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05/11/2016 | The Libyan Political Agreement: Time for a Reset

International Crisis Group Staff

The UN-brokered peace process in Libya has stalled, leaving unresolved pressing issues like worsening living conditions, control of oil facilities, people-smuggling, and the struggle against jihadist groups. New negotiations are needed to engage key actors who have been excluded so far.

 

Executive Summary

The December 2015 Libyan Political Agreement, signed in Skhirat, Morocco, has reconfigured more than contributed to resolving internal strife. A year ago, the conflict was between rival parliaments and their associated governments; today it is mainly between accord supporters and opponents, each with defectors from the original camps and heavily armed. The accord’s roadmap, the idea that a caretaker government accommodating the two parliaments and their allies could establish a new political order and reintegrate militias, can no longer be implemented without change. New negotiations involving especially key security actors not at Skhirat are needed to give a unity government more balanced underpinning.

Skhirat sought to resolve the dispute between the House of Representatives (HoR) and its associated government, based respectively in the eastern cities of Tobruk and al-Bayda, and the General National Congress (GNC) and its government in Tripoli. It created a Presidency Council, a rump executive that took office in Tripoli in March 2016 and was tasked to form a unity government, and an advisory High State Council of ex-GNC members. The HoR was to continue as the sole parliament and approve the unity government, but it has yet to do so. The institutional set-up thus is incomplete, leading to a skewed result, while supporters and foes cling to technical legalities to buttress their positions.

Military actors seek leverage by faits accomplis aimed at improving their negotiating positions and imposing themselves within their own camp. Between February and September, the forces of General Khalifa Haftar, who rejects the accord, drove foes from Benghazi and seized much of the Gulf of Sirte’s “oil crescent”, with its oil and gas production, refining and export facilities. Over this period, a coalition of western Libyan militias operating nominally under the Presidency Council and with U.S. air support has taken over most of Sirte, a city the Islamic State (IS) seized in March 2015. The possibility exists that some forces now in Sirte, aided by others in western Libya, will continue eastward and clash with Haftar’s forces in the oil crescent, or that the latter will seek to move west toward Tripoli. The aggregate effect is that divisions have deepened. That the Presidency Council, as interim executive, has made little progress on everyday issues such as the cash liquidity crisis and water and electricity shortages further undermines confidence.

External actors who pushed for diplomacy and made much of their support for Skhirat are almost as divided as Libyans. A group of mostly Western countries, led by the U.S., calls for unconditional support of the council and recognises the unity government it nominated. Prioritising the fight against IS and controlling migrant and refugee flows, it favours moving ahead on the Skhirat roadmap without the HoR if necessary, betting that if governance can be improved in the west first, the east may eventually join. Haftar’s resilience has upset that assumption.

Another group, led by Egypt, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Russia, prioritises unity of what remains of the army (especially Haftar’s “Libyan National Army”) as the nucleus of a future military and is concerned about leverage Islamist militias controlling Tripoli may have on the council. It has given Haftar overt and covert political and military support, as has France on counter-terrorism grounds. Ostensibly concerned with finding a solution to Libya’s divides, it publicly subscribes to the peace process but undermines it and offers no concrete alternative.

Skhirat’s underlying objectives, avoiding further military confrontation and preventing financial collapse, appear increasingly distant. IS’s Sirte setback risks being followed by fighting among non-jihadists over oil and gas, which would likely postpone Libya’s ability to increase exports and further endanger peace prospects. Longer term, a failed peace process and escalating clashes would give radical groups opportunity to regroup. The immediate priority thus is to avoid the violence that seems to be brewing in the Gulf of Sirte, Benghazi and perhaps Tripoli. Avoiding a new confrontation in the oil crescent is particularly urgent, combined with an agreement that the forces there allow the National Oil Corporation to repair damaged facilities and resume exports, as Libyan law and UN resolutions demand.

Beyond this, a reset of the mired peace process is imperative. The attempt to implement Skhirat without HoR approval and excluding Haftar should end; likewise, backers must press Haftar to negotiate. Both sides need to make concessions, especially on security. The Presidency Council should do more to reassure the east it works for all, not just the west, and resume unity government talks with the HoR.

Little progress will be made without involving the most important armed actors in dialogue. Compromise on the command structure and their relationship with the Presidency Council is a necessary precursor to tackling wider disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration. Designating one side the “legitimate army” does not address the hybrid reality of military power: most armed groups claim ties with a state institution as they continue to operate as militias.

The prospect of Libya in freefall should give all pause, especially the vulnerable neighbours. Regional and global actors involved in the diplomatic process over Libya should converge on common goals, push for a renegotiation of the accord, use their influence to restrain the belligerents and nudge them toward a political solution and participation in a security track. Specifically,

  • The Presidency Council and allies should not take over the Gulf of Sirte facilities; the HoR and its forces should not move further west; the sides’ foreign backers should push hard to avoid an escalation.
     
  • General Haftar’s forces should observe their commitment that all Sirte oil and gas production and export facilities remain under the National Oil Corporation, as Libyan law and UN resolutions demand.
     
  • The Presidency Council should negotiate with the HoR on a new unity government, engage eastern opinion and address issues urgent to ordinary Libyans, eg, electricity, banking liquidity and health care.
     
  • The UN and states supporting diplomacy should promote a forum for Haftar and major armed groups from the west to discuss de-escalation in the Gulf of Sirte, Benghazi and elsewhere. As part of this security track, they should also begin talk on arrangements that could be part of a broader agreement.
     
  • Neighbours, the U.S., Russia, European states, Turkey, Qatar and the UAE, together with the UN, should help frame outcomes and contain spoilers by renewing efforts for convergence of their ambitions, based on issues where they already agree: oil and gas exports to stabilise the economy; a unified army command chain in a reunified security structure; territorial integrity; and confronting IS and al-Qaeda.

As the situation has taken increasingly alarming turns, outside actors – some, like France, long involved; others, like Saudi Arabia, newly active – are seeking to revive, the Skhirat process in one form or another. Understanding what went wrong, might be corrected and is necessary to do so is the best hope to salvage an agreement.

I.Introduction

When, in January 2015, the UN launched the negotiations that would produce a Libyan Political Agreement by year’s end, its aim was a power-sharing deal to surmount institutional and military fractures precipitated by a mid-2014 governmental crisis.  The process, led by UN Special Representative Bernardino León until November and since then by Martin Kobler, envisioned the creation of a unity government and eventually a new constitution and elections. A legitimate, sovereign government could restart oil production and export, right the economy, begin demobilising and reintegrating armed groups and call on the international community to root the Islamic State (IS) out of Sirte.

The driver of the talks was the Libyan Political Dialogue, which included representatives of the two rival parliaments in existence since 2014, the House of Representatives (HoR, based in Tobruk) and the General National Congress (GNC, based in Tripoli), joined later by various independent personalities. León developed parallel dialogue tracks for representatives of armed groups, political parties, municipalities, women and other civil society organisations to reinforce an accord, though the armed-groups track never took off.

