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11/11/2009 | Parsing China's North Korea Policy

Richard Weitz

One of the issues President Barack Obama will inevitably discuss when he visits China next week is the deadlocked Six-Party Talks seeking to resolve the North Korean nuclear crisis.

 

Perhaps the most important difference between the 1994 Agreed Framework (.pdf), which settled the 1992-94 nuclear crisis, and the current Six-Party Talks is that the People's Republic of China (PRC) has been considerably more involved in supporting the latter process. Chinese policymakers initially promoted the Six-Party Talks primarily as a means of preventing Washington from adopting more coercive measures -- whether severe sanctions or military attacks -- toward the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). Over time, the Chinese government has developed a stake in the talks' successful outcome as well as in maintaining a smooth negotiating process.

From Beijing's perspective, an enduring and comprehensive agreement within the Six-Party process would serve many interests. These include eliminating the problems that a North Korean nuclear arsenal would present for China; decreasing the threat of U.S. military intervention in a PRC border state; securing economic and other assistance for Pyongyang that could help avert DPRK state failure on China's doorstep; and helping to reinforce perceptions of Beijing as a committed and influential regional security stakeholder.

Whatever the ultimate outcome, China's pivotal role in the Six-Party Talks has enhanced its international status, even if Chinese officials have been careful to characterize the talks as a "win-win" process in which all the parties have contributed and benefited. China's stance has notably gained Beijing considerable popular support in South Korea, for whom China has become the leading trading partner.

American and other observers have seen securing Beijing's support as essential for influencing the DPRK, since the PRC is Pyongyang's most important foreign ally. Chinese officials contend that, while the PRC's influence over DPRK policies is greater than that of any other government, it is still modest given North Korea's adamant pursuit of independent policies. Ironically, this perception of China's influence may have encouraged Beijing to moderate its pressure on Pyongyang in order to maintain good relations with the DPRK.

A sterner Chinese stance toward Pyongyang would certainly earn some American gratitude. But if it comes at the cost of alienating the DPRK, it would risk undermining China's value to Washington and other partners with respect to North Korea. Conversely, while U.S. officials may criticize Beijing for not pressing the DPRK harder to abandon the nuclear weapons business, Chinese and American officials have declined to let these differences jeopardize their larger bilateral relationship.

Chinese policymakers have opposed North Korea's acquisition of nuclear weapons because such a development might induce South Korea, Japan, and even Taiwan to pursue their own nuclear force -- weapons that, under some contingencies, might be used against Beijing as well as Pyongyang. Some Chinese leaders, recalling the country's history with Russia and Vietnam, worry that the DPRK might even threaten to use nuclear weapons against China in some future dispute.

Furthermore, PRC decision-makers presumably would also like to avoid the negative reaction in Washington and other capitals that would arise if Pyongyang re-transferred materials and technologies originally provided by China to third countries. North Korea has already exchanged items useful for developing WMD and ballistic missiles with Pakistan, another Chinese ally, as well as with Syria and other countries of proliferation concern.

China's leaders also fear that North Korea's ostentatious displays of improving its missile and nuclear capacities will further encourage the United States, Japan, Taiwan and other states to develop missile defenses that will in turn weaken the effectiveness of Beijing's missile arsenal. China's increasingly large and sophisticated missile fleet represents a core element of its national security strategy.

Given these concerns, Kim Jong-il's defiance of Beijing's warnings against testing a nuclear weapon in October 2006 clearly angered Chinese leaders. In response, the Chinese conducted some high-profile inspections of cross-border shipments and dispatched an envoy to Pyongyang to bring Kim Jong-il back into the fold.

Nonetheless, the Chinese government has never committed to the demanding U.S. objective of "complete, verifiable, and irreversible disarmament," at least as a near-term goal. Chinese officials generally depict ending the DPRK's nuclear weapons program as a long-term objective. For Beijing, that may require accepting Pyongyang's continuation of some nuclear activities, even if they could result in the DPRK maintaining at least a limited, latent nuclear weapons capacity. Chinese officials also argue that the United States and other countries will need to make additional concessions to Pyongyang to secure North Korea's denuclearization, rather than expect North Korea to first disarm before receiving any enticements.

Despite their irritation with the DPRK regime, most Chinese officials appear more concerned about the potential collapse of the North Korean state than about its intransigence on the nuclear question. They depict Pyongyang less as a nuclear-armed rogue regime than as a potential failed state and humanitarian disaster. Chinese policymakers fear that North Korea's disintegration could induce widespread economic disruptions in East Asia; generate large refugee flows across their borders; weaken China's influence in the Koreas by ending Beijing's unique status as interlocutors with Pyongyang; allow the U.S. military to concentrate its military potential in other theaters (e.g., Taiwan); and potentially remove a buffer separating their borders from American ground forces (should the U.S. Army redeploy into northern Korea). At worst, the DPRK's collapse could precipitate military conflict and civil strife on the peninsula, which could spill across into Chinese territory.

PRC policymakers have therefore consistently resisted military action, severe economic sanctions, and other developments that could threaten instability on the Korean peninsula. They have also strived to downplay concerns about the extent of North Korea's nuclear program as well as the DPRK's involvement in the proliferation of nuclear and other WMD technologies to third parties. From the start of the talks, Chinese officials have insisted (.pdf) that everyone "should recognize that North Korea has legitimate security concerns" and that it is essential "to continue the dialogue and practice more patience to ensure that the Korean peninsula is free of nuclear weapons."

At bottom, Beijing desires a change in Pyongyang's behavior, but not a change in its regime. Despite their frustrations with Kim Jong-il, Chinese policymakers appear to have resigned themselves to dealing with his leadership for now, while hoping that a more accommodating regime will eventually emerge in Pyongyang. In the meantime, China continues to provide essential food, weapons, arms, and other economic and political support to the DPRK.

From Beijing's perspective, the optimal outcome would be for the North Korean regime to relinquish its nuclear weapons and moderate its other foreign and defense policies in return for security assurances, economic assistance, and diplomatic acceptance by the rest of the international community. Such a benign outcome would serve a range of interests for Beijing -- as well as for the U.S. and its partners -- while avoiding the feared consequences of precipitous regime change.

Unfortunately for President Obama, the Chinese government is willing to take only limited steps to pursue this goal, leaving it to the president and his team to assume the main burdens of solving the North Korean nuclear crisis.

**Richard Weitz is a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute and a World Politics Review senior editor. His weekly WPR column, Global Insights, appears every Tuesday.

World Politics Review (Estados Unidos)

 


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