It is morally good for the US to speak about support for protestors, but it is also quite dangerous. Mubarak may go, but his regime is necessary for US and Israeli security, regional stability, and keeping at bay the Islamic extremists that would rise in its place. Obama must support it.
There is no good policy for the United States regarding
the uprising in Egypt, but the Obama administration may be adopting something
close to the worst option. It seems to be adopting a policy that, while somewhat
balanced, is pushing the Egyptian regime out of power. That situation could not
be more dangerous and might be the biggest disaster for the region and Western
interests since the Iranian revolution three decades ago.
Experts and news media seem to be overwhelmingly
optimistic, just as they generally were in Iran’s case. Wishful thinking is to
some extent replacing serious analysis. Indeed, the alternative outcome is
barely presented: This could lead to an Islamist Egypt, if not now, then in
several years.
There are two basic possibilities: the regime will
stabilize (with or without President Hosni Mubarak), or power will be up for
grabs. Here are the precedents for the latter situation:
• Remember the Iranian revolution of 1979, when all sorts
of people poured out into the streets to demand freedom? Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is
now president.
• Remember the Beirut Spring of 2005 when people poured
out into the streets to demand freedom? Hezbollah is now running Lebanon.
• Remember the democracy and free elections among the
Palestinians in 2006? Hamas is now running the Gaza Strip.
• Remember democracy in Algeria? Tens of thousands of
people were killed in the ensuing civil war that begin in 1991 and endured over
a decade.
It doesn’t have to be that way, but the precedents are
pretty daunting. And what did Egyptians tell the Pew pollsters recently when
asked whether they liked “modernizers” or “Islamists”? Islamists: 59 percent;
Modernizers: 27 percent.
'Pro-democracy' vs. regime's survival
Here’s the problem. On one hand, everyone knows
that Mr. Mubarak’s government, based on the regime that has been running
Egypt since the morning of July 23, 1952, is a dictatorship with a great
deal of corruption and repression.
But this Egyptian government has generally been
a good ally of the United States, though it has let Washington down at
times. Its loss of power to an anti-American government would be a tremendous
defeat for the United States. Moreover, a populist and radical nationalist –
much less an Islamist – government could reignite the Arab-Israeli
conflict and cost tens of thousands of lives.
So the United States has a stake in the survival of the
regime, if not so much of Mubarak personally, or the succession of his son, Gamal
Mubarak, now reported to have fled to Britain. This means that US policy should
put an emphasis on the regime’s survival. And this regime might be better
off without the Mubaraks, since it can argue that it is making a fresh start
and will gain political capital from getting rid of the hated dictator.
On the other hand, the United States wants to show that
it supports reform and democracy, believing that this will make it more popular
among the masses in the Arab world, as well as being the “right” and “American”
thing to do. Also, if the revolution does win, the thought is that it is more
likely to be friendly to America if the United States shows, in advance, its
support for change.
This “pro-democracy” approach is based on the belief that
Egypt might well produce a moderate, democratic, pro-Western state that will
then be more able to resist an Islamist challenge. Perhaps the Islamists can be
incorporated into this system. Perhaps, some say (and it is a very loud voice
in the American mass media) that the Muslim Brotherhood isn’t really a threat
at all.
Obama's mixed position unrealistic
Of course, it is possible to mix these two
positions, and that is what President Obama is trying to do.
On paper, this is an ideal policy: Mubarak should reform;
the opposition should not use violence; and everything will turn out all right.
Unfortunately, it has little to do with reality. If the regime does what Mr.
Obama wants it to do, it will fall. And what is going to replace
it? By his lack of outright support for Mubarak, the president is
demoralizing an ally.
No matter what the United States says or does at this
point, it is not going to reap the gratitude of millions of Egyptians as a
liberator. For the new anti-regime leaders will blame America for its past support
of Mubarak, opposition to Islamism, backing of Israel, cultural influence, and
incidents of alleged imperialism.
Precedent for failed US strategies
This is not the first time this kind of problem has come
up. The most obvious precedent is Iran in 1978 and 1979. At that time, the US
strategy was to do precisely what Obama is doing now: announce support for the
government, but press it to make reforms. The shah did not turn to repressive
measures, partly because he didn’t have US support. So the revolution built up,
and the regime fell. The result wasn’t good.
There is a second part of this story as well. Experts on
television, consulting with the government, assured everyone that the
revolution would be moderate, the Islamists couldn’t win, and even if they did,
this new leadership could be dealt with. That didn’t turn out too well, either.
Even more forgotten is how the situation in Egypt came to
be in the first place. Back in 1952, US policymakers supported – it was not a
US-engineered coup, but they were favorable to – an army takeover. The idea was
that the officers would be friendly to the United States, hostile to the Soviet
Union and communism, and more likely to enjoy mass support.
The pattern is for US policy to believe that getting rid
of a corrupt regime – the Egyptian monarchy in 1952; Iran's shah in 1978;
Mubarak now – and supporting a new, popular regime with a seemingly appealing
ideology will produce stability and benefit US interests. In fact, the last two
times, this strategy resulted in the two biggest disasters in the history of US
Middle East policy.