By the end of 2015, while much progress had been made on general principles, the outcome was quite different from the plan. Rather than forging consensus on a political roadmap between the parliaments and other constituencies, it empowered politicians willing to use the UN framework to identify common ground with foes and left out those who disagreed on key aspects, including a unity government’s composition and a security roadmap. The latter included the leaders of the GNC, Nuri Abu Sahmein, and of the HoR, Aghela Saleh, and their constituencies.

The result was a power-sharing deal between the majority of the 23 negotiators, a “coalition of the willing” that had some support in the parliaments but not from their leaders much less among military factions.  When, after nearly a year of negotiations, the outcome appeared imperilled, many external advocates thought it better to press ahead, calculating naysayers could be brought in later. The timing of the agreement, signed on 17 December 2015, appeared premature and to lack a sufficiently broad consensus to be sustainable.  Though there has since been some progress in countering IS, the bridging failure at signature threatens to deepen the main political divide between the deal’s supporters and opponents and has created new fractures within both camps. This undermines the ultimate goal of territorial integrity under a unity government that, by improving the political, economic and security situation, can lay the foundation for a more stable, inclusive order.

This report analyses the accord’s impact and reactions to developments it has engendered in Libya and among international actors involved in the diplomacy. It also suggests how to rejigger the process to achieve a more durable outcome.

II.Whose Peace Deal?

A.A Contested Agreement

The Libyan Political Agreement, signed in Skhirat, Morocco, on 17 December 2015, established a “Presidency Council of the Council of Ministers”, to serve until appointment of a Government of National Accord.  It consisted of a council president (considered the future government’s prime minister-designate), five deputies (deputy prime ministers-designate) and three state ministers, each representing a different political and geographical constituency. Faiez al-Serraj, a relatively unknown HoR member from Tripoli, became council president on signature.  Serraj was to become prime minister once the HoR ratified the accord and approved a cabinet that the council had 30 days to present (and the HoR ten days to approve). The new government would then govern for a renewable one-year period. The governments linked to the post-2014 parliaments would be dissolved, and the HoR would stay as the legitimate parliament, while most members of the Tripoli-based GNC would be integrated into the consultative High State Council, a new body with a say in appointing top state posts.

A key difference with previous arrangements, under which the head of the parliament was head of state (and hence of the armed forces), was the council’s enlarged security authority, namely to appoint the top positions in the armed forces and security services. ​​​​​  It also had powers to appoint a Temporary Security Committee (TSC) to implement security arrangements envisioned in the accord, including ensuring the council’s (and later the new government’s) safety in Tripoli and preparing a countrywide ceasefire and militia disarmament. To be integrated into state security forces, armed forces would need to recognise the unity government and lay down weapons. Also envisioned was a “comprehensive and permanent ceasefire” to enter into force when the agreement was signed.

Supporters in Libya and abroad said the accord was backed by majorities of both parliaments and ordinary citizens. The latter was broadly true. Most Libyans were fed up with the long divide, the fighting and economic and financial toll and welcomed a settlement in principle. But the same cannot be said of the parliaments.  A substantial HoR majority opposed the military and security provisions; many also contested enlarging the council from three to nine and individual nominations to it. Reservations in the GNC centred on some nominations (mainly because made while the GNC was boycotting the talks) and the High State Council’s limited authority.  “There is no real political agreement”, a senior UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) official said. “This is an agreement to support those who seem trustworthy for the sake of saving the country”.

In retrospect, proponents inflated support for the accord within the rival legislatures to justify going forward.  The claim of majority backing was factually dubious – many members supported an agreement in principle but differed widely on details – and politically misleading, since key opponents were outside the HoR and the GNC and had military power to intimidate supporters, including several armed groups in western Libya and important forces affiliated with Haftar and the self-proclaimed Libyan National Army, mainly in the east.

B.A Rushed Agreement

By end of 2015, mounting anxiety among Libyan participants of the UN-mediated dialogue and their international backers about the state of negotiations and the deteriorating economic and security situation heightened pressures to sign the accord even with key issues unresolved. The main international backers were well aware of the limited progress, incompatibility of demands and popular disaffection, but they, including incoming UN envoy Kobler, felt they were out of time, and the process might collapse.

The most engaged Security Council permanent members – the U.S., UK and France – were particularly vocal in pushing the UN to finalise the deal. This was also crucial for Libya’s neighbours, including southern European governments worried about the threats incubating in a security vacuum. Even states sceptical of implementation, such as Russia and Egypt, urged that the deal go forward. All argued the talks were at an impasse and might be derailed by reports of an apparent conflict of interest concerning the former UN envoy, León, which had just surfaced, and the growing political fragmentation.  “When you drive on ice”, a U.S. official said, “it is better to accelerate than to hit the brakes”.

Political Dialogue participants indicated they also wanted the accord signed. They feared separate negotiations led by the heads of the two rival parliaments, the “Libya-Libya” initiative, would gain traction as a “nationalist” alternative to the UN-led talks, which some saw as an international or Western imposition.  Their main concern was that the situation would fester, factions would fragment further and the most intransigent political actors would drown out more moderate voices. They also assumed opponents might join once they saw the level of support, and they brushed aside concerns over a possible backlash from rushing a deal without bringing along important constituencies and key military actors.

Several other factors contributed to a perception a deal was needed fast. One was concern with IS expansion in Libya, especially after the November attacks in Paris. Some  states saw a unity government as vital to coordinate a military response to IS’s capture of territory in central Libya and elsewhere. In early 2016, U.S. officials estimated that there were some 4,000-6,000 IS followers in Libya, mainly in Sirte but also Benghazi, Derna and Sabratha.  Explaining the rationale for moving forward with the Skhirat agreement, a senior U.S. official said:

In six months all three Libyan governments will have ceased to exist, and the only one left will be the government of Daesh [IS]. By implementing the political accord and moving the Presidency Council to Tripoli, we might have a chance to change dynamics and improve the fight against Daesh, which is consolidating its grip in the country.

A second factor was EU states’ concern with migrants and refugees, which made them eager to expand EUNAVFOR MED, the operation to “disrupt the business model of human smuggling and trafficking networks” and prevent loss of life in the Mediterranean, into Libyan waters.  By late October 2016, the UN Security Council had authorised operations in international but not territorial waters, and the Presidency Council had not requested the latter. The regional environment was another concern. Some Western backers of the UN process feared that without a quick agreement, regional actors such as the UAE and Egypt, which were nominally supportive but sceptical of the deal and continuing to back its opponents, would get their way. A Western official said:

Not signing and endorsing the accord would have been a major defeat for those like us who had been advocating a negotiated power-sharing deal as the only solution to the Libya crisis. It would have meant a failure of the principle of negotiations, and that would have allowed those governments that throughout 2015 had advocated direct unilateral action in support of the HoR and its government to declare victory.

