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18/10/2006 | Time for Iran's Close-Up - Part 2 - South Asia: Still Feeling the 'Washington Effect'

Stratfor Staff

Our third-quarter forecast for South Asia was almost entirely accurate. Many of the core issues laid out in that forecast will continue to play out in the coming quarter.

 

In what we described as the "Washington Effect," India and Pakistan during the third quarter largely formulated their foreign policies based on the Bush administration's priorities. Once more, South Asia's relevance in the global arena will reflect U.S. interests.

The fourth quarter begins in the intense build-up to the November U.S. congressional elections. U.S. President George W. Bush is promoting his Republican base with a clear focus on national security issues and is ramping up efforts to capture another high-value al Qaeda target to help ensure Republicans' hold on both chambers of Congress. We state in the third-quarter forecast that the Bush administration would deliver an ultimatum to Pakistani President Gen. Pervez Musharraf: Cooperate with U.S. forces and provide the necessary human intelligence to launch a successful operation and take out a key al Qaeda figure, or be left to face growing domestic opposition alone.

It appears that the Bush administration's negotiations with Pakistan are well under way. Musharraf recently announced an agreement with tribal leaders in North Waziristan to help boost his image at home after coming under severe criticism for having Pakistani security forces kill a major rebel leader. In spite of widespread concerns that the deal would create a sanctuary for Taliban militants, the United States has gone out of its way to praise Musharraf for his cooperation in the war on terrorism. Islamabad and Washington's behavior reveal that the two governments have reached an agreement to allow Musharraf to regain popularity at home in exchange for providing intelligence and greater access for U.S. forces in the region. There is a strong chance that the United States will be able to claim the capture or killing of another high-value al Qaeda target in the fourth quarter.

As in the past, a major U.S. operation on Pakistani soil would undoubtedly compromise Musharraf's domestic standing. The Pakistani president will be forced to confront intensifying opposition claims that he has sold out the country's territorial integrity to Washington. Though Musharraf is bound to run into some rough patches this quarter, he will maintain his hold over the country, mainly because of the various opposition groups' inability to overcome their own differences.

Major challenges remain for NATO forces in Afghanistan. NATO's September request for reinforcements highlights the tenacity of a resurgent Taliban. A security crisis already exists in the country, and fighting will intensify as both sides try to consolidate gains as winter approaches. Meanwhile, suicide attacks have grown more frequent and more effective; they will not decrease, even as winter sets in. Nevertheless, the Taliban is in no position to topple the government, and ultimately, the stalemate with NATO will continue.

India will begin the quarter by appearing more cooperative in reinvigorating peace talks with Pakistan, but New Delhi has little intent to move the talks forward significantly. Pakistan-based Islamist militant group Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) is very likely to carry out another attack in a major Indian city this quarter. Following the July Mumbai railway bombings, Indian security forces have dealt with an alarmingly high number of bomb hoaxes. Though many of these are pranks, LeT has likely staged several dry runs to time Indian security forces' responses at intended targets. Setting up numerous bomb hoaxes also allows the Kashmiri militants to confuse or distract Indian security forces. The cities of Mumbai, New Delhi and Bangalore are prime targets for such an attack. Another militant attack would prompt retaliatory attacks carried out by fundamentalist Hindu groups against Muslim targets. Should LeT carry out another bombing, relations between New Delhi and Islamabad will be strained, but an attack would not result in a substantial shift in the governments' positions or actions toward each other.

India's main struggle this quarter will be maintaining momentum on a major civilian nuclear deal that it has been trying to cement for more than a year. We correctly stated in the last quarter that the U.S.-Indian civilian nuclear agreement would not gain any real traction before the U.S. congressional elections. With time and room to maneuver on the nuclear deal, New Delhi, as we forecast, test-launched its long-range Agni III ballistic missile without fearing significant backlash from the United States over nuclear proliferation concerns.

