Bomb blasts tore through two luxury hotels in Jakarta between 07.30 and 07.40 local time this morning. Near-simultaneous explosions hit the Ritz-Carlton and J.W. Marriott hotels in Jakarta's business district, killing at least nine people and wounding 42 others. Several foreigners are reported to be amongst the casualties. A New Zealander was reported killed, while the dozens of injured included Indonesian, American, Australian, South Korean, Dutch, Italian, British, Canadian, Norwegian, Japanese, and Indian nationals. An earlier account of a third bombing, a car bomb at a toll road, later proved to be a small explosion resulting from a faulty car battery. Security has been tightened across the capital, as well as at hotels in the tourist resort of Bali.

Details of the attacks are currently being investigated. It is not yet clear exactly where the explosions took place, though the nature of the widespread damage to the hotels suggests the bombs were inside the building, near the lobby restaurants where hotel guests were gathering for breakfast. It is also not known whether the bombs had been left in the hotel, or whether suicide bombers carried out the attacks. Preliminary speculation appears to be centring on the likelihood that suicide bombers were involved. A third, unexploded bomb is reported to have been found in a room at the Marriott Hotel. The room in question is being treated as a possible "control centre" for the attacks, as other explosive material was also uncovered from the room.

No group has yet claimed responsibility for the attacks, but all preliminary inquiries are focusing squarely on splinter factions of the regional terror network Jemaah Islamiyah (JI). The group has carried out close to 50 attacks in Indonesia since 1999, the largest of which include the 2000 church bombings, the 2002 Bali bombing, the 2004 Australian Embassy bombing, and the 2005 Bali bombings. JI was also responsible for the August 2003 attack on the J.W. Marriott Hotel in Jakarta, which was today once again the target of violence.

JI: Splintered but Still Dangerous

JI’s founders pledged loyalty (bayat) to Osama bin Laden in the 1990s, and the organisation's main goal remains to establish an Islamic government in the Indonesian capital, Jakarta, and ultimately a caliphate in South-East Asia. Initially, the organisation was divided into operational cells (Mantiqi) covering various areas of South-East Asia. Largely, members of the Mantiqi I cell favoured an al-Qaida (AQ)-style approach to jihad in Indonesia, while members of Mantiqi II favoured a longer-term approach grounded in social outreach and conversion. All major attacks perpetrated in Indonesia between 2002 and 2005 were planned and executed by members of Mantiqi I. Mantiqi I has since been dismantled by counter-terrorist operations, and the Mantiqi structure has been abandoned. The remaining core JI members hail from what used to be Mantiqi II, favouring an Indonesia-centric, long-term social outreach approach to turning Indonesia into an Islamic state. This JI core disavows AQ-style attacks but operates a social network—including schools, businesses, and publishing houses—that spreads radical doctrine.

Although the JI core continues to spread radical doctrine, it does not pose a significant threat in terms of potential for attack. This threat stems from renegade or splinter factions of JI. In 2003, Noordin Mohammed Top, who was involved in several high-profile JI attacks, split from JI's core and reportedly founded Tanzim Qaedat al-Jihad (Organisation for the Base of Jihad). This organisation was the last Indonesian group to allegedly receive funds from al-Qaida in late 2003. A raid in the spring of 2006 at a location where Noordin was reportedly hiding out uncovered several backpack bombs such as those used in Bali in 2005, and led to the deaths of two of his close supporters. Noordin remains at large, reportedly leading a cell called al-Qaida for the Malay Archipelago, and was apparently connected to a major foiled plot in Indonesia exactly one year ago.

JI suffered massively in the counter-terrorism crackdown in the years since 2005. The leadership of the group was decimated, notably in mid-2007 when Indonesian security forces captured two JI core leaders, Abu Dujana and Zarkasih. JI had been unable to mount any attacks in the years between 2005 and 2009, raising hopes that the period of mass terror bombings was behind the country. However, several recent events point to the involvement of a splinter JI group in today's attacks in Jakarta. A report published yesterday by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) outlines how the release of dozens of JI militants from prison, combined with the recruitment of young hardliners, has served to re-energise JI. As mentioned previously, JI maintains a legal social network which continues to radicalise young people. Moreover, over 100 JI members have been recently released from jail, after finishing their sentences or benefiting from an amnesty. Though they tend not to be accepted by core JI, they can find like-minded jihadis in splinter cells such as those led by Top. The ASPI report cites an anecdote whereby members of these splinter factions refer to senior core JI members as "NATO—No Action, Talk Only".

In addition, several other high profile JI members remain at large, among them not only Top, but also JI's alleged military commander, Zulkarnaen, the electronics and bomb-making expert, Joko Pitono (alias "Dulmatin"), and the recruitment expert, Umar Patek, who are believed to be seeking shelter with the Abu Sayyaf Group in the Philippines. A recent upsurge in violence in the southern Philippines also indicates a strengthening of the informal networks that support South-East Asian terrorism.The fact that JI member Mas Selamat Kastari, who escaped from prison in Singapore in 2008, managed to stay on the run for over a year until his re-capture in Malaysia earlier this year, indicates that these networks remain intact and some are unknown to the authorities.

Finally, there were reports of a raid by Indonesian police earlier this week on a house used by an Islamic boarding school in Cilacap, Central Java. Bomb-making chemicals including sulphur and potassium, as well as cables and detonators, were uncovered. The owner of the building is reported to be Top’s father-in-law. Although it is too early to link the raid to today's attacks, the fact that a link between bomb-making materials and Top emerged so soon before the bombings is a cause for concern. JI factions had promised retribution for the execution of three operatives found guilty for their role in the 2002 Bali bombing. It appears that today they made good on that pledge.

Outlook and Implications

Major Challenge for Yudhoyono

The timing of the attacks is especially poignant, given that Indonesia was brimming with optimism less than ten days after President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono was re-elected in peaceful presidential polls.The country has enjoyed a period of strong political stability, peace and security, and relatively positive economic prospects despite the global downturn. Yudhoyono rushed to the site of today's attacks, condemning them as "inhuman".

Today’s attacks will certainly dent confidence in the security environment, which had been painfully rebuilt in the years since 2005. However, provided there are no major follow-up attacks, investor confidence should bounce back relatively soon. The political and economic fundamentals remain strong, and counter-terror capabilities are much more robust than when JI launched mass bombings in 2000. Investigations into the attacks will no doubt be thorough. As well as establishing the identity of the perpetrators of the violence, much attention will focus on how the bombers managed to get through the tight security measures at the hotels. Having been the target of terrorism before, the Marriott was extremely well-guarded and several checks were performed on anyone entering the hotel. Similar procedures were in place for the Ritz-Carlton. Speculation may centre on the possibility that the bombers had inside help.

The attacks in Jakarta were a message to Indonesia, the re-elected president, and the foreign business community, that JI remains alive and well. The scale of today's bombings does not quite compare to the 2002 mass-casualty attack, and with JI as splintered as it is, such attacks are unlikely to materialise. However, it is clear that the threat remains very real. Security forces need to keep gathering intelligence on the JI network in an attempt to capture Top and other renegade operatives. Further steps need to be taken towards proscription of JI to allow a clampdown on the radical social network of schools and businesses operated by the organisation. Strong co-operation is also needed with the Philippines, as Mindanao continues to provide a fertile area for radicalisation, training, and safe passage to JI members and members of affiliated organisations.

Undoubtedly, today's attacks are a major setback for Indonesian peace and security. However, as the recent elections demonstrate, the country has come a long way since 2000, and there remains hope that the bombings will prove to be an exception rather than the rule.

Global Insight (Reino Unido)