United States Southern Command's (Southcom) 2012 Posture Statement by General Douglas Fraser provides a good view of how the US military views itself in Latin America and the Caribbean (which is different than how many regional analysts view it). As Gen. Fraser has stated in previous speeches and testimonies, the US military views the following as the biggest issue in the hemisphere: "In many parts of our hemisphere -- but most acutely in Central America -- transnational organized crime has evolved into a volatile and potentially destabilizing threat to both citizen and regional security." And this is probably the most important sentence in the entire 30 pages: "Our goal is to support partner nation and US government efforts to improve citizen safety by reducing the threat of transnational organized crime from a national and regional security threat to a public safety problem."

Goals are important. It's how the US military defines its mission. I agree with that goal and I'd like to see more discussion of it. Do we have enough resources to accomplish it? How do we know when we're winning? How long do we expect it to take? If we fail to reach that goal within a certain time frame, are there other policy options or strategies that we should consider?

That sentence is immediately followed by this paragraph, which is excellent:

"We expect militaries in Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador will continue to be called upon to play an important role in domestic security matters in the coming years, given the increasing threat to citizen security and the numerous challenges facing regional law enforcement institutions, which are under-resourced, poorly trained and equipped, and prone to corruption. While we recognize this is a necessary initial step to help curb the rising tide of violence, we also recognize that this approach is unsustainable in the long term; strengthening civilian law enforcement institutions is critical, and we will support the Department of State as the lead agency in this endeavor. As militaries continue to take on internal security responsibilities, our Human Rights Initiative will remain a critical mission set. Through this program, we will continue to support partner nation military and security forces in instituting human rights training; revising policies and regulations to include human rights principles; strengthening internal control mechanisms; and improving cooperation with civilian authorities and civil society."

The US military recognizes that the use of militaries to combat crime is unsustainable (I would add "undesirable"). It comes with a cost and it needs to be balanced with training and human rights protections. The military knows that its goal is not to eliminate or defeat crime, but to reduce it to a manageable law enforcement problem. I hope every member of Congress reads the above, asks questions about it and works to fully fund the long term solution of strengthening civilian law enforcement institutions. Meanwhile, the governments of Central America must develop strategies that look beyond the current deployment of military forces to find sustainable solutions.

And this is the worst case scenario in the view of the military:

"The emergence of a collective of compromised states in Central America that is unable to counter transnational threats would have enormous implications for the United States and the hemisphere. The inability of one country to effectively respond to the intertwined threats of transnational organized crime and illicit trafficking is troubling; the inability of an entire subregion has serious implications for regional stability and the security of the United States."

I agree with all of the above. I think much of the posture statement is a strong and correct justification of the US military's activities in the hemisphere.

My criticism of the testimony is a lack of measures of effectiveness. The annex is full of measures of performance, in terms of the numbers of conferences held, military units trained, surgeries provided during medical missions, tons of humanitarian relief, etc. All of that is wonderful. In the document itself, the top measure of effectiveness is on drug interdiction. I know the US is seizing a whole lot of cocaine; I know JIATF-South is a great model for inter-agency cooperation. But are Southcom's and JIATF-South's drug interdiction efforts improving citizen and regional security? Are the conferences held or trainings provided moving us closer to the stated goal of reducing the threat of transnational organized crime in the hemisphere? As I asked above, how do we know if we're winning?

We need measures of effectiveness that tell us whether we are meeting the goals we set. I'm concerned that the 2013 Posture Statement will look a lot like the 2012, with commentary on potential threats in the strategic environment combined with statistics as to what Southcom does and how many tons of cocaine were seized. It won't answer the question of whether we're making progress.

The 2013 Posture Statement should offer statistics that answer directly whether the hemisphere is any closer to meeting the goals set in the 2012 Posture Statement: improving citizen security and reducing the threat of transnational organized crime to a manageable public safety problem. And if the hemisphere's security is not improving, it should say why not and what additional resources or policy changes are needed. If we know anything from the last 10 to 20 years of statistics, it's that the numbers of drug seizures and military trainings do not measure the effectiveness of whether US policy is reaching its goals. Until the US military and government start measuring the correct results, we're not going to reach the goals we want.