The nuclear deal will not move forward in the fourth quarter either. With the U.S. Congress preoccupied with the November elections, a Senate vote on the deal will not be a priority. The deal could come up for discussion in a lame-duck session in November, but any final decision will not take place until after a new congressional session begins in January 2007. Should North Korea decide to ramp up its nuclear threat early in the quarter, the U.S.-Indian nuclear deal will be paralyzed. Meanwhile, India and the United States will continue to woo recalcitrant members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, whose support will ultimately be necessary for the deal to be approved internationally.

Domestic issues will take up most of India's attention this quarter. With the nuclear deal in limbo, the ruling Congress Party once again will take up the issue of implementing a caste-based quota system for Indian universities. New Delhi's stalling on the issue has given anti-quota protesters more time to plan their demonstrations. When the quota issue was first introduced to the Indian public four months ago, students and professionals from medical, engineering and management schools poured into the streets across India to join demonstrations, many of which turned violent and ended up paralyzing business operations in major Indian cities. When the Indian Parliament takes up the issue again toward the end of this quarter, more protests can be expected throughout the country.

India will also be keeping a close eye on its war-ravaged neighbor in the south, where the Sri Lankan government has been pursuing an aggressive offensive against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam to divide the northern and eastern Tamil strongholds. As we stated in our last forecast, violence between Colombo and the Tigers steadily escalated as the Sri Lankan government continued pursuing its strategy of allowing the breakaway Karuna faction to target Tiger militants. India came under growing pressure from its own Tamil population to intervene in the crisis, as we predicted, and even publicly said it would no longer provide military assistance to Colombo. Beaten down by the military offensive, the rebel group will entertain the idea of peace talks in Oslo to buy time to recuperate from its losses and pressure Colombo to put the brakes on its military campaign. The Tigers will drag their feet in the peace talks, and hostilities will restart once the Tigers feel they are back in a position of strength. In other words, the civil war is far from over despite talk of negotiations.

Our third-quarter forecast for Nepal was on track. Negotiations between the Nepalese government and Maoists progressed, but a great deal of distrust remains between the two parties. The Parliament majority's insistence on retaining a role for the monarch and hesitance to incorporate Maoist cadres in the armed forces will likely lead to another Maoist standoff in the form of mass public demonstrations this quarter. These street protests will have a paralyzing effect on the country's economy, but the Maoists will not return to insurgent tactics this quarter. Meanwhile, the royalists in the government who have remained loyal to King Gyanendra will attempt to fuel distrust between the Maoists and the government by leaking stories of arms deliveries to the Royal Nepalese army to the press.

Another hot spot in South Asia this quarter will be Bangladesh. A 14-party opposition alliance led by former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina is expected to stage mass protests against current Prime Minister Begum Khaleda Zia over the latter's refusal to implement electoral reforms ahead of the January elections. The riots will be marked with violence and will intensify in the run-up to the elections.

Latin America: The Beginning of the End for the Left

In the third quarter, Mexico's presidential election took center stage. The election was extraordinarily close, as we forecast, with conservative candidate Felipe Calderon earning the presidency by a margin of just more than half a percentage point after a drawn-out investigation by Mexico's top electoral court. As we predicted, post-electoral conflict ensued when leftist challenger Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador lost.

Lopez Obrador continues to protest of the election; on Sept. 16, he held a "National Democratic Convention" during which his supporters declared him president of a parallel government. Though this move appears revolutionary, sources indicate that Lopez Obrador's "election" is purely symbolic and unlikely to jeopardize the official government. The protests that began July 30 seem to be losing significance and drawing to a close as life -- for everyone but Lopez Obrador and his shrinking support base -- returns to normal in Mexico City.

We also forecast that regional reactions on Bolivia's May 1 nationalization of hydrocarbons would be vital in the third quarter. This issue proved to be a hot topic, as Chile and Brazil announced plans for energy self-sufficiency by 2008 in the wake of mounting Bolivian gas prices. Only Argentina demonstrated a willingness to negotiate with Bolivia, agreeing to a significant price hike and even to foot the bill for a pipeline expansion that will quadruple current Bolivian exports to Argentina.