A corollary was fear Western countries such as France and the U.S. had begun to signal intention to begin counter-terrorism measures inside Libya in collaboration with local actors, potentially undermining a future unity government. Most notably the U.S. and UK, were lobbying for moving the Presidency Council to Tripoli and recognising the unity government as the legitimate government as soon as possible, even without formal HoR endorsement.

Though these were all valid concerns, particularly for nearby countries threatened by IS and other jihadist groups and Europe, where the refugee crisis had become a political and policy priority, they have not been sufficient priorities to convince Libyan military actors to rally behind the accord and the Presidency Council. After being in denial for much of 2015, Libyans were concerned with IS growth, particularly as it began increasingly deadly attacks outside Sirte and threatened to expand eastward toward critical oil facilities.  But, several important military factions remained at loggerheads, displaying little interest in collaborating against IS.

In June 2016, forces from western Libya launched Operation al-Bunyan al-Marsus (The Impenetrable Edifice) against IS in Sirte, but they were mainly volunteers from Misrata (joined by a few from other western and southern cities). East of Sirte, there was some coordination between the Misratans and the Petroleum Facilities Guards’ central-region unit, led by local strongman Ibrahim Jadran and in charge of security at Gulf of Sirte oil facilities, but other eastern forces opposed to the Presidency Council, notably Haftar’s, did not take part.  A sizable proportion of those fighting IS in Sirte did not recognise the council’s authority, though the operation has been portrayed as carried out by accord supporters loyal to the council.

A major flaw of the strategy to create facts on the ground by recognising a unity government was that it was difficult to see how international goals – countering IS and stemming the refugee flow through Libya – could be sustainable without improved governance and a genuine broad agreement on state institutions and the military. Progress in fighting IS in Sirte has not addressed Libya’s political and institutional divides nor persuaded, as some deal backers hoped, factions and their regional supporters that national unity could come through an anti-IS coalition under the council’s aegis.

III.A Widening Divide

From early 2016, unresolved issues turned into institutional hurdles to the deal’s implementation. The gap between its supporters and foes increased and triggered military mobilisations, while international fractures reasserted themselves.

A.A Growing Regionalisation

1.Western Libya

When signed, the accord’s most stalwart Libyan supporters were politicians, militiamen and businessmen from western Libya, especially Tripoli and Misrata. The Tripoli-based heads of the Central Bank and National Oil Corporation, key institutions for the viability of any unity government, were also on board.  More generally, there was broad support among ordinary people in the west for any deal that produced a more effective government that would end division and violence. International supporters treated the west as more immediately important, because of the necessity of establishing a government in Tripoli, the capital.

Even so, there were some important opponents in the west other than the GNC leaders, including Mahmoud Jibril’s Tahaluf, the National Front Party and militias and politicians close to Abdelhakim Belhaj, head of the now-defunct Libya Islamic Fighting Group.  Each had often opportunistic reasons to oppose either the agreement or council line-up. Jibril considered the power-sharing set-up unworkable.  Armed groups from Zintan, important military stakeholders despite being kicked out of Tripoli in 2014, were divided, with some prepared to support the deal in exchange for sharing security responsibilities in the capital, others dead-set against and openly coordinating with Haftar’s forces in the east.  Islamists of various stripes opposed the council initially as foreign-picked.  Even some of the accord’s proponents and those backing the process found UN stewardship problematic.

Despite opposition from these groups and the GNC leadership, the UN and several foreign capitals felt there was enough militia and political leader support in the west to proceed.  Last-minute support from Abderrahman Swehli, a Misratan with ties to his city’s armed groups, changed the force balance in the deal’s favour.

The president of the Presidency Council, Faiez al-Serraj, surprised many when, on 30 March, he and six other council members arrived in Tripoli from Tunisia aboard a Libyan navy frigate and set up operations inside the naval base. This called the GNC leadership’s bluff: there was no substantial military opposition, and several local armed groups rapidly declared support. Many western municipalities were also quick to recognise council authority, as did the main financial institutions in Tripoli.  On 5 April, Khalifa Ghwell, prime minister of the pre-existing Tripoli-based “government of national salvation”, who had threatened to arrest Serraj if he came to Tripoli, was reported to have fled. (He later denied this, and continued to run a rump cabinet in the capital and in October again declared himself in power).  That the arrival in Tripoli went smoother than expected was in part because it co-opted groups by allowing them to retain influence and financial leverage.  This demonstrated the council, once marginal in Tunis, could gain control over key state institutions.

Momentum was short-lived, however. In early April, the decision by former GNC members (per the accord’s roadmap) to convene the High State Council prior to an HoR ratification revived tensions, particularly as a State Council majority voted to appoint the controversial Misratan politician Abderrahman Swehli as the body’s president.  By late May, it was clear Serraj’s control of Tripoli was tenuous, and tensions were brewing among militias there and elsewhere. The risk of open confrontation was real on multiple fronts.  Several armed groups in the capital’s outskirts continued to oppose the council but refrained from open confrontation fearing European navies or because they were waiting for the Supreme Court to declare the council and proposed unity government illegitimate.  The boycott of two of the council’s nine members was another source of tension, as it gave their factions ammunition to argue the council was acting outside its legal framework, especially regarding security sector decisions, since according to the agreement these had to be taken unanimously by Serraj and all five deputies.

On the eve of a 16 May ministerial in Vienna, Serraj felt confident enough to announce that the unity government would begin functioning that week. Though the HoR had not approved his cabinet, he called on ministers-designate (a new group of thirteen ministers plus five ministers of state, in addition to the nine-member Presidency Council) to take office.  A handful began to work as de facto ministers, but at least four refused without HoR endorsement. Only one full cabinet meeting has taken place since, in June.

The Presidency Council’s control of the capital and so of ministries was limited. Several ministries, particularly those outside the downtown and east-central Souq al-Jumaa area, remained controlled by the Ghwell government or anti-council militias. Initially, only the ministers-designate for foreign affairs, local governance and interior could work in their own buildings. The council itself continued to operate for some months from the naval base. Until July, the building housing the prime minister’s central Tripoli office was controlled by an armed group that said it would allow the council to enter if it remained in charge of security there; some council leaders claimed the unit had left, but it appears to have only rebranded and affiliated itself to the interior ministry. Serraj gave a press conference there in July but otherwise continues to hold meetings at the naval base (though his deputies work from the building housing the prime minister’s office).

For months, few Serraj-appointed ministers (including those who started to meet with foreigners in May) controlled their budgets. Though the council appears to be in charge of approving payments through the Central Bank, it is unclear whether any minister will have long-term access to state funds without HoR endorsement, as under the accord parliament must approve the budget. But at least through July, when the bank gave it 1.5 billion dinars ($1 billion) for emergency spending in the absence of a legal budget, the council appeared able to tap into former cycles’ unused funds.

