The Executive

Together with Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) leaders Morgan Tsvangirai and Arthur Mutambara, President Robert Mugabe took an historic step forward yesterday (15 September) by signing an agreement for sweeping political reform. For the first time since independence in 1980, Mugabe must share the government with his rivals, if unequally. On this basis alone, Zimbabwe is a dramatically changed place, but while some executive functions have been transferred from the presidency to a new prime-ministerial post for Morgan Tsvangirai, the bulk is to remain with the president.

The president will chair the cabinet, which will include 31 ministers—15 to be nominated by Mugabe's Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF), 13 by Tsvangirai's faction of the MDC and three by MDC-Mutambara. In addition, 15 deputy ministers will be appointed, consisting of eight from ZANU-PF, six from MDC-Tsvangirai and one from MDC-Mutambara. Although the agreement states that no minister or deputy minister may be dismissed without consultation with all political party leaders, the future may reveal significant differences in interpretation of the word "consultation". The president's seniority is further confirmed by his exclusive power to commute sentences, appoint ministers and constitutional commissions, and chair the National Security Council, among other things.

As prime minister, Morgan Tsvangirai is effectively the chief operating officer on government business. He is also deputy cabinet chairperson and the chair of a new Council of Ministers. The latter body, which will be populated by the same 31 cabinet ministers, is charged with facilitating decisions made in cabinet and assisting the prime minister in his oversight functions. There does not appear to be a direct contradiction in the responsibilities of the cabinet and the Council of Ministers, but at the very least the process is convoluted. The cabinet evaluates and adopts government policy, while the Council of Ministers documents implementation. The prime minister will also sit on the National Security Council that the president chairs. As such, the MDC party faithful may find the implicit hierarchy disappointing.

Under the agreement, both the president and the prime minister are to have two deputies. ZANU-PF and/or the president will nominate the vice-presidents, while the two deputy prime ministers will include one from MDC-Tsvangirai and one from MDC-Mutambara. Finally, the Senate is to include 14 appointees, five at the president's discretion in addition to three allocated to ZANU-PF, MDC-Tsvangirai and MDC-Mutambara respectively.

Constitutional Reform

Disappointment notwithstanding, it would be unfair to say this agreement is a one-sided bargain. In addition to the above redistribution of executive authority, the document is replete with MDC language and includes concessions on certain MDC points—wholesale constitutional reform being the most important example thereof. An 18-month timetable has been set for the adoption of an entirely new constitution to replace the 1979 Lancaster House agreement, including the creation of a parliamentary select committee to draft the document, stakeholder and parliamentary reviews, followed by a general referendum. The draft constitution will be premised on the cross-party agreement of last year.

However, this is not the transitional authority that the MDC had hoped for. Pending Constitutional Amendment no 19, which will create the new organs and positions, it appears that this inclusive government will serve a full term instead of the abbreviated role that the MDC had demanded at the outset of the cross-party talks. Other than a commitment to devise policies to encourage the repatriation of Diaspora Zimbabweans and to consider the creation of a mechanism to advise on measures needed to further national cohesion in the wake of pre- and post-independence political conflict, the document is largely silent on the treatment of human and civil rights abuses since the 29 March polls. Significant civil-society groups, such as the National Constitutional Assembly, will no doubt note this omission. On freedom of expression, the respective parties have agreed to immediately process registration applications under the Broadcasting Services Act, which should diminish the state media's effective monopoly in Zimbabwe's populous rural areas.

National Programme

There is a more detailed agreement on land redistribution, however. Reform of colonial era land-ownership patterns and maintaining agricultural productivity is seen as in the national interest. Responsibility for compensation of former land-owners will rest with the United Kingdom as former colonial power. To this end, parliament will create a "comprehensive, transparent and non-partisan land audit" to clarify ownership and create security of tenure. The government will then seek international support and finance for its land-reform programme "in terms of compensation for the former land-owners and support for the new farmers". Predictably, there is no detailed treatment of the new government's economic programme other than to list subject areas and call for an end to sanctions. The economic recovery programme will have to square the circle of respecting the post-2000 redistribution of commercial farming land, while pursuing its economic growth objectives. A National Economic Council, composed of party members and industry representatives, will be created to advise the government on this plan. No mention is made of the Indigenisation Bill, which seeks to create minimum 51% "indigenous" Zimbabwean ownership in all firms operating in the country.

Outlook and Implications

South African President Thabo Mbeki has achieved much, but Zimbabwe is not out of the woods. In the coming weeks and months, this fragile settlement will likely stutter forward more often than run. President Mugabe's pre-eminence and the exclusion of transitional justice mechanisms mean that key civil-society groups will not be party to the agreement. In practice, this does not stop the deal from functioning, but it does rob it of some of the political capital needed to implement painful reforms, such as reducing government spending.

Mugabe's position could also help push the agreement through the intransigent security services and paramilitary groups. The antipathetic relationship between Mugabe and Tsvangirai could be more damning, however. The agreement frequently refers to consultation between the two, but leaves the final decision to the president in many instances. Typically, Mugabe has little appetite for consultation with rivals, least of all Tsvangirai. Negotiations on ministerial appointments, which began today, will be an early litmus test