Mercosur grew more insignificant during the third quarter as divisive factors -- tensions after Venezuela joined, the paper mill dispute between Uruguay and Argentina and U.S. attempts to circumvent the bloc by holding individual free trade talks with Uruguay and Paraguay -- weakened the trading bloc. There was strife in intraregional relations with Venezuela; longtime Venezuelan allies Brazil and Argentina responded with fierce negativity when Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez attempted to assert leadership within Mercosur equal to that of the much larger countries.

Bolivia was a key player in the third quarter. We mentioned that President Evo Morales would win a majority -- but not a commanding majority -- of the assembly tasked with redrafting the constitution. Because of conflict between Morales' indigenous Movement Toward Socialism party and opposition groups supported by wealthy Bolivians, the country is destabilized, with separatist movements in the lowland regions and civic strikes gaining steam.

Latin America's fourth quarter will be defined by what becomes of the leftist movement in the region. Four upcoming elections -- in Brazil, Venezuela, Nicaragua and Ecuador -- will drive the changes in the Latin American left.

The radical leftist movement is at or near its peak. In the third quarter, the leftists lost ground for the first time since sweeping through the region at the turn of the 21st century. Chavez might be the self-appointed face of the left in Latin America, but he did not trigger the leftist movement; he is a result of it. The leftist movement in the region re-emerged out of the perceived failure of neoliberal policies of the late 1990s and the pre-existing economic troubles and high levels of unemployment that the policies did not fix. Left with a weak economy, lacking an effective legal system and troubled by poverty, corruption and unequal distributions of wealth and power, Latin America turned to the left. Except for Venezuela, countries in the politically jaded region did not approach this political shift enthusiastically. While the leftist movement enjoyed popularity and favor, its limitations are becoming apparent and the movement is on the decline.

Former powerhouses of the left have been shaken. The third quarter saw Venezuela's Chavez taking a world tour to build ties with various nations, including China, Iran, Syria and Angola. Though he signed numerous bilateral accords, his tour seems to have been more talk than action. Cuba faces a not-too-distant future without Fidel Castro. Mexico's election was a huge loss for the left, with the extent of the damage made all the more apparent by Venezuela and Bolivia's refusal to recognize the conservative Calderon as president-elect. Bolivia's Chavez-backed Morales made a small, but perceptible, move away from the Venezuelan leader by seeking the renewal of a preferential trade agreement with the United States, Chavez's adversary. Morales also has partially capitulated to Brazil's criticisms of a measure that would dictate how much profit foreign investors could earn from operations within the country by suspending the policy's implementation. In these ways -- some small, others more blatant -- the region is beginning to turn away from the radical left, a là Chavez, and move toward a centrist-left model that looks more like a European-style social democracy.

The four upcoming elections in Latin America hold the key to understanding how the left will change in the fourth quarter. Chavez has a strong advantage in polls leading up to Venezuela's Dec. 3 presidential election. Most of the opposition is organized behind one candidate, Manuel Rosales, a former state governor. Chavez's strong hold on the presidency is not surprising. He has assumed near total control of the country, crushing dissidents almost completely -- and Venezuela has enjoyed improved social and economic conditions. But the strength and popularity of the Chavez regime is directly tied to the high oil prices that have benefited the country. When oil prices fall, Chavez will make some significant cuts in his extravagant spending, which will lead to mounting tensions and decreasing popularity for his government.