Finances aside, since arriving in Tripoli the council has appeared incapable of strategising and, most importantly, to lack means to implement most of its decisions. Individuals close to it express complaints ranging from failure to liaise with the ministers-designate to monopolisation of decisions and refusal to delegate. Even some international backers are frustrated: “We had very low expectations to start with, but we see that the council is not undertaking even minimal actions”.  With precarious financial arrangements, electricity shortages and a plummeting economy (banks have limited cash withdrawals and frozen foreign currency transfers, while the black-market dinar is less than a third of its official U.S. dollar value), public support has dwindled. All this has created rifts, even within the council’s original powerbase of politicians and businessmen in western Libya. Several early supporters fear the current arrangement may collapse.

More generally, the council, particularly without the support of military factions in the east and other armed groups from the west, especially the Zintanis, is overly reliant on a few militias and personalities, some of which may be obstacles to national reconciliation. The appointment in April of Swehli, a former pro-GNC hardliner despised by many HoR constituencies, especially in the east, to head the High State Council is such a case. So is the role of Islamist figures like Khaled Sherif, an ex-member of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group who was deputy defence minister in several post-Qadhafi governments.  Some army officers working for the council in Tripoli and instrumental in shaping security arrangements there said they felt “the Misratans are calling the shots”. That perception and the fact that their armed groups control Tripoli and its surroundings have fuelled anti-Misrata resentment. Clashes between local residents and members of a Misratan brigade left more than 40 dead in a town on Tripoli’s outskirts in June.

The precedent of weak governments in 2013-2014 that were hostage to militia demands, comes to mind. Not addressing Tripoli’s security landscape before relocating there was risky; over time it may become clear that long-term detriments offset the short-term benefits of a foothold in the capital. The presence there of armed groups operating without formal government oversight fuels the impression, particularly in the east where support of the accord was always minimal, that the Presidency Council and unity government are again hostages.

2.Eastern Libya

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The accord has less traction in the east than west at the grassroots and among the political elite. Eastern tribes, some members of western ones who fled Tripoli in mid-2014 and most army officers who operated under HoR authority saw the UN and the talks’ Western backers as biased toward the GNC and consider them responsible for the post-2011 chaos and rise of radical Islamist groups.  Eastern Libya (Cyrenaica), was ripe for this narrative because monarchists, federalists, secessionists, local businesspeople and elements of certain tribes advocated greater economic decentralisation. They feared the accord would produce another Tripoli-based government dominated by western militias and personalities. The Serraj team’s reliance on local militias in Tripoli added to the fears. Some eastern HoR members who demanded revisions to the accord warned that implementing it and recognising the government without an HoR vote would keep the HoR-appointed government of Prime Minister Abdullah al-Thinni in place.  Most easterners consider that government legitimate, even if it is not operational.

Haftar initially paid lip-service to the accord, meeting Kobler the day before its signing and proposing a close associate, Ali Qatrani, for the Presidency Council. By January 2016, however, he turned against it, as he realised that literal implementation of its security arrangements (Article 8) would sideline him.  He began to lead eastern opposition, which has enhanced his local appeal. A Haftar supporter called the accord “a plot by Islamists and their fans in the West to get rid of the one person who is really fighting the terrorists”.

The accusation was not altogether unfounded: Skhirat focused on getting around the “Haftar problem”. Several leading participants saw him as a chief obstacle.  The main security sector provision, that the Presidency Council would become supreme armed forces commander, was requested by the general’s foes, who accused him of an indiscriminate war against Islamists of all stripes, not just jihadists, and of plotting a coup to bring back the former regime.

Western powers gave Haftar an ultimatum: get on board or be marginalised. Several EU governments and individuals close to the Presidency Council have made overtures, hinting that if he recognised council authority, all, including Article 8, could be discussed. However, many in his camp seem to believe the council’s dependence on Tripoli militias and repeated violations of agreed procedures (mainly for HoR endorsement of the accord) render it untrustworthy.

The perception that western militias and politicians who previously backed the GNC were the main “winners”, combined with Haftar-led opposition to the accord, pushed opinion in the east and some influential fence-sitters there to rally behind the general. A late backer said, “support for Haftar is mostly a matter of ego, the pride of people in the east, their way of being heard and seen”. Hope that eastern opponents might eventually come around depends not only on Haftar making concessions or being sidelined, but also on someone emerging to replace him. Most current accord backers in the east oppose Haftar, driven in part by fear of his violent tactics and calls for military rule.  Some are army officers who blame him for unleashing endless war in Benghazi and believe an internationally-recognised government would curtail his authority and that of his HoR allies.

Prominent Haftar opponents in the east who support Serraj include al-Mahdi al-Barghathi and Faraj Baraasi, army commanders once aligned with him, and Jadran, the former Petroleum Facilities Guards commander.  These men, who have official (contested in Jadran’s case) security sector positions, previously backed the HoR and enjoy support from their influential eastern tribes (Awaghir, Baraasa and Magharaba). When in May 2016 the Presidency Council appointed Barghathi the new government’s defence minister and confirmed Jadran in his Guards post, it and its international backers hoped to fragment Haftar’s eastern support and ensure immediate resumption of vital oil exports. A diplomat said, “Barghathi will be Serraj’s bridge to the east [and] Jadran his purse-holder”.

It has not worked out: Haftar’s forces continue to dominate, and, despite hefty council payments to Jadran to reopen the oil terminals, exports did not resume.  Haftar’s capture of the main Gulf of Sirte facilities in September 2016, forcing Jadran and his allies to retreat, opened the possibility of a drawn-out battle for control of resources and further consolidated anti-accord forces’ leverage.

Some supporters of the Benghazi Revolutionaries Shura Council, an anti-Haftar coalition of ex-revolutionary fighters, political Islamists and jihadists, favour the accord, as bringing to power an amenable government backed by some of their western allies.  Likewise, fighters driven from Benghazi formed a new anti-Haftar militia, the Benghazi Defence Brigade, in 2016. Some of its members received covert Presidency Council backing without pledging it allegiance.

Alignments are not clear-cut. Rivalries between tribes, business lobbies and military commanders have also influenced attitudes toward the accord. For example, some eastern tribal leaders (especially in Jalo, Awjela and Marada) support Haftar and oppose the accord because they want to sideline Jadran, their main local rival. Shared resentment against Misrata’s rise as the dominant military power in the west has led some eastern supporters of the 2011 uprising to reconcile with high-ranking ex-regime officials, some of whom began to return from exile in 2016 with the consent of eastern tribes and authorities.

B.Absence of a Security Track

The accord left key security questions unaddressed. That track never took off: militia representatives on both sides stalled; UNSMIL had insufficient resources; access to militia leaders who rarely left their territory was limited; and politics became increasingly fragmented. By the time it was signed, the accord was predicated on the logic that the parties should accept its framework first and work out details only as they began implementing it.  Yet, major disagreements remained. What role for militias that sprang up in 2011 and were not officially army? What future for Haftar and other controversial commanders? Was it okay to reach out to the Benghazi Revolutionaries Shura Council and other groups in which mainstream ex-rebels had forged alliances of convenience with more radical groups, such as Ansar Sharia or even IS followers? What about the Derna Revolutionaries Shura Council, which, unlike its Benghazi counterpart, had some success fighting IS but allegedly included several dozen al-Qaeda supporters?

