/04/2007|
25/04/2007|
25/04/2007|
25/04/2007|
21/04/2007|
21/04/2007|
19/04/2007|
19/04/2007|
19/04/2007|
19/04/2007|
19/04/2007|
19/04/2007|
19/04/2007|
19/04/2007|
10/04/2007|
10/04/2007|
07/04/2007|
07/04/2007|
04/04/2007|
04/04/2007|
02/04/2007|
02/04/2007|
01/04/2007|
28/03/2007|
28/03/2007|
25/03/2007|
25/03/2007|
20/03/2007|
20/03/2007|
28/02/2007|
23/01/2007|
23/01/2007|
08/01/2007|
08/01/2007|
08/01/2007|
08/01/2007|
06/01/2007|
06/01/2007|
04/01/2007|
04/01/2007|
29/12/2006|
29/12/2006|
28/12/2006|
28/12/2006|
26/12/2006|
26/12/2006|
26/12/2006|
26/12/2006|
26/12/2006|
26/12/2006|
26/12/2006|
26/12/2006|
26/12/2006|
26/12/2006|
20/12/2006|
20/12/2006|
20/12/2006|
20/12/2006|
16/12/2006|
16/12/2006|
16/12/2006|
16/12/2006|
15/12/2006|
15/12/2006|
14/12/2006|
14/12/2006|
14/12/2006|
14/12/2006|
14/12/2006|
14/12/2006|
12/12/2006|
12/12/2006|
12/12/2006|
12/12/2006|
11/12/2006|
11/12/2006|
11/12/2006|
11/12/2006|
11/12/2006|
11/12/2006|
11/12/2006|
11/12/2006|
09/12/2006|
09/12/2006|
02/12/2006|
02/12/2006|
02/12/2006|
02/12/2006|
25/11/2006|
25/11/2006|
23/11/2006|
23/11/2006|
22/11/2006|
22/11/2006|
21/11/2006|
21/11/2006|
21/11/2006|
21/11/2006|
21/11/2006|
21/11/2006|
11/11/2006|
11/11/2006|
02/11/2006|
01/11/2006|
01/11/2006|
28/10/2006|
28/10/2006|
28/10/2006|
28/10/2006|
20/10/2006|
20/10/2006|
20/10/2006|
20/10/2006|
14/10/2006|
14/10/2006|
07/10/2006|
07/10/2006|
07/10/2006|
05/10/2006|
04/10/2006|
04/10/2006|
04/10/2006|
04/10/2006|
23/09/2006|
23/09/2006|
23/09/2006|
23/09/2006|
23/09/2006|
23/09/2006|
06/09/2006|
04/09/2006|
04/09/2006|
02/09/2006|
02/09/2006|
02/09/2006|
01/09/2006|
30/08/2006|
02/08/2006|
02/08/2006|
30/07/2006|
30/07/2006|
27/07/2006|
27/07/2006|
21/07/2006|
20/07/2006|
20/07/2006|
18/07/2006|
16/07/2006|
13/07/2006|
12/07/2006|
12/07/2006|
07/07/2006|
07/07/2006|
06/07/2006|
29/06/2006|
29/06/2006|
29/06/2006|
29/06/2006|
28/06/2006|
26/06/2006|
26/06/2006|
21/06/2006|
21/06/2006|
20/06/2006|
20/06/2006|
04/06/2006|
09/05/2006|
03/05/2006|
03/05/2006|
03/05/2006|
03/05/2006|
18/02/2006|
04/02/2006|
04/02/2006|
29/01/2006|
23/09/2005|

ver + notas
 
Center for the Study of the Presidency
Freedom House