Brazilian President Luiz Inacio "Lula" da Silva suffered an unexpected upset in the first round of the presidential election. Heavily favored to win with a strong lead in polls leading up to the Oct. 1 election, da Silva won a majority - but fell short of the absolute majority needed to prevent a run-off. This loss is due to growing allegations of electoral corruption. Though da Silva is still favored to win the run-off, the biggest surprise is the enormous jump contender, Geraldo Alckmin made. The latest polls before voting began indicated that Alckmin was nearly 24 points behind da Silva; but Alckmin, the centrist former governor of Sao Paulo, closed the gap in the election to approximately 7 percent. Lackluster Alckmin has not been willing to be very critical of da Silva and suffers from association with the Sao Paulo police force's failure to keep organized violent crime under control. Alckmin has also suffered allegations of electoral corruption, yet saw a significant and unanticipated gain. Though da Silva has been allied with Morales, Brazil is pulling away from Bolivia because of irritation over Bolivia's nationalization of hydrocarbons and seizure of assets belonging to Brazilian state-owned energy company Petróleo Brasileiro (Petrobras). Though it was not surprising that Petrobras would protest the seizure of its assets, it is surprising that Bolivia was willing to take steps backward. Brazil's recent pressure on Morales indicates a growing divide within the left -- between the radical and the more moderate leftist movement. If re-elected, as expected, da Silva will likely continue Brazil's measured movement toward more centrist policies.

As the region generally moves away from the radical left, Nicaragua's election appears to be an outlier. Polls indicate that leftist candidate Daniel Ortega is favored in the Nicaraguan election, set for Nov. 5. Ortega, a Sandinista, lost power in 1990 but has re-emerged as a top contender for the presidency. He is powerful enough that Chavez recently bypassed Nicaraguan President Enrique Bolanos to negotiate an oil deal directly with Ortega. His main opponent, Eduardo Montealegre, a banker and former foreign minister, has consistently trailed Ortega in the polls. If Ortega wins the presidency, Chavez will be pleased, though the overall effect on the leftist movement will be negligible since Nicaragua is a very minor player in the region.

The Latin American wildcard in the fourth quarter is Ecuador, which is the last country in the region where the radical left can take control. The first round of the presidential election will be held Oct. 15, and since none of the 10 candidates is likely to gain the 50 percent majority required to win, a second round is planned for Nov. 26. The top candidates are both left-leaning, but one -- Rafael Correa -- brags of his close relationship with Chavez. Correa is closing the small gap in the polls between himself and front-runner Leon Roldos, a center-leftist. Other close contenders include Cynthia Viteri from the Social Christian Party and Alvaro Noboa, a wealthy businessman. The Nov. 26 runoff will likely be a race between Roldos and Correa. Regardless of which candidate wins, Ecuador is the end of the road for the leftist movement. If Correa wins, Chavez will add Ecuador to his list of close allies. But if Roldos takes the presidency, there will no nation left for Chavez and his Bolivarian associates to align themselves with.

Economic trouble will be the downfall of the radical, Chavez-style leftist movement in Latin America. The economies of most Latin American countries appear relatively stable, but economic turmoil will eventually materialize and the appeal of the radical left will be lost. This will prove to be the case particularly in oil-reliant Venezuela, where even a moderate drop in oil prices could render the country unstable, threatening Chavez's standing on both domestic and international fronts.

In addition to changes in the leftist movement, the fourth quarter will see Chile continue in its quest for increased international relevance and a more robust economic outlook -- specifically through free trade talks such as those planned for the quarter with Australia, Thailand and Malaysia. Peru will wait, likely until after the U.S. midterm congressional elections in November, for an answer from Washington on a bilateral free trade agreement. The bill has met with some resistance in the U.S. House of Representatives, primarily because of its lack of fair labor provisions. However complicated and contentious Peru's potential free trade agreement may be, free trade talks between the United States and Colombia -- planned for early 2007 -- will generate more opposition.

Europe: Kosovo, NATO and Instability

We are happy to report that everything that we expected to happen in Europe in the third quarter did indeed happen. Of course, we forecast that nothing would happen -- the entire Continent was on vacation throughout the bulk of the quarter. About the only development of significance for the past three months has been the flurry of diplomacy surrounding the Lebanon crisis.