The accord sought to sidestep all these. It empowered the TSC to take charge of security arrangements and its Article 8 short-circuited the question of who would head the armed forces by giving that power to the council and granting its president and deputies a veto over senior military and security appointments. Supporters of the dialogue process considered this formula, agreed after heated, lengthy debate and one of the accord’s cornerstones, as sufficient guarantee to Libya’s multiple political and military factions that no controversial personality would be put in charge of the security apparatus.  It also had the advantage of allowing the council and its international backers to keep the door open for all armed groups.

Rather than taking a comprehensive approach to security sector fractures, the council and international backers prioritised Tripoli security. This transformed the TSC from a nationwide body for security arrangements, as the accord envisioned, to one mainly tasked with preparing the council’s arrival in the capital. Reflecting this, council members selected the TSC’s eighteen members on the basis of their personal ties to them, as well as their leverage with armed groups in the capital. The idea was that, once firmly established, the council would set up a new committee for nationwide arrangements.

The council has largely focused on establishing a Presidential Guard. When originally conceived, just after signing of the accord, that was intended primarily as a Tripoli-based force under council authority into which local militias could integrate. The plan has expanded and, according to council members and some internationals, it is now seen as in charge of securing strategic sites, borders and government institutions nationwide. Supporters view it as a key step to an army; foes, even among council friends, argue that the broad remit risks further institutional chaos. More importantly, council detractors see it as proof of lack of seriousness about a unified army and desire only to give legal cover to militias.  This idea only gained more traction after mid-October, when some Presidential Guard units turned against the council and backed return of the GNC-aligned government.

The “Tripoli first” approach and plan to create such a Presidential Guard rested on three assumptions that did not hold: first, that by creating facts on the ground and allowing it to operate in Tripoli the council could control key institutions, thus address immediate financial needs and so achieve greater citizen buy-in;  secondly, that opponents would join the bandwagon, because self-interested military factions would not want to be deprived of the cash that only recognition of the unity government would give them access to;  and thirdly, that after coming to Tripoli, the council would resolve its legitimacy problem and overcome HoR refusal to endorse the accord, council and proposed government. But it took five months for 101 HoR members to convene, and when they voted on 22 August, 60 passed a no-confidence motion (whether legally is still debated).

For these calculations to play out constructively, ground events would have had to build self-sustaining momentum; armed groups opposed to (or ambivalent about) the Serraj government would have had to have no financial or ideological incentives to continue undermining its authority; and external actors would have needed to stay united behind accord implementation. This was not the case.

C.International Contradictions

The accord received strong backing from the P3+5 (the UN Security Council’s three permanent members most active on Libya – the U.S., UK and France – plus Germany, Italy, Spain, the EU and UN) and, at least officially, Libya’s neighbours.  Resolution 2259, soon after the signing, and subsequent Security Council presidency statements welcomed the accord.  By January 2016, most members recognised the Presidency Council as Libya’s executive, treated Serraj as de facto head of government and stopped engaging with Thinni.  Western states in particular called Serraj interchangeably head of council and government, though legally there was no unity government. Others, like Russia and Egypt, while officially supportive, stopped short of granting Serraj the diplomatic privileges normally awarded a prime minister.

Ambiguities have continued since the May Libya ministerial in Vienna, when over twenty states, including Russia, Egypt and China, backed Serraj, though not all formally recognised his government. Those such as Algeria, the U.S. and UK have come to consider HoR endorsement irrelevant, though they pay lip-service to the requirement. These and other, mostly EU, countries have actively encouraged the council to roll out a government and move on with an implementation whose terms they do not want to change.  Russia, Egypt and the UAE, with stricter legal views that an HoR vote is needed, are open to amendments.

Disagreement over the need for a HoR vote conceals divergent policy objectives. The first group of countries, which have shaped the international narrative on Libya and supported the UN-led process, wants to move forward with creating the architecture envisaged by the accord, consolidate security and state institutions in Tripoli and deal with accord opponents later, when they hope to have greater leverage.  The latter group would like the political process to accommodate concerns of HoR members and eastern constituencies that remain disaffected with the process and to guarantee the influence of their Libyan clients (HoR President Saleh and General Haftar in particular).

In addition to supporting Libyan factions they are closest to, there is also an ideological dimension: Egypt and some other Arab states see, like many eastern Libyans, the Presidency Council as dependent on Islamist armed groups and politicians, including members of the Muslim Brotherhood’s Libyan branch.  Egyptian officials view their country as having a natural role in eastern Libya due to contiguity, historical links, the many Egyptian migrant workers and the security threat posed by radical groups there. But their chief concern now appears to be Serraj’s reliance on people they consider too close to Islamists. “A Libya where security decisions are taken by somebody close to the Brotherhood is anathema to Sisi”, said a Libyan activist close to Egyptian intelligence.  Egyptians are perplexed by the council’s Misrata-dominated turn since its arrival in Tripoli.  Ex-Qadhafi officials in Cairo and Abu Dhabi with close ties to their host governments appear to play a key role in channelling support to Haftar and depicting the Serraj-led council as controlled by Islamists.

The international divisions have resulted in divergences over using sanctions against spoilers. The EU and U.S. imposed travel and financial sanctions on HoR President Saleh and GNC officials, accusing them of creating obstacles to the political agreement. Russian and Egyptian diplomats criticise this as unhelpful.  Moscow is also invested in the Haftar-commanded army. Like Egypt and the UAE, it has repeatedly called over the past two years for an easing of the arms embargo to allow Haftar to receive weapons and has given pro-HoR factions political support. Unlike the UAE and Egypt, however, Russia has apparently refrained thus far from giving Haftar military aid and has kept ties with politicians in Tripoli.

Some Western states have also urged a softer line on Haftar, ostensibly for counter-terrorism. In the first half of 2016, France gave his forces intelligence support in Benghazi, helping them regain near-complete control over the city. Covert and unacknowledged until late July 2016, when anti-Haftar forces downed an army helicopter carrying three French officers, France’s support for the general significantly weakened his Benghazi Revolutionaries Shura Council foes, thereby both strengthening his army’s claim in the east and his leadership credentials, even as he sought to undermine the Presidency Council. Other Western countries have also dispatched intelligence officers to eastern Libya, but they appear to have been less involved in ground operations.  

