The White House said yesterday that the Taliban pose less of a threat to the United States than al-Qaida, sparking speculation over a possible change in U.S. strategy in Afghanistan. The statement comes at a time when U.S. president Barack Obama is in intense talks with his closest aides over the way forward in Afghanistan, which has experienced the worst levels of political instability and insecurity since the Taliban were routed from power there in late 2001. It also comes shortly after the Taliban made a statement in which the group claims to not pose a threat to other countries, including those in Western Europe and the United States, in what can be seen as an effort on the part of the Taliban to influence decision-making in the United States.

While it is unclear whether there is a clear shift in strategy behind the Taliban announcement, the U.S. administration has made distinctions between the threat of the Taliban and al-Qaida before. Notably, when formulating its then-new Af-Pak strategy in late March this year, the United States distinguished between the two groups not least because Pakistan at that time viewed the Taliban as an essentially internal matter, while al-Qaida constitutes a problem of international concern. However, while the renewed stress upon the differing level of threat emanating from the two groups is not new, it could be the precursor for a change of strategy, given that calls for a more conciliatory stance vis-à-vis the Taliban have grown louder over the past months and years. It also suggests that the U.S. administration, while stressing this week that troops numbers would not be cut, could rebuff the call made for up to 40,000 more troops in the country by U.S. top military commander in Afghanistan, General Stanley McChrystal.

Outlook and Implications

Attempts to Get Things Right in a Desperate Situation

Afghanistan appears to have reached a tipping point, and a stabilisation of Afghanistan's domestic political and security situation has become one of the top priorities of the international community. The Taliban constitute a formidable part of the problem, being responsible to a large extent for the deterioration of the security situation throughout the country over the past two years and for massively disrupting Afghanistan's second-ever presidential and provincial council elections almost two months ago. Largely pushed to the very remote border areas of Afghanistan by early 2002, the Taliban have managed to stage a remarkable comeback since 2006. This is despite staged-up efforts by both Afghan forces and coalition troops to push them back, in particular a surge in coalition troop numbers that currently stand at an unprecedented 101,000. Given this situation, the Pentagon in June this year ordered a strategic review of the situation, which McChrystal delivered last month. The review found that the war in Afghanistan could well be lost, unless coalition troops would commit to an "uncomfortably" changed strategy coupled with a surge in troop numbers by up to 40,000.

However, there is currently much debate and disagreement among the international community as to the way forward in Afghanistan, and over the past weeks there has been significant furore as to disagreements within the U.S. administration as to what strategy to adopt. Two main issues greatly complicate such efforts. First, it increasingly emerges that August's presidential and provincial council elections are unlikely to produce a leader that is widely seen as legitimate throughout Afghanistan; this is due to hundreds of allegations of fraud and highly uneven voter turnout, and has already caused severe delays in the election process and is likely to have increased the Afghan population's disenchantment with democracy. Without the population's trust, it will be hard for the international community to support the government in a counterinsurgency campaign that essentially aims at removing support for militants by gaining the trust of the people, as envisaged by McChrystal. Secondly, the deteriorating security situation and the flawed elections process in Afghanistan have greatly reduced U.S. domestic popular support for the war there. While certainly necessary, this latest "strategy review" only further exacerbates confusion over the international community's competence in fighting the war in Afghanistan, something that has already greatly affected the way in which coalition troops are perceived inside the country.

Not surprisingly, then, the U.S. administration is now undertaking significant efforts to get things right, with the U.S. Secretary of State saying yesterday that it currently rules out no option, including accepting a political role for the Taliban in Afghanistan and instead focusing its fight against al-Qaida. This could essentially mean that McChrystal's demand for more troops may be turned down, as fewer troops may be needed for tackling the threat posed by al-Qaida.

Not a New Strategy: Dialogue with the Taliban

While the United States has stressed that there has been no policy shift by differentiating between the Taliban and al-Qaida, it does suggest that the United States is considering a more political role for the Taliban. Attempting to lure the Taliban into the political mainstream is not a new idea, as it has been proposed time and again by a variety of scholars and politicians, including Afghanistan's incumbent President Hamid Karzai. While it was never convincingly elaborated how exactly this could work, a key focus in this approach is to single out "moderate" elements of the Taliban that would be willing to fight for their cause by political means. However, a main problem has been the definition over who constitutes a "moderate" Talib, with the Taliban themselves rejecting this notion as "fiction". Indeed, the Taliban have repeatedly rejected Karzai's previous calls for reconciliation, and have vowed to continue to fight the central government as well as coalition forces. Most strikingly, the Taliban have also ruled out participating in the country's presidential and provincial council elections, signalling just how difficult it would be to bring the Taliban into the political mainstream.

To some extent, coalition forces under McChrystal have already begun efforts to divide "moderate" from "hardcore" Taliban, by attempting to cut people's support for the insurgent group. This was particularly seen in this summer's Operation Khanjar, in which marines were poised to "talk" to tribal elders in order to gain their support and prevent popular support for the Taliban. This approach is essentially built upon the assumption that, had the people and "moderate Taliban" the choice, they would support the central government rather than the Taliban. However, while many—even within the group—may not be outright supportive of the Taliban, a surge in civilian casualties through erroneous air raids and a central government that has never extended control to most insurgency-affected areas has led to widespread resentment against both coalition forces and the government.

The renewed focus on this approach, in particular international support for it, can be ascribed not least to the fact that many, including McChrystal, have raised the possibility that a failure in Afghanistan is a real possibility, increasing public pressure within NATO member countries to scale down or even end military operations there. Dialogue with the Taliban, it seems, would be an easy way out for international troops in Afghanistan and provide for a solution to the conflict. However, the Taliban have in the past shown no inclination towards accepting such deals, and many view such offers as counterproductive as these send signals of weakness to the Taliban that are currently at their strongest since coalition troops first entered the country in late 2001. Questions will also be raised as to what extent it really is possible to differentiate between the Taliban and al-Qaida, given that the Taliban regime provided al-Qaida with a sanctuary from which it could freely operate between 1996 and 2001.

In any case, given the current disagreements as to the way forward within the U.S. administration, a final decision on both strategy and troop levels is not expected before the end of this month.

Global Insight (Reino Unido)