The fourth quarter will be busier (naturally), with three leading issues dominating the Continent. The first and most critical is the final disposition of the Serbian province of Kosovo. Ultimately the decision of whether to grant the province independence is up to the U.N. Security Council, but then so was the authorization for the 1999 NATO-Serbia war launched over veto-wielding Russia's objections. The decision to implement formal independence for Kosovo has already been made in the West, and all that is left are details (and possibly some planning on how to circumvent a Russian veto).

But that is hardly the end of the process that began with the NATO-Yugoslav war back in March 1999. Kosovo's independence will not only introduce a new statelet (the province is the size of Connecticut, with a population of 2 million), it will also send Serbian politics into a tailspin. Belgrade's government fell apart Sept. 30 with the defection of the pro-Western G17 Plus party and the country is deeply riven, both ideologically in terms of party and personally in terms of the elite. Standing off to the side is the Serbian Radical Party, the more xenophobic and anti-Western of Slobodan Milosevic's old ruling coalition, far and away the most powerful political force in the country.

The remnants of the current government would like to hold national elections before the Kosovo separation so that the Radicals cannot capitalize on what will soon become a fiery nationalistic issue and come to power. That, unfortunately, requires an intermediate step -- the ratification of a new constitution. When Montenegro -- another former Yugoslav territory -- broke away from Belgrade back in May, the standing Serbian constitution was made null and void. New elections cannot be held until there is a new constitution, the ratification of which is scheduled for an Oct. 28-29 referendum. After that it will be a race between the Serb national elections and a U.N. decision on Kosovo -- both tentatively scheduled for November.

Should Serbia's caretaker (yet with out G-17 Plus noticeably less pro-Western) government dramatically increase its efforts to apprehend and surrender war-crimes suspects from the Yugoslav wars of the 1990s, the United States might be able to delay -- although probably not prevent -- Kosovar secession. But odds are that this quarter Kosovo will go its own way, and Serbia will once again descend into nationalist passions.

The second major European event of the quarter will be the Nov. 28-29 NATO heads-of-state summit, where NATO will create a list of states to which it intends to offer membership. This summit, more than any other event this year, will indicate just how distracted and/or frisky the Bush administration is feeling.

Odds are that Washington is not feeling frisky at all. Given the administration's domestic unpopularity, Iran's intransigence and the ongoing agony of Iraq, the United States simply does not have the resources to continue its 15-year push into the former Soviet states. The expansion talks at the NATO summit will reflect these constraints; the most that can be expected will be a small enlargement limited to the southern Balkans -- specifically Albania, Croatia and Macedonia. And not even all three of these are guaranteed admittance. Any more than these three states and NATO risks three things: overextending itself, putting Russia on the warpath, and creating a split between Washington and the alliance's less anti-Russian members. Those are problems Washington simply cannot afford right now.

Finally, aside from the Kosovo/Serbia situation, there are other signs that Central Europe is at its most unstable since 1989. Several governments are not simply weak, but teetering:

  • Poland: The Kaczynski twins, now president and prime minister, are failing in their struggle to hold together their nationalist/populist coalition while their efforts to strengthen Poland's voice within the EU are adding to tensions with France and Germany. Even a successful effort to harness U.S. influence against Russia, a move that is popular across the entire Polish political spectrum, at this point will fail to keep their government from failing in the coming weeks.

  • Czech Republic: The current Czech center-right coalition government has not yet passed a vote of no confidence and will likely collapse officially in the opening days of the fourth quarter. Even if it somehow survives -- perhaps with a handful of center-left defectors -- it will face the unenviable task of avoiding collapse on a daily basis. The fourth quarter will be the coalition's proving ground, and its chances of birth -- much less survival -- are slim.

