Iran agreed yesterday to meet with EU foreign-policy chief Javier Solana and representatives from the foreign ministries of the so-called P5+1 states—the United States, United Kingdom, France, Russia, China, and Germany—for the first time since July 2008 to discuss Iran’s nuclear programme. Iran’s chief nuclear negotiator, Saeed Jalili, will attend the meeting on 1 October, as will William Burns of the U.S. State Department who also attended the July meeting last year as an observer. Solana said today that the meeting will most probably be held in Turkey. The Iranian agreement follows its presentation of a package proposal on 9 September to the P5+1 states, which in turn was a response to a September deadline set by the group of six world powers for Iran to respond to the offer of launching a fresh round of direct talks over Iran’s nuclear programme. The package proposal itself fell decidedly short of the more optimistic hopes and of the necessary criteria for negotiations. However, the proposal certainly lived up to all realistic expectations of how far—or not—the Islamic Republic would stretch to meet international demands for sitting down with the group of six powers to openly negotiate over its nuclear programme. Realism, and to some degree desperation—is undoubtedly behind the U.S. decision push for discussions despite the stated disappointment over the content of the package proposal. U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs Philip Crowley, said last week that the report was "not really responsive to our greatest concern, which is obviously Iran’s nuclear programme".

A leaked copy of the five-page proposal has revealed that the offer is a revived version of a package presented by Iran last year to the P5+1 group; that proposal also skirted the key issues at hand and instead outlined Iran’s vision for a new international world order. This time around the Iranian proposal has taken on the nuclear issue from an international perspective, apparently with the hope of instigating a broader debate on global nuclear disarmament. Yesterday, White House spokesperson Robert Gibbs nevertheless clarified that the nuclear issue certainly was on the agenda stating: ''I don’t know what’s on their agenda, but I know what’s on our agenda and I know what’s on the agenda for countries around the world that are concerned about Iran’s illicit nuclear programme''. Iran’s top nuclear negotiator Saeed Jalili said yesterday that Iran was willing to negotiate openly; however, he also reiterated Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s oft-repeated red-line that Iran will under no circumstances negotiate over its ''inalienable'' right to pursue a nuclear programme.

Outlook and Implications

Given the great uncertainty which surrounds Iran’s willingness to even touch on the nuclear issue, the U.S. signals and objectives are manifold. The public signal is clearly that the United States will pursue discussions on the nuclear agenda, whether Iran wants to or not; that is the only justifying principle for sitting down with the Islamic Republic. On the other hand, one major objective has already been reached simply through the agreement on the 1 October meeting given President Barack Obama’s policy of opening the doors of direct dialogue with the Islamic Republic and the fulfillment of the September deadline. Certainly, resumption of talks is a necessary prerequisite for moving the P5+1 powers towards unifying their stance on how to deal with Iran’s nuclear programme as China and Russia have consistently resisted or watered down sanctions proposals. Time is increasingly of the essence as fears are growing that Iran is getting increasingly close to developing a nuclear weapon. The most optimistic scenario is perhaps that the meeting will not close the door to future talks and that it would either lead to a break in the current impasse, or greater unity among the much divided P5+1 states. A more subtle hope is perhaps that closed-door meetings could yield more than Tehran would be willing to openly admit. Iran’s agenda may appear to be less clear, with multiple signals and sometimes seemingly contradictory stances causing significant confusion. However, Iran’s priorities are also relatively clear. The nuclear programme has become part and parcel of the Islamic Republic’s core strategic domestic and foreign-policy agendas. The nuclear programme is a sign of internal strength and competence, of technological development despite stringent international sanctions and lack of access to western technology and assistance and ultimately it is a sign of Iran’s independence from foreign influence and foreign assistance—a central objective of Iran’s revolutionary doctrine. Certainly, Iran has consistently weighted the political and economic costs of international sanctions and consistently chosen defiance instead. Thus, barring hidden signals from both sides, the outlook for the 1 October meeting remains decidedly uncertain and fairly bleak; the question of which way Iran’s nuclear saga will go remains open ended.

Global Insight (Reino Unido)