Global Insight Perspective
Significance	On Monday (27 August), the UN Security Council gave its approval for the deployment of a multi-dimensional force in eastern Chad and north-eastern CAR in order to protect refugees, civilians and internally displaced persons.
Implications	The operation will be three-pronged: a multi-dimensional UN contingent, a Chadian police and gendarme component, and an EU military force. This proposal has been watered down since the Chadian president rejected the initial plan.
Outlook	It is unclear when the force will be deployed, although it is expected to be imminent. While the UN’s support for the operation shows a commitment to securitisation of the sub-region, there are elements of the proposal that could arguably be said to provide loopholes for sustainable peace.

The Congolese ambassador to the United Nations (UN), Pascal Gayama, said yesterday (27 August), “The Security Council reiterates its concern about the prevailing insecurity along the borders between Sudan, Chad and the Central African Republic, and about the threat which this poses to the civilian population and the conduct of humanitarian operations.” The operation, which has been authorised by the UN, will be comprised of three distinct components. Firstly, there will be a multi-dimensional UN contingent, made up of civilian staff, UN police and military liaison officers commissioned to provide assistance in civil affairs, human rights and the rule of law. The second tranche of the operation will comprise the Chadian police and gendarmes, who will be vetted by the UN and supported with UN technical and logistical aid. The purpose of this tranche will be to provide security in the refugee camps stationed in eastern Chad. The third element is the EU military force, which would provide security and facilitate the provision of humanitarian assistance. The operation is expected to last 12 months.

Tentative Action

The question over the deployment of a multi-dimensional force in both Chad and CAR is not new—the UN Secretary-General compiled a report in February 2007 calling for a UN presence composed of military and police forces (see Chad: 21 February 2007:UN Secretary-General Promotes Peacekeeping Force on Sudanese Borders in Chad and C.A.R.). The aim was for the UN contingent to reinforce security in 12 refugee camps in eastern Chad and for the UN to provide a mobile and sophisticated military force that would quell conflict and provide a more secure environment for residents. However, Chadian President Idriss Déby was reluctant to accept the military element of the UN proposal and in March 2007, following the UN’s discussions with the Chadian Minister for External Relations, Ahmad Allam-Mi, it came to light that in fact what Chad wanted from the UN was radically different from what was initially proposed.

Thus, the present UN proposal is a watered-down version of that initially brought to the table. Firstly, the international force will be supported by a military dimension, but now, these military operations will be undertaken by an EU force—a proposal that has been accepted by the Chadian President. This EU military force is to remain in place for 12 months, after which an appropriate agreement would be taken, which could include a UN military force. This follow-on arrangement would be decided upon mutually between the EU and the UN, but would require the prior consent of the Chadian government. The second principle adjustment to the initial UN proposal is the removal of the idea of having a presence in the border area. Thirdly, Chadian police and gendarmes who are to serve in the refugee camps are now to do so under national law, instead of under a UN mandate. That said, they will receive training, monitoring and mentoring by the UN police.

Recent Developments

There have been a number of improvements to the political stalemate in Chad, with the government opening up an inter-Chadian dialogue with members of the opposition in February 2007, during which discussions were held on how to tighten electoral law, and civil and human rights. While the insurgent groups refused to participate in the dialogue and to disarm themselves, the holding of the talks was undoubtedly a positive move forward. The following month, a new government was formed, headed by the opposition figure, Prime Minister Nouradine Delwa Kassire Koumakoye. The security situation in the country has also improved, with the government lifting the state of emergency on 26 May 2007, and clashes between the government and the rebels have been occurring only intermittently since then). However, banditry is now problematic, highlighting a distinct breakdown in law and order. It is this level of insecurity that makes it more difficult for humanitarian aid flows to reach the vast swathes of refugees from Sudan. According to the latest UN Secretary-General’s report on Chad, dated 10 August 2007, the number of refugees from Sudan has stabilised at 236,000. At the same time, however, the number of internally-displaced persons has seen steady growth as militancy within Chad’s borders has not been quelled, with the UN putting the figure in excess of 170,000, which is an increase of close to a staggering 80,000 since December 2006.

CAR, particularly the north of the country, has been experiencing problems of its own. In the north-east of the country, there are currently 30,000 internally displaced persons resulting from the rebel insurgency in the country between government troops and the rebel Union des Forces Democratiques pour le Rassemblement (UFDR). Although a peace agreement was signed in February, violence still persists in the north . The influx of some 2,500 refugees from the neighbouring Sudanese village of Daffak in southern Darfur has put pressure on the limited resources of the CAR government, as the refugees head for the CAR town of Sam Oudandja. The north-west of the country is no better, with militancy leading to the displacement of some 180,000 and the worsening security situation punctuated with the tragic death of a humanitarian worker in June .

Outlook and Implications

The UN Security Council’s support for the deployment of a multi-dimensional force shows that the organisation is taking the spill-over effect from the Darfur crisis seriously. The legitimacy of the operation will be provided by the adoption of a Security Council resolution and it is thought that this could occur by 17 September, the date by which the EU must decide upon the details pertaining to the mandate of the military force. Jean-Maurice Ripert, France’s ambassador to the UN, told journalists that the EU force would be composed of somewhere between 2,500 and 3,000 men, half of which would likely be supplied by France. While it is positive that action will be taken imminently, the content of the revised proposal does raise pertinent questions. Firstly, the fact that the protection of refugees in the camps will be assigned to the Chadian police and gendarmes does not inspire the Chadian population with confidence, IRIN reports, for the population does not consider that the Chadian police will be competent enough. Furthermore, the fact that the UN operation will not be deployed along the border between Chad and Sudan could be a potential pitfall in the process, given the history of sour relations between the two countries, with Déby suspecting Sudan of supporting the Chadian rebels. That said, skirmishes along the border do not present the principle challenge to Chad’s security environment—it is more the escalation of violence in the interior of the country.