Global Insight Perspective

Significance

The cement that binds a large portion of the electorate to their loyalty for President Hugo Chavez, namely the social programmes or "misiones", is expected to prevent the governor of the state of Zulia, Manuel Rosales, from gaining the right to move into Miraflores, the presidential palace.

Implications

While Rosales is not seen as the favourite in the race, his candidacy, and the level of support he has rallied, is a positive rejuvenating sign for the opposition after years of partly self-inflicted political disarray.

Outlook

The furtherance and future trajectory of President Hugo Chavez's Bolivarian Revolution will depend on the degree of legitimacy he secures at the ballot box on Sunday. In the short term, however, more pressing unrest-related issues could emerge from Rosales's reaction to a possible defeat.

The Poor's Champion Remains a Champion

With many thematically and geographically targeted social schemes, the so-called "misiones", President Hugo Chavez has managed to maintain critical levels of support during his first eight years in power, in particular amongst the poor. Since the first "mission" was set up in 2003 (Barrio Adentro, providing healthcare services in a poor neighbourhood), others have followed—in education, in particular, and more recently in housing—while a subsidised market chain has provided discounted basic staple items for the most deprived. The latest figures from the country's National Statistics Institute (INE), ratified by the respected Economic Commission for Latin American and the Caribbean (CEPAL), and echoed by World Bank representatives, confirm that poverty has declined under President Chavez. Without entering into heated debate on how much the Bolivarian Revolution—Chavez's programme for Venezuela—has actually achieved in terms of poverty reduction, and how much is essentially due to propitious external factors (high oil prices), it is true that the poor have seen some changes in their daily lives. With this in mind the poor majority will mobilise to defend their leader and ensure his stay in office.

Rosales, a Valid Option

Electoral rival Manuel Rosales, however, is not to be discounted as an unworthy candidate. By gaining the governorship of the oil-rich state of Zulia in 2000 and keeping it in 2004, Rosales emerged as a fortress withstanding the pro-Chavez wave that swept the political landscape. His ability to draw up a manifesto that looks beyond mere anti-Chavez discourse may well prove appealing to some undecided voters. Rosales has partially resorted to some populist comments and programmes to garner much-needed votes. His promise to redistribute oil wealth to the poor emulates the incumbent administration's goals, and the promise to maintain the popular "misiones", though with some modifications, also attests to the predominance of the poverty question in the election. Such focus is more or less imposed on the opposition by the current administration's policies. It forced Rosales into venturing into the poor slums: a common occurrence for Chavez, but more of a novelty for the opposition.

Post-Electoral Violence?

The climate is ripe for unrest to emerge due to (as-yet-irreconcilable) political polarisation in the pro- and anti-Chavez camps. The position Rosales will take on a possible defeat is going to be a key factor conditioning potential post-election disruption. Claims of fraud and contestation of results could well encourage protests from his supporters, who will rush to the defence of their defeated leader. However, calls for calm and a concession of defeat, if that is the case, should guarantee limited disruption. Rosales has repeatedly claimed he would respect the results of the election should the process be clean and fair. However, this does not in itself predict much about his post-vote attitude—by qualifying this statement, he is effectively leaving himself the option not to recognise a Chavez victory. Finally, sources on the ground have confirmed that Rosales's supporters are deeply convinced of their chances in the election, which could easily result in a backlash on the streets.

Other events could also fuel violence. Yesterday President Chavez announced that a plot to murder Rosales and blame it on the president had been foiled. Plot theories have abounded in the run-up to the vote, with each candidate accusing the other of intentions to destabilise the situation. Needless to say Chavez has also pointed to the U.S. administration in Washington as having a mind to undermine his victory. While much of this speculation seem unfounded, the possibility of unexpected events shall not be rejected out of hand given the level of polarisation and the strength of will in each camp to see the other defeated.

Outlook and Implications

President Chavez continues to dominate most polls, leading by around 20 percentage points. It would not be surprising to see a similar level of support to that shown in the 2004 recall referendum, in which Chavez gained 58% support. A re-election of the president raises pivotal questions on the political and economic future of the country. Will Chavez go further left? Will his administration be radicalised? Both Chavez's margin of victory and level of participation shall determine how comfortable the president will be to implement changes. As for the private sector, Chavez is for now likely to continue mixing private and public participation in the economy, with his traditional control over the latter. Reform in the mining sector is to be expected in 2007, as announced, and possibly taking the shape of the model that is seen in the oil sector, over which the state-owned oil company, PDVSA, has partial control. Renegotiation of the contract in the Orinoco oil belt will continue—once again as planned. As for the long-term impact, radicalisation is possible, but the ideological infighting among Chavistas—socialism or otherwise—should play a further role in shaping the political trajectory of the country. At this stage it is useful to add that the improvised nature of the administration and the haziness over the actual content of the Bolivarian Revolution—a scheme very much under construction and experimental—poses problems for long-term prediction.

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