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17/12/2009 | Supreme Court's Rescinding of Graft Amnesty Threatens Political Turmoil in Pakistan

Global Insight Staff

Pakistan's Supreme Court has declared as unconstitutional an amnesty that protected leading politicians including the president from graft charges, probably resulting in political turmoil although the effects on the country's fight against extremism are overstated.

 

IHS Global Insight Perspective

 

Significance: The Supreme Court verdict has long been feared and anticipated, and comes after an earlier landmark ruling of the apex court that declared as unconstitutional President Musharraf's imposition of the state of emergency in November 2007.

Implications: The ruling is likely to increase political turmoil in Pakistan, setting the stage for a cabinet reshuffle and increased calls on President Asif Ali Zardari to resign. There are also fears that political uncertainty may dilute the country's efforts against extremists.

Outlook: All eyes will now be on how the verdict will affect the political set-up in Islamabad, in particular how Zardari reacts to the increasing pressure on him to resign, while political uncertainty is set to persist over the short-to-medium term.

In a move that threatens political stability in Pakistan and highlights the vulnerability of the civilian government, the Supreme Court rescinded a landmark amnesty that was used to protect more than 8,000 Pakistanis from various charges, including graft and murder, among others allowing the return of current President Asif Ali Zardari and his late wife Benazir Bhutto to the political scene in Pakistan in 2007. The move followed a landmark ruling of the Supreme Court earlier this year which declared former President Pervez Musharraf's declaration of a state of emergency in November 2007 as unconstitutional, and the 37 ordinances and laws enacted during the state of emergency or protected by amendments to the constitution passed during the period as illegal and invalid. While declared illegal, the affected laws and ordinances were then transferred to parliament, which was given a further 120 days to reconsider the laws and pass them as Acts of Parliament. Some members of the ruling Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) attempted to push through the passing of the NRO, but given heavy resistance from such parties as the Pakistan Muslim League–Nawaz (PML-N), such efforts proved futile, leading to the NRO finally lapsing on 28 November 2009.

With its decision, the Supreme Court is walking a tightrope between ensuring more respect for the country's constitution and therefore strengthened democracy, and political turmoil. On a positive note, the court's two landmark decisions on the unconstitutionality of the declaration of the state of emergency and the invalidity of the NRO represent serious efforts to curb any further attempts to arbitrarily suspend or amend the constitution for personal gain. Musharraf justified his declaring of the state of emergency, suspending the constitution and purging the Supreme Court of critical figures as necessary to upkeep national cohesion and stability and to bring about national reconciliation, although these steps have widely been viewed as measures to safeguard his own political survival. However, given that the lapsing and unconstitutionality of the NRO means that more than 8,000 bureaucrats and acting politicians will now have to face up to serious graft charges, this decision also has the potential of seriously upsetting the country's political order, just as Pakistan needs cohesive and decisive leadership to address serious challenges that threaten the very fabric of the state, including security problems due to widespread militancy, especially in the country's north-west, major economic instability, poor international relations, particularly with neighbours, India and Afghanistan, and natural resource shortages.

What Lies Ahead?

While a number of current cabinet members are set to now have to face up to a number of criminal cases, of most interest will be how President Zardari will muddle through the current upheaval. Legally speaking, Zardari remains unaffected by the rescinding of the NRO due to his presidential immunity. However, the fact that the NRO technically allowed him to contest the country's elections in the first place means that his eligibility for presidency is likely to be challenged. Pressure has been mounting on Zardari to step down over this issue, mainly emanating from the fierce opposition PML-N, but it has also become evident that there has been a fallout between Zardari and many of his party colleagues, including with Prime Minister Yousuf Gilani. There are also tensions between him and the military over a variety of issues, including over the government's giving in to stringent conditions on massive U.S. aid bills that the army is arguing violate the sovereignty of the country. Furthermore, his popularity is currently at an all-time low among the populace, with popularity bonuses granted to him after the assassination of his wife Benazir Bhutto largely evaporated and impatience growing over his reputation for being corruptible (he was kept in custody on corruption charges from 1997 to 2004 and is frequently dubbed "Mr. 10 Per Cent"), his inability to curb inflation, provide for jobs and basic services, and curb militant attacks.