And this is the strategy policymakers and experts are
endorsing today.
No organized, moderate opposition
Mohamed ElBaradei, leader of the reformist movement,
makes the following argument against my analysis:
“Mubarak has convinced the United States and Europe that
they only have a choice between two options – either they accept this
authoritarian regime, or Egypt will fall into the hands of the likes of bin
Laden’s Al Qaeda….Mubarak uses the specter of Islamist terror to prevent a
third way: the country’s democratization. But Washington needs to know that the
support of a repressive leadership only creates the appearance of stability. In
truth, it promotes the radicalization of the people.”
This is a reasonable formulation. But one might also say
that nothing would promote the radicalization of the people more than having a
new radical regime in power – the Islamist regime that would probably rise in
the absence of any other organized opposition.
That is not to say that there aren’t good, moderate,
pro-democratic people in Egypt, but they have little power, money, or
organization. Though opposition leaders have now formed a loose
coalition backing Mr. ElBaradei, this backing includes leaders of the
Muslim Brotherhood. The fact that they are dependent on the Muslim Brotherhood
is shown by ElBaradei's negotiating with that group for a coalition. Much of
his past support has also, in fact, come from the Brotherhood. And he himself
has no governing experience, no independent base, and limited abilities to
govern.
This hardly constitutes an organized, moderate
opposition. Even the most important moderate organization of the past, the
Kifaya movement that emerged in 2004, has already been taken over by the Muslim
Brotherhood.
Muslim Brotherhood is popular and extreme
Rajab Hilal Hamida, a member of the Brotherhood in
Egypt’s parliament, proves that you don’t have to be moderate to run in
elections:
"From my point of view, bin Ladin, al-Zawahiri, and
al-Zarqawi are not terrorists in the sense accepted by some. I support all
their activities, since they are a thorn in the side of the Americans and the
Zionists.…[On the other hand,] he who kills Muslim citizens is neither a jihad
fighter nor a terrorist, but a criminal murderer. We must call things by their
proper names!"
A study of the Brotherhood members of Egypt’s
parliament shows how radical they have been in their speeches and
proposals.
But it is also being said that the Brotherhood is not so
popular in Egypt. Then why did the party get 20 percent of the vote in a 2005
election, even when they were repressed and cheated? This was not just some
protest vote, because voters had the option of voting for secular reformers,
and very few of them did.
The deeper question is: Why does the Brotherhood not
engage in violence in Egypt?
The answer is not that it is moderate, but that it has
felt the time was not ripe. One deterrent has been the knowledge that it
would be crushed by the government, and its leaders sent to concentration camps
and tortured or even executed. It is no accident that Hamas and Hezbollah –
unrestrained by weak governments – engaged in violent terrorism, while the
Muslim Brotherhood facing strong and determined regimes in Egypt and Jordan did
not.
Little US influence over post-regime vacuum
Unfortunately, US influence on these events, already
rejected by Egypt’s government, is minimal. It is morally good to speak about
freedom and seem to support the protestors, but also quite dangerous. Such
support will not reap the gratitude of the Egyptian masses in the future. The
Egyptian elite wants to save itself, and if it has to dump Mubarak to do so –
as we saw in Tunisia – the armed forces and the rest will do so. But if the
regime itself falls, creating a vacuum, that is going to be a very bad outcome.
Consider this point: Egypt’s resources and financial
capital are limited. There aren’t enough jobs, land, or wealth. How would a new
regime deal with these problems and mobilize popular support? The more probable
outcome is that a government would win support through demagoguery: blame
America, blame the West, blame Israel, and proclaim that Islam is the answer.
That’s how it has been in the Middle East in too many places.
US must support Egyptian regime
The emphasis for US policy, then, should be put on
supporting the Egyptian regime generally, whatever rhetoric is made about
reforms. The rulers in Cairo should have no doubt that the United States is
behind them. If it is necessary to change leadership or make concessions, that
is something the US government can encourage behind the scenes.
But Obama’s rhetoric seems dangerously reminiscent of
President Jimmy Carter’s in 1978, regarding Iran. He has made it sound – by
wording and nuance, if not by intention – that Washington no longer backs the
Egyptian government.
Without the confidence to resist this upheaval, the
Egyptian system could collapse, leaving a vacuum that is probably not going to
be filled by friendly leaders.
Nothing would make me happier than to say that the United
States should give full support for reform, to cheer on the insurgents without
reservation. But unfortunately that is neither the most honest analysis nor the
one required by US interests.
**Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in
International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of
International Affairs (MERIA) Journal. His latest books are “Lebanon:
Liberation, Conflict, and Crisis,” “Conflict and Insurgency in the Contemporary
Middle East,” “The Israel-Arab Reader,” “The Truth About Syria,” “A
Chronological History of Terrorism,” and “The Long War for Freedom: The Arab
Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East.”