France aside, most Western states firmly supported the council and argued it should receive military aid. Offers of assistance have come from the U.S., where Secretary of State John Kerry said he would support and consider any requests from Serraj for an arms embargo exemption. Throughout 2016, the U.S. has deployed special forces, mainly for intelligence gathering, and offered to train and equip Libyan forces.  Since early August, at the council’s request, it has also supported the anti-IS offensive in Sirte with airstrikes. UK special forces based in Misrata have stepped up their presence and started to assist local armed groups involved in fighting IS in Sirte.  In June, the EU extended the mandate of Operation Sophia and added two tasks: “training of the Libyan coastguards and navy; and contributing to the implementation of the UN arms embargo on the high seas off the coast of Libya”. In August, it also extended the mandate of its Integrated Border Management Assistance Mission to Libya (EUBAM Libya), a civilian mission mandated to plan for a possible future EU mission providing advice and capacity building in the area of criminal justice, migration, border security and counter-terrorism.

Italy took the lead in establishing the Libya International Assistance Mission (LIAM) in early 2016. Intended as a coordinating body for all international efforts to train Libyan forces, it has remained largely defunct given the council’s inability to control the military. Rome reduced earlier offers to train council-allied forces, when parliament agreed in September only to send 300 military (in rotation) to guard an Italian military field hospital in Misrata. At UK and U.S. instigation, NATO has offered to be more involved, but no concrete plans have materialised.

In short, far from showing unity on the way forward, international actors pursue diverging objectives, including by giving or pledging military support to various forces only superficially tied to any national army or political oversight.  The risk increases of a growing divide over military support, with most Western countries backing the council and forces loyal to it, and Russia, Egypt and the UAE continuing to assist what they consider to be the legitimate army under Haftar.

IV.What Way out of the Impasse?

A.Avoiding Further Escalation

The conflict is becoming more entrenched, blocking prospects for revitalising state institutions and stabilising the economy. Entropy is growing: the rival governments’ ability to deliver concrete improvements in the lives of ordinary Libyans is decreasing, while the risk of further violence increases. Entire Benghazi neighbourhoods have been destroyed; hundreds of thousands of Libyans are displaced.  Haftar’s September takeover of the Gulf of Sirte’s oil export facilities has allowed crude-oil exports to resume, offering the possibility of refilling state coffers, but also increased tensions between the two major armed coalitions and the institutions supporting them.

Both sides, with their international backers, are convinced they can ultimately triumph. In western Libya, factions supporting the Presidency Council and High State Council have gained the international recognition they desired and feel bolstered by their victory-in-progress against IS in Sirte. They are semi-covertly helping fighters defeated in Benghazi, some of whom have come together under a new banner, the Benghazi Defence Brigade, to spearhead an offensive in that city against Haftar’s forces. They are also preparing to retake the oil terminals.  In turn, Haftar is using his victory to appoint officers to head municipalities, confirming his opponents’ fears that he aims for military rule. He and his allies, bolstered by their successes, appear to believe the “liberation” of Tripoli is within reach; they may also be planning to broaden their territorial control to the south, where they enjoy tribal support.

Both sides are making calculations based on dubious assumptions. Haftar forces now control most of the east, and their defeat is not likely, if only because their foes are unlikely to gather sufficient military strength. Some Tripoli politicians and military officials, as well as some Presidency Council members, would like to see the accord’s international backers impose a no-fly zone over the Gulf of Sirte and Benghazi to neutralise Haftar’s air force, his strategic advantage. Yet, the council may not ask for this while oil revenue is flowing, and the UN Security Council is unlikely to approve it given that Russia, a permanent member, and Egypt, currently a non-permanent member, are unlikely to back measures that would weaken Haftar.  Similarly, Haftar’s promise to “liberate” Tripoli and destroy militias there is a mirage, because the armed groups across western Libya remain well-equipped and numerically superior. A renewed battle over the oil terminals could trigger a wider conflagration. Avoiding this and other military offensives is the immediate priority, followed by putting negotiations back on track.

B.Restarting a Political Process

If the central aim of what remains of the peace process is forming a unity government, an aim that major actors on either side still profess, the Presidency Council needs to bolster its legitimacy and reconcile with eastern Libyans and the HoR. The August 2016 HoR vote to reject the government of eighteen ministers offers a window of opportunity. The council should, in wide consultation with political leaders, make substantial changes to the government’s composition in order to bridge the gap with the east. It could reiterate its early 2016 proposal to assign key ministries such as finance, planning and justice to easterners, thus addressing the widespread view in the east of being marginalised. This may not satisfy HoR leaders, who have asked for the entire council to be changed (with only two deputy presidents, as the HoR proposed during the Skhirat negotiations), but it could be important in swaying wider public opinion.

The council should resist the push from politicians, including within its ranks, to ignore the August 2016 HoR vote.  Such a line would deepen the divide and trigger more military confrontation. Even some HoR opponents see getting it on board as necessary to maintain coherence of the accord’s framework, as well as, more broadly, national unity.  This more accommodating line would also return the ball to the HoR’s court, in effect calling its bluff; above all, the Presidency Council, whose legitimacy rests on having been created by the accord, should not derogate from its accord obligation to seek the HoR’s endorsement.

The accord’s external backers should help create momentum toward a political solution based on the accord’s broad outlines, but they cannot hold it sacrosanct. The most important aspect of resuming a peace process is accepting that the accord cannot be implemented as is, so should be renegotiated, starting with security arrangements. It is imperative to launch a security track parallel with the political process that would be a forum for negotiations on issues specific to the security sector, including temporary de-escalation initiatives to prevent new hostilities until a wider agreement is reached, for example on political issues such as the composition of a unity government and security arrangements.

C.Creating a Security Track

Part of the reason why attempts to implement the accord have failed in the absence of a wider agreement incorporating security issues is that the military balance has changed since December 2015. The political divide is between pro- and anti-accord rather than pro-HoR and pro-GNC; and whereas the agreement and much of the diplomatic conversation envisaged civilian control over armed groups, those have grown stronger: in the west because of the council’s dependence on them in Tripoli and their success against IS in Sirte, and in the east because Haftar has asserted control over Benghazi and the Gulf of Sirte’s “oil crescent”. Each sees the other as aiming for domination, making compromise elusive.

Two things need to happen: an end to military operations and a resumption of political negotiations under a new formula including a security track. Armed groups in the west should stop supporting the Benghazi Defence Brigade and negotiate a local ceasefire in Libya’s second-largest city rather than pursue a vain attempt to retake it from Haftar. Calling on people displaced from Benghazi to join against Haftar-aligned groups would fuel the fighting and postpone their negotiated return in a local settlement, for which some support exists among Haftar’s forces.  Western militias should break ties, direct and indirect, with jihadist groups to create common ground with eastern commanders (as well as reassure Haftar backers such as Egypt) and space to start local contacts between military representatives from both sides.

In turn, Haftar’s forces should halt their offensive in Benghazi and refrain from moving west of the Gulf of Sirte, as they have threatened. They should engage with Benghazi residents who have relocated in the west and reassure them they can go home safely. They and their affiliated security forces (such as intelligence and internal security organs) should also cease abuses against residents accused of siding with the Presidency Council.