So where does this leave the country's embattled polity, given that Pakistan has traditionally suffered a fundamental lack of stability and has see-sawed between democracy and military rule throughout its history? The president's office has declared that the government welcomes and would accept the verdict (indeed it had refrained from defending its position during court proceedings), but made clear that Zardari would continue his duties. The opposition is demanding affected cabinet members, including Zardari, step down on moral grounds. The profound difference in positions between the country's two main political blocks suggests that there will be no easy solutions to political instability in the short term.

A cabinet reshuffle is now the most likely scenario, as this was repeatedly promised by Prime Minister Gilani over the past weeks to be carried out after the NRO verdict. This is likely to affect the interior minister, defence minister, numerous senior advisers and ambassadors. In this scenario the current government would continue to govern the country. Depending on the scale of the reshuffle, the ruling party could emerge strengthened, keeping political turmoil to a minimum. However, there are numerous uncertainties, including what would happen to Zardari. In fact, given his presidential immunities it is most likely that he will retain his position, in which case lengthy court proceedings are set to follow aimed at challenging his eligibility for office, fiercely driven by the strong opposition PML-N. Exacerbating uncertainties is the current process of rescinding the president's overarching executive powers, as enshrined in the controversial 17th amendment of the constitution. In the case of keeping his power, Zardari is likely to shed more and more of his powers to survive politically and to retain at least a fraction of legitimacy. This would set the stage for months of political uncertainty, stymieing political processes and diverting attention from the country's other important problems. Should he step down, questions arise over who could succeed him.

A second, if much less likely possibility is that, under intense pressure of the opposition, a new round of elections is called for. The PPP-led government has so far refuted any such possibility, saying that the government would complete its five years in office. In this scenario the current unpopularity of the PPP is likely to lead to a crushing electoral defeat, to the distinct advantage of the PML-N, the popularity ratings of which have shot up over the past months.

Finally, political turmoil in Pakistan has always raised fears over the military stepping in. While this cannot be ruled out, particularly if political instability leads to widespread demonstrations, agitations and political violence, the military's leaders have shown little propensity over the past year to once more step into the political arena.

Effects on Fight against Extremism Overstated

Political turmoil in Islamabad is something that the United States fears would dilute the government's resolve and ability to clamp down on Islamic extremists in the north-west of the country. This is a major concern given that U.S. president Barack Obama in his new Afghanistan strategy that he unveiled two weeks ago put a particular emphasis on the need of Pakistan to take on militants on the Pakistani side of the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, where Afghan Taliban have over the past years found a "safe haven" from which to stage attacks against NATO and government forces in Afghanistan.

Such fears are not unfounded, although the impact that this has on the government's ability to take on militants is probably overstated. In fact, political turmoil or not, the Pakistani military has shown no propensity to tackle Afghan Taliban, which are focused on attacks against NATO forces in Afghanistan, and only this week Zardari rebuffed U.S. demands of doing so when U.S. top general Petraeus paid a visit to Islamabad. Pakistan's refusal to do so is creating serious headaches for the United States, which is currently mulling extending its controversial drone strikes on Pakistani territory to address the threat posed by al-Qaida and Afghan Taliban militants. On the other hand, Pakistan is likely to continue its drive against the Pakistani Taliban, a distinct group from the Afghan Taliban that has vowed to attack government and military installations in Pakistan and is therefore perceived to pose a direct threat to national security. Indeed, given that over the past days and weeks there have been significant developments in this respect, including the creation of the National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA), as well as a comprehensive plan to address the Baluchistan insurgency, there is a possibility that the government may increase its efforts in the field of anti-terrorism in order to divert attention from more political upheaval.

Outlook and Implications

All eyes will now be on how the verdict will affect the political set-up in Islamabad, in particular how Zardari reacts to the increasing pressure on him to resign. In the short term, a cabinet reshuffle remains the most likely scenario. While a military coup or a call for new elections cannot be ruled out, these scenarios appear rather unlikely at the present stage.

Global Insight (Reino Unido)

 


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