Significance: Hizbollah's decision to leave the government was prompted by Prime Minister Saad Hariri's continued determination to support the UN tribunal investigating the assassination of his father, former prime minister Rafik Hariri, in February 2005. The tribunal has implicated, but not indicted, Hizbollah members in the assassination.

Implications: In the immediate future Hariri will remain caretaker prime minister as the political parties attempt to reach agreement on a new candidate. However, with a lack of viable and acceptable alternatives, the process will be protracted, destabilising, and accompanied by heightened risks of political and sectarian violence.

Outlook: With the domestic parties unlikely to be able to form a new national consensus, international mediation will almost certainly be required to prevent the situation from deteriorating further.

March 8 alliance sources yesterday said that the immediate cause of their decision to leave the government was Prime Minister Saad Hariri's refusal to convene a cabinet meeting by yesterday morning to discuss the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) investigating Rafik Hariri's death. March 8 had demanded that the prime minister use the cabinet meeting to halt all co-operation with the STL, including stopping Lebanese funding to the tribunal; withdrawing Lebanese judges from it; and begin the prosecution of what the March 8 alliance has alleged are "false witnesses", who have allegedly provided evidence that Hizbollah was involved in Rafik Hariri's death.

However, at the time the deadline expired, the prime minister was preparing for a meeting in Washington with U.S. president Barack Obama, a fact that has fed Hizbollah suspicions that the United States is responsible for the collapse on 11 January of Saudi-Syrian diplomatic efforts to find a way of dealing with the fallout from the potential indictment of Hizbollah members by the STL. Referring to this after the collapse of the government was confirmed, maverick Druze leader and nominal March 8 alliance partner Walid Jumblatt said: "Saad Hariri was on the brink of making a major concession as concerns the tribunal but occult forces prevented him from doing so."

Campaign of Disruption

Since being informed in October 2010 that its members were likely to be indicted by the STL, Hizbollah has launched a vociferous and increasingly bitter campaign to undermine the work of the tribunal and Hariri's support for it. Labelling the investigation an "Israeli project", Hizbollah has tried to pressure Hariri to distance himself from the investigation, believing that if it could raise the political stakes high enough—backed by the implicit threat of Hizbollah's military strength—it could force Hariri to back down in the cause of "national unity". However, Hariri, whose tenuous grip on power has, since he was installed as prime minister in 2008, rested on his acceptance of Hizbollah's continued military independence, refused to bow to this pressure.

Nevertheless, he tried hard to mitigate the effects of the STL investigation by rebuilding ties with Syria's president Bashar al-Assad, and withdrawing accusations he had previously made in the immediate aftermath of his father's death that the Syrian administration was responsible for the assassination. Syria, along with Iran, Hizbollah's key foreign sponsor, has continued to play a key role in trying to resolve the political stalemate in Lebanon.

Under pressure from Saudi Arabia, Hariri's major foreign sponsors, Damascus and Riyadh, have attempted to broker a solution acceptable to all sides. Despite claims by Hariri at the beginning of January that a deal had been in place for months and that Hizbollah intransigence was holding it up, these efforts came to nothing and were declared "dead" on 10 January by Free Patriotic Movement leader Michel Aoun. In hindsight, the collapse of this initiative appears to have removed a further reason for March 8 to remain in the government.

Foreign Forces

Given the weakness and fragility of the domestic Lebanese political scenes, this foreign influence remains a key determinant of stability. The relative strength of foreign powers' interests has fluctuated over time, but they remain a constant factor. Saudi Arabia and Syria are the most recent high-profile states involved in asserting their claims in Lebanon, but behind the scenes Iran remains a constant presence through its military and political support for Hizbollah. Israel, too, although disinclined to involve itself in Lebanon's internal political machinations, is also a recurrent factor. Finally, since the 2005 Syrian withdrawal, the United States, and to a lesser extent France, have also become major players.

Resolving the competing interests of these forces is likely to hold the key to long-term stability in Lebanon, but such a resolution appears improbable in the wake of this latest crisis. More likely is a prolonged period of stalemate and deadlock as Hariri's March 14 alliance and Hizbollah's March 8 faction attempt to find common ground. When, as is likely, this fails, both sides will need to rely on their foreign sponsors to shore up their respective positions. Complicating this is the very real potential for political and sectarian unrest and violence, as occurred in the aftermath of the Syrian withdrawal, when factions fought to fill the political vacuum left. In this respect, much will rest on the ability of President Michel Suleiman to act as a unifying and pacifying presence. However, he was unable to prevent Hizbollah from almost launching a coup in May 2008 and it is doubtful whether he has enough authority to prevent them doing so again in the future.

Outlook and Implications

Hariri will remain as caretaker prime minister for the immediate future, but with an absence of viable alternative candidates it is currently difficult to envisage who might replace him. Moreover, given the gulf between the two major political factions, it is doubtful that a compromise will be reached quickly. As took place in 2008 when Qatar stepped in, international mediation will probably be needed again to ultimately bring the sides together, perhaps with the promise of fresh elections. In the meantime, it remains to be seen whether the STL will proceed with indicting Hizbollah members for the assassination of Rafik Hariri, although to do so would raise tensions further and increase the risk of more serious unrest. Moreover, although government business will continue, the situation will compound the already slow legislative process in the country, delaying again the implementation of much-needed tax, legal and economic reform. The outlook for Lebanon, therefore, is one of economic stalemate, political frustration and increased threat of violence.