Haftar should likewise re-engage with UNSMIL, particularly its security team, to reach a broad understanding on a possible security dialogue. The priorities in any political solution should be an Article 8 compromise, especially on army and police command chains, and consensus on a unified security force. Disagreement, including over who should lead the military and which Islamist factions should be fought (only IS and al-Qaeda or also groups that have collaborated with them), can be overcome by ensuring that key military representatives from both sides are at the table. This means staking out a compromise whereby, as a French diplomat said, “Haftar has to be in the picture, even if he cannot be at the centre”.

Both the UN and council members have floated the idea of creating a forum for security actors to negotiate these issues and be directly involved in shaping a unified military command. Thus far, these efforts have been limited to one July meeting, hosted by UNSMIL in Tunis, bringing together military actors from both camps.  Several proposals have been aired. In June, Kobler proposed a military council divided into regional commands – essentially acknowledging current reality – but under the Presidency Council’s authority. In September, boycotting council member Qatrani, a Haftar ally, proposed a five-person body, separate from the council and including Serraj, two of his deputies (possibly Maitig from Misrata and Koni from the south), Haftar and H0R President Saleh, that would assume the council’s supreme commander role.

These separate but similar proposals have drawbacks: Haftar and his associates rejected Kobler’s as an attempt to divide the army; Qatrani’s excludes western military leaders. But the underlying acknowledgment that military power has become localised is worth retaining. A third, perhaps better way forward, may be to separate the Presidency Council’s civilian and military roles. Some council members are considering a “Supreme Defence Committee” in which Haftar would sit with western officers such as Colonel Salem Joha from Misrata (nominated, though he did not accept, as a member of the military operations room for the Misrata-Sirte area), but it is unclear if Haftar and key Misrata armed groups would agree.

Whatever the format, a forum is needed for the Presidency Council and its military advisers to negotiate with military from both sides over the command chain, or at least find a placeholder formula until a solution to the Article 8 dispute can be found. The council must do more t0 create confidence that its security strategy will lead to a working army and police that stand above the political divide. What it has done thus far – announcing creation of a Presidential Guard and empowering eastern military actors such as Barghathi and Jadran to try to fragment Haftar’s forces – is far from a national security strategy and has backfired, particularly as internationals have worked to contrary ends. Instead of creating a Presidential Guard that would deepen the divide, the council and its TSC should draft a security plan that would put Tripoli under the army and police, including elements from the east and Zintan.

D.The Need for International Convergence

The international community has a key role. Polarisation of political and military support to Libyan factions entrenches the conflict and makes it more difficult to salvage the accord elements all can agree on. Outside actors – pro-Presidency Council (the U.S., UK, Italy, Algeria, Turkey and Qatar) and those who support the council while also providing support to Haftar (Russia, Egypt, the UAE and to an extent France) – must chart a way based on the common ground between them.

Many in the first camp have been too optimistic that an agreement imposed on recalcitrant factions would eventually be accepted. The focus on eliminating IS in Sirte, which they hoped would establish Misratan forces’ counter-jihadist credentials for states such as Egypt that have long argued Haftar was the only leader taking on jihadists overshadowed other factors.  The gamble that the accord roadmap could be implemented even without HoR endorsement underestimated the extent to which opponents could exploit this to gain support in the east. It made it easy to paint the UN as biased, thus hindering its impartial mediator role. Conversely, those who have supported Haftar, undermining an agreement to which they pay lip-service, have derailed the process but not provided constructive alternatives. If they want to maintain a united Libya and stop the conflict spiralling toward worse confrontation, they will have to set limits on their client.

Perhaps unavoidably in a context of regional, even global, upheaval, some of these actors filter their Libya policy through the lens of geopolitics: the U.S.-Russia rivalry over Syria and Ukraine, the regional divide over political Islam and contests for influence over the Sahel and Maghreb. By this logic, compromise is undesirable if considered success for a rival.  Yet, the status quo (a deteriorating situation) can only lead to protracted conflict that would plunge Libya into further chaos, with no certain victory for any camp, great damage to the economy and few of the opportunities many hope for in post-conflict reconstruction.

At a minimum, states with leverage over Haftar should press him and his allies to stop calling for further military operations toward southern and western Libya and withdraw their support if he continues to refuse a negotiated solution. Similarly, those backing Tripoli- and Misrata-based forces should dissuade them from a counteroffensive against Haftar in the Gulf of Sirte.

Generally, outside actors should refrain from taking sides, for instance through increasing military support to Haftar or supporting a Presidency Council call for a partial no-fly zone.  They should instead focus on the lowest common denominators, which do exist, and not endorse measures that they undermine on the ground.  At a minimum, these include the need to stabilise the economy by increasing oil and gas exports; creating a unified army chain of command as part of a reunified security structure; preserving Libya’s territorial integrity; and confronting IS and al-Qaeda. They should also persuade their Libyan friends that a military solution does not exist and agree on parameters for renewed negotiation.

V.Conclusion

The absence of a security dialogue and agreement among competing internal and external actors has rendered the well-intentioned Skhirat accord impossible to fully implement at this time. It is critical to return to hammer out a security agreement that can be married to those elements of the accord that both sides support. On its current trajectory, the peace process is headed for a failure that would leave pressing international issues unresolved, such as combating people-smugglers and jihadist groups, and ensure dramatic worsening of living conditions for most Libyans. What has been achieved by the UN-led negotiations – broad agreement on the need for a transitional framework and some of its critical political elements – would be lost. The December 2015 agreement could have been imposed on recalcitrant actors had they been marginal and the international community united. That was not the case. Salvaging a political solution requires dealing with the fragmented and deeply frustrating Libya that exists, with its local leaders and armed groups, not the one we wish for.


Members of the Presidency Council of the Council of Ministers

Members of the Presidency Council of the Council of Ministers, as appointed according to the Libyan Political Agreement:

Faiez al-Serraj
President of the Presidency Council, from a prominent Tripoli family and trained as an engineer, he worked prior to 2011 in the housing ministry and in August 2014 became an HoR member representing Tripoli.

Ahmed Maitig
Deputy President of the Presidency Council, and a Misrata businessman, the GNC elected him prime minister in May 2014, but the Supreme Court annulled the vote on procedural grounds. He is a nephew of Abdelrahman Swehli, president of the High State Council.

Fathi al-Majbari
Deputy President of the Presidency Council, an academic and economist at Benghazi University who served as education minister in the Abdullah al-Thinni government in 2014-2015. He is originally from Jalo.

Musa al-Koni
Deputy President of the Presidency Council, a Tuareg from the south and consul-general in Mali under he old regime, he defected in 2011 and was appointed the Tuareg representative to the National Transitional Council.

Ali al-Qatrani
Deputy President of the Presidency Council, a Benghazi businessman and late addition to the council seen as General Haftar’s appointee, he suspended his participation in January 2016 after a row over the appointment as defence minister of al-Mahdi al-Barghathi, who is from Qatrani’s al-Awaqir tribe.

