Today, 11 February, is one of the most significant days for the Islamic Republic. Each year marches are staged across the country to celebrate the removal of the Shah of Iran, Mohammed Reza, and the coming to power of the revolutionary state. The day presents a chance for the regime to signal its independence, strength, and defiance of the international community which has for three decades attempted to limit Iran’s regional and international power and intentions. The 31st anniversary of the revolution comes on the back of fresh tensions between Iran and the West following the country’s decision earlier this week to ramp up its nuclear fuel enrichment to higher degrees than previously produced.

Fearful of the possibility of mass protests being staged by anti-regime forces, the authorities have implemented stringent security measures in the capital (Tehran) and other major cities ahead of today’s marches. Aside from rounding up some 1,000 alleged opposition supporters over the past couple of month, according to the rights group International Campaign for Human Rights in Iran, the authorities have also issued harsh statements to intimidate would-be protesters. Last week Police Chief Esmail Ahamdi-Moghaddam was quoted as warning protesters from taking to the streets, saying also that a number of people had been arrested for allegedly plotting protests. Yesterday reports broke that Internet and mobile services had been restricted, amid news also that Google e-mail services had been shut down, possibly permanently. Despite the authorities’ best efforts in the past, opposition supporters have defied warnings, bans, and intimidation and have taken every ample opportunity to march on the streets. The latest wave of unrest was seen in December last year following the death of Grand Ayatollah Ali Montazeri and the shortly ensuing Ashura holidays which turned bloody with nearly a dozen people killed by security forces. The opposition’s obvious understanding of the risks—with thousands arrested, hundreds put on trial (and dozens convicted), plus several handed death sentences since June last year—suggests that many will again defiantly take to the streets today.

Who are the Real Revolutionaries?

By all accounts the Islamic Republic has had one of the most turbulent years in its 31-year history. Setting aside the devastating and draining eight-year war with neighbouring Iraq (1980-1988) which in fact cemented the revolution and its institutions in its early days, the post-election turmoil that hit the country after the presidential poll in summer 2009 has been one of the most significant domestic challenges to the regime to date. The opposition movement, which has grown out of the mass disapproval of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s apparently fraudulent re-election, has proved an resilient challenge to the regime. What began as opposition clearly directed towards the government and Ahmadinejad’s re-election has transformed into a wider rejection of the regime’s authority and legitimacy and its claim to be a representative and fair political system. Opposition supporters have consistently taken to the streets when the opportunity has presented itself, shouting slogans calling for the fall of the regime, clashing with security forces using live ammunition, setting buildings and vehicles alight, carrying the colour green—the election colour of presidential candidate Mir-Hossein Mousavi, who has become one of the more prominent public faces of this loosely connected movement. Together with reformist presidential candidate Mehdi Karroubi, Mousavi has emerged as a leader of sorts for the opposition. Both leaders have a long history of serving the Islamic Republic; Mousavi as a former prime minister and Karroubi as a long-serving speaker of parliament. Their rejection of some of the current system has not been tantamount to a public repudiation of the revolutionary regime itself, although both of them (along with former reformist president Mohammed Khatami), have effectively rejected some of the key tenets of the regime.

Cleverly, opposition supporters have used the Revolution’s own symbols to challenge the regime to illustrate that the current system has strayed far beyond its original principles. In its early manifestations when millions took to the streets in Tehran and in major cities across the country to voice their discontent, revolutionary echoes were certainly in the air. Since then it has become apparent that in its current shape and form the opposition movement does not have the capacity to overturn a regime that has become increasingly brutal and repressive.

Evolving Police State

The rising power of the Revolutionary Guards is a key element in Iran’s effective evolution into a police state. The elite security corps has seen its power grow rapidly since president Ahmadinejad’s first term in power. Answering directly to the Supreme Leader, the Guards are the ultraconservative protectors of the principles and institutions of the Islamic Revolution. Many former or current top-members have been elected into parliament and hold high positions in government and state institutions, leading to a militarisation of politics and an increasingly rigid and inflexible political atmosphere. Their control and influence over Iran’s controversial space, missile and nuclear programmes has added further to their power and reduced the possibility of Iran reaching a meaningful understanding with the West over the ongoing nuclear issue. Furthermore, adding to their already-strong economic clout, the Revolutionary Guards’ commercial interests have strengthened to a dominating degree under Ahmadinejad’s watch. Companies owned by the Guards have snapped up key contracts under favourable terms, including for example in the sale of a 50%-plus-one share sale of Iran’s Telecommunication’s Company (ITC) in September last year. Ultimately the rise of the Guards might be likened to gradual military coup. It has given the regime’s head, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, a much-needed partner, securing its survival to bolster his power where his legitimacy has failed. As a result however, the political fault-lines in Iran have deepened. The Revolutionary Guards’ power does not sit comfortably with the interests of reformists, pragmatic conservatives, and parts of the religious elite based in Qom.

Outlook and Implications

Acknowledging this political fact yesterday the U.S. Treasury announced that it has implemented a fresh set of sanctions targeting the Revolutionary Guards. The assets of Rostam Qasemi, a general with the Revolutionary Guard, Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Company, the Guards’ biggest company—and its four subsidiaries—Fater Engineering Institute, Imensazen Consultant Engineers Institute, Makin Institute, and Rahab Institute. These fresh sanctions come on the back of escalating tensions with the West over Iran’s latest moves on the nuclear front and paves the way for further targeting of the Guards in future sanctions. Ironically the Guards have in many ways benefited from Iran’s isolation; part of their commercial growth can be attributed to their filling up the space where international companies have opted to withdraw from Iran or have been discouraged to enter in the first place. Overall it is unclear how external sanctions can effectively weaken the current regime. Accustomed to adjusting to incrementally implemented sanctions, further restrictions are unlikely to push Iran to change its behaviour even though punitive financial restrictions have in the long term certainly hurt Iran. In any case, while the regime’s survival remains secure, its greatest current challenges are on the home front and do not appear to be going anywhere any time soon.

Global Insight (Reino Unido)