But it could also been seen as gesture politics on both sides which will do nothing to further the cause of peace in the three Muslim-Malay majority provinces, Yala, Narathiwat and Pattani.

For Thailand's Abhisit it provided a means of showing that he was at least trying to make progress on the issue, in contrast not only to the disastrous southern policy pursued by Thaksin Shinawatra. A meeting with Najib in the south also gives the impression that Malaysia is in earnest about not allowing Pattani separatist sympathizers on the Malaysian side aiding the bomb planters and slogan painters in the three southern provinces. It may also be aimed to please the southern voters who mostly support Abhsit's Democrat Party. He called for a political solution while rejecting dialogue with the rebels.

As for Najib, it gave him a chance to look statesmanlike, deliver a message to PAS-run Kelantan not tolerate cross-border trouble makers and reaffirm Malaysia's acceptance of Thai sovereignty over a region which has wanted to be joined to (then British-ruled Malaya) for a century100. That would play well with non-Malays and underline UMNO's self-image as a moderate, responsible force for domestic progress and regional cooperation. But at the same time Najib could make it clear to Abhisit that without more serious political effort on the Thai side, the problem would at best fester and could get worse. To some Malays at least it would seem that Najib is showing some concern for cousins across the border.

Perhaps not coincidentally the International Crisis Group came out on December 8 with a report criticizing the Thais for lack of any initiatives to address the discontents of the Malay-Muslim majority in the provinces. It noted that government in the region was more in the hands of the military than the civil administration and the army had resisted attempts by Abhisit's government to reduce its role.

The fact is however that much as Abhisit may personally favor attempts to reach out and engage the rebels – whoever their leaders may be – his government is too weak and itself too reliant on military backing to do so, or even to propose any real political steps to accommodate the aspirations of the majority in the provinces.

The military anyway believes that its efforts since Thaksin's overthrow have improved the security situation. For them tough security measures plus some more cooperation from Malaysia, not political compromises, are the answer.

The Crisis Group report acknowledges that "military sweeps" since 2007 had curtailed violence but also claims that the insurgency has "proved resistant to military suppression". It even says that a huge development budget which is supposed to help tackle the problem may have made things worse by engendering corruption while providing an excuse for avoiding addressing the political issues.

It urges an end to martial law in the area, disbandment of Buddhist "self-defense" groups, better control of weapons held by "self-defense civilians" and investigation of past abuses against Malay-Muslims.

Although acceptance of some measure of autonomy, like Aceh, or even Malaysia's Sabah and Sarawak, may seem to non-Thais an obvious potential solution, it remains anathema to much of the Thai military and senior bureaucracy for whom there can be no retreat from the notion of a centralized, monarchist and predominantly Buddhist-guided state.

In any event, though a running sore, the situation in the south is a minor, if embarrassing, issue for a Bangkok focused on red/yellow shirt divides and the monarch-succession watch. So whether empty gesture or serious attempt to push for peace, the Najib-Abhisit meeting seems unlikely to lead to substantive progress.