Abdelsalam Kajman
Deputy President of the Presidency Council, an engineer from Sebha believed to be close to the Muslim Brotherhood and picked instead of GNC Deputy President Salah Makhzoum, whose nomination some members of the dialogue committee refused.

Omar al-Aswad
Minister of State for Legislative Affairs, from Zintan and a member of Qadhafi’s amn al-khariji (foreign security service), he withdrew from the Presidency Council in January 2016, accusing it of cronyism and corruption.

Mohammed Ammari
Minister of State for Specialised Council Affairs, a former GNC member from Benghazi, he is a non-aligned Islamist who prior to 2011 studied in Germany and the UK.

Ahmed Hamza
Minister of State for Civil Society Affairs, from Traghen in the south, was a member in the Qadhafi era of the revolutionary councils and part of the “Libya al-Ghad” (Libya Tomorrow) reform initiative led by Seif al-Islam al-Qadhafi, the late ruler’s son.

These appointments follow a geographical partitioning, with three members from each of Libya’s three provinces: west (Tripolitania), east (Cyrenaica) and south (Fezzan). For the west: Serraj, Maitig, Aswad; for the east: Majbari, Qatrani, Ammari; for the south: Koni, Kajman, Hamza.

Glossary

EUBAM: European Border Assistance Mission in Libya

EUNAVFOR MED: European Naval Force – Mediterranean (also known as Operation Sophia)

GNA: Government of National Accord

GNC: General National Congress, the parliament elected in 2012, based in Tripoli

High State Council: Advisory body created by the LPA, primarily composed of former GNC members

HoR: House of Representatives, parliament elected in June 2014 and based in Tobruk since August 2014

IS: Islamic State

JCP: Justice and Construction Party, associated with the Libyan Muslim Brotherhood

LPA: Libyan Political Agreement (signed on 17 December 2015 in Skhirat, Morocco)

LIAM: Libyan International Assistance Mission

NOC: National Oil Corporation

Presidency Council: Nine-member body created by the December 2015 Libyan Political Agreement, holding executive powers and tasked with nominating a GNA

Presidential Guard: New security force under the control of the Presidential Council

TSC: Temporary Security Committee, task force in charge of security questions created by the LPA and answerable to the Presidency Council

UNSMIL: United Nations Support Mission in Libya

International Crisis Group (Organismo Internacional)

 



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09/09/2011|
06/09/2011|
06/09/2011|
23/08/2011|
23/08/2011|
23/08/2011|
23/08/2011|
23/08/2011|
23/08/2011|
22/08/2011|
22/08/2011|
14/08/2011|
08/08/2011|
05/08/2011|
05/08/2011|
04/08/2011|
04/08/2011|
29/07/2011|
27/07/2011|
23/07/2011|
22/07/2011|
17/07/2011|
17/07/2011|
07/07/2011|
07/07/2011|
03/07/2011|
03/07/2011|
28/06/2011|
28/06/2011|
16/06/2011|
16/06/2011|
16/06/2011|
16/06/2011|
07/06/2011|
07/06/2011|
31/05/2011|
31/05/2011|
28/05/2011|
28/05/2011|
25/05/2011|
24/05/2011|
24/05/2011|
07/05/2011|
07/05/2011|
06/05/2011|
06/05/2011|
05/05/2011|
05/05/2011|
03/05/2011|
03/05/2011|
02/05/2011|
02/05/2011|
01/05/2011|
01/05/2011|
01/05/2011|
01/05/2011|
22/04/2011|
22/04/2011|
18/04/2011|
18/04/2011|
10/04/2011|
07/04/2011|
07/04/2011|
25/03/2011|
25/03/2011|
25/03/2011|
17/03/2011|
11/03/2011|
22/02/2011|
22/02/2011|
15/02/2011|
15/02/2011|
08/02/2011|
04/02/2011|
04/02/2011|
28/01/2011|
19/01/2011|
13/01/2011|
01/01/2011|
31/12/2010|
23/12/2010|
05/12/2010|
02/12/2010|
28/11/2010|
27/11/2010|
26/11/2010|
22/11/2010|
22/11/2010|
22/11/2010|
18/11/2010|
01/11/2010|
26/08/2010|
26/08/2010|
24/08/2010|
24/08/2010|
06/08/2010|
28/06/2010|
18/06/2010|
16/06/2010|
11/06/2010|
19/05/2010|
02/05/2010|
02/05/2010|
25/04/2010|
04/04/2010|
11/03/2010|
02/03/2010|
18/02/2010|
20/11/2009|
20/11/2009|
06/11/2009|
01/11/2009|
27/10/2009|
22/10/2009|
05/09/2009|
31/08/2009|
27/08/2009|
15/08/2009|
02/08/2009|
02/08/2009|
20/07/2009|
20/07/2009|
18/07/2009|
18/07/2009|
11/03/2009|
11/03/2009|
10/03/2009|
10/03/2009|
10/03/2009|
10/03/2009|
17/12/2008|
14/12/2008|
02/10/2008|
02/10/2008|
24/08/2008|
24/08/2008|
08/08/2008|
08/08/2008|
14/05/2008|
02/04/2008|
02/04/2008|
12/01/2008|
19/05/2007|
19/05/2007|
10/05/2007|
10/05/2007|
03/05/2007|
03/05/2007|
30/04/2007|
30/04/2007|
02/04/2007|
01/04/2007|
29/03/2007|
16/03/2007|
16/03/2007|
05/03/2007|
05/03/2007|
28/02/2007|
26/02/2007|
26/02/2007|
26/01/2007|
26/01/2007|
08/01/2007|
08/01/2007|
15/12/2006|
15/12/2006|
11/12/2006|
11/12/2006|
11/12/2006|
11/12/2006|
28/11/2006|
28/11/2006|
24/11/2006|
24/11/2006|
11/11/2006|
08/11/2006|
01/11/2006|
01/11/2006|
30/10/2006|
25/10/2006|
20/10/2006|
11/10/2006|
04/10/2006|
15/09/2006|
13/09/2006|
03/09/2006|
17/08/2006|
17/08/2006|
09/08/2006|
26/07/2006|
13/06/2006|
06/06/2006|
01/06/2006|
30/05/2006|
15/05/2006|
12/05/2006|
12/05/2006|
10/05/2006|
02/05/2006|
25/04/2006|
21/04/2006|
21/04/2006|
10/04/2006|
23/03/2006|
20/03/2006|
17/03/2006|
15/03/2006|
15/03/2006|
15/03/2006|
15/03/2006|
27/02/2006|
23/02/2006|
17/02/2006|
15/02/2006|
15/02/2006|
04/02/2006|
04/02/2006|
18/07/2005|
03/07/2005|
30/06/2005|
28/06/2005|
28/06/2005|
28/06/2005|
19/04/2005|
19/04/2005|

ver + notas
 
Center for the Study of the Presidency
Freedom House