In addition to meeting with media and U.S. officials, Rasmussen was also in Washington to participate in a seminar held to advise the Group of Experts drafting the next NATO Strategic Concept, due out at year's end. The seminar, attended by several hundred NATO experts, was the final one in a series of four, and addressed transforming the alliance's structures, forces and capabilities. Previous seminars had discussed roles and missions, operations, and partnerships.

Former U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, who chairs the group, later introduced Rasmussen at Georgetown University, where he delivered a major speech on the alliance at an event co-sponsored by the Center for a New American Security. From Rasmussen's remarks and in an interview with World Politics Review afterward, it became clear that although the alliance's Strategic Concept is important, NATO's immediate future will be most affected by the outcome of the war in Afghanistan. Losing that conflict could preclude NATO's ability to embrace all the new missions under consideration by the expert group, which range from cyber-defense to support for global humanitarian missions.

Ever since NATO assumed control of the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan in August 2003, many Americans have complained that some European countries are not providing sufficient military support for the mission. Rasmussen strived to refute this perception by arguing that NATO governments have increased their troop contributions in Afghanistan in line with the U.S. military buildup. "When President Obama announced a major increase in U.S. troop levels, 35 other countries announced increases of their own," he told the Georgetown audience. Rasmussen later told WPR that he was confident they would meet these commitments, which he calculated would amount to some 10,000 additional troops, and concluded, "We have succeeded in increasing the number of troops more or less equivalent to what Gen. [Stanley] McChrystal, had recommended, namely 40,000."

Rasmussen further insisted that the United States needed NATO to achieve its objectives in Afghanistan. "Making Afghanistan inhospitable to terrorism is a huge challenge. It is complicated and expensive and often painful," Rasmussen said in his speech. "No one country, not even the United States, could do this alone."

Speaking with WPR, Rasmussen asserted that in recent months, the allies had also eliminated or diminished many of the operational restrictions limiting the use of their national forces in Afghanistan. Some of these so-called "caveats" constrain the locations where their troops can operate, often keeping them away from the southern and eastern provinces where the Taliban insurgency is centered. Other caveats, which are not normally made public, limit the type of operations national forces are allowed to engage in to economic reconstruction and other non-combat missions. 

For several years now, under both the Bush and Obama administrations, U.S. officials havestruggled to induce European governments both to increase their military commitments in Afghanistan and to make them more flexible. Citing alliance solidarity, they have warned that defeat in Afghanistan, or even a war effort that left some countries bearing an unequal share of the military burden, would call into question the alliance's ability to manage post-Cold War security challenges. 

To rally European publics often more concerned about homegrown terrorism than about the war in Afghanistan, U.S. officials have highlighted the link between distant terrorist sanctuaries and the threat of Islamist-inspired violence in Europe. Finally, U.S. administrations have sought to lead by example, sending tens of thousands of additional American military forces to Afghanistan in recent years.

Rasmussen had the misfortune of delivering his Georgetown speech two days after the Netherlands declined to extend its 1,900-strong military deployment in the dangerous southern province of Uruzgan. The ruling parties split on the issue, leading to the collapse of the governing coalition. Dutch combat soldiers are currently set to leave Afghanistan by the end of this year.

Although Rasmussen doubted the Dutch decision would affect the contributions of other NATO allies, its timing -- in the midst of NATO's major Operation Moshtarak against the Taliban stronghold of Marja -- is unwelcome. The offensive partly aims to demonstrate NATO's will and capacity to defeat Taliban fighters in battle, in the hopes of inducing insurgents to defect or negotiate a peace settlement. Taliban hopes of ultimate victory reflect their conviction that foreign countries will eventually tire of the war and withdraw their military contingents.

Recognizing that NATO publics are eager to end their involvement in the war, Rasmussen stressed that accelerating and expanding the planned growth of Afghan security forces offered the most effective exit strategy. In his interview with WPR, Rasmussen stressed that the Marja offensive involves "close cooperation between Afghan security forces and foreign troops," making it "an example of what will happen in the future in a gradual process of handing over more and more responsibilities to the Afghans." 

Rasmussen also elaborated on the three main roles of Ambassador Mark Sedwill, NATO's new senior civilian representative in Afghanistan -- namely, to improve NATO's ties with the other international actors in Afghanistan (particularly the U.N. but also the EU and individual donor nations), to engage with the Afghan government (especially to promote capacity-building within the security sector), and to promote coordination among the dozens of Provisional Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) now in Afghanistan. 

Rasmussen added, however, that NATO aimed to transfer an increasing number of political, economic, and security responsibilities to Afghan institutions, which would gradually assume the functions now performed by the PRTs, allowing the United States and allies to reduce and eventually end their Afghan campaign.