  • Slovakia: The leftist-nationalist government in power includes the party of former Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar, whose corrupt and authoritarian policies delayed Slovakia's NATO accession and threatened its EU accession. Now that Meciar is in the government, he is turning up the heat on his senior coalition partner in order to increase his influence over policy. Most of Slovakia's European partners are already praying for an outright government collapse, rather than allow Meciar any chance to actually wield power.

  • Bosnia: National elections held Oct. 1 produced a government aching for an internal fight, with Bosnian and Croat leaders arguing for nothing less than the full unification of the state and the elimination of Serb autonomy, with Serb leaders pushing for independence and union with Serbia proper. Normally this would not be big news in a "state" like Bosnia, whose "national" government is run by internationally appointed governor, High Representative and EU Special Representative Christian Schwarz-Schilling. However, these elections were supposed to select a government that will take over for the governor. Now Schwarz-Schilling has to figure out how to get unrepentant nationalists on all sides to form a non-sectarian-based unity government so that he can go home. Stratfor is not particularly optimistic that such a departure would end in anything shy of civil war.


Furthermore, Macedonia just had national elections and is now struggling with the ethnic tensions the elections created; recently independent Montenegro -- which finally broke from Serbia in the second quarter -- could have a rough time if the Radicals come to power in Belgrade. And, as of this writing, Estonia has still not selected its next president. Hungary is not out of the woods yet either, particularly after a private speech by Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsany denoting how he had lied to the country for four years was aired for all to hear Sept. 17. But this is hardly a complete rundown of Europe's problems.

Though Europe is now back from its summer holidays and governments are once again getting down to the nitty-gritty details of governance, the European Union remains in waiting. Decision-making within the EU is paralyzed and will remain so until Germany assumes its presidency in 2007. The leadership secession issues of France and the United Kingdom remain unresolved, and Italy's nine-party ruling coalition is as characteristically unstable now as it was the day it took office. In Romania we expect the government to break up acrimoniously, but because the parties in power need to be on their best behavior in order to join the European Union at New Year's, it will be all white knuckles and fake smiles until Jan. 1.

But the biggest problem looming on the horizon is energy. Russia is more than simply miffed that the European Union is seeking a free trade agreement with Ukraine -- an action that Moscow fears could tear Ukraine out of its orbit just as surely as membership in NATO would. Russia has several tools to use against Europe should it feel the need, but nothing gets Europeans to sit up and pay attention more than the heat going off in winter. Such an action is hardly written in stone, and if it did occur it would not likely happen before January. If the Russians love anything, however, it is surprising everyone.

Africa: Impatience, Violence and the Political Process

Our forecast for Africa for 2006 is largely on track. South Africa remains paralyzed by an internal struggle resulting from a corruption trial involving former Deputy President Jacob Zuma, and it is thus unable to effectively influence events elsewhere in Africa. Zimbabwe continues to deteriorate economically, and President Robert Mugabe's regime still faces political opposition. We accurately forecast that Mugabe would rely on his security forces to harass and marginalize his opponents. Our call on Nigeria proved true, as that country faced an increase in attacks against foreign oil interests involving more militant groups, and that Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo would malign his political opponents, most notably his own vice president and rival, Atiku Abubakar.

The third quarter saw significant attention being paid to the conflict in Sudan's Darfur region. We correctly anticipated that the United Nations would pass a resolution calling for an international peacekeeping force for Darfur - and when the government of Sudan rejected the proposed U.N. intervention in favor of African Union (AU) peacekeepers. The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) saw violence break out immediately following the July 30 presidential elections. Though we accurately forecast there violence, we expected President Joseph Kabila to be re-elected. Having failed to secure an outright majority -- Kabila fell short with 45 percent of the vote -- he faces a runoff with Jean-Pierre Bemba scheduled for Oct. 29.

Somalia's Islamic Courts Union (ICU) consolidated its hold over the country's southern and central regions in the third quarter. We correctly forecast that no international peacekeeping force would intervene to support Somalia's interim government, and our anticipation that the interim government would then turn to Ethiopia as its defender against ICU advances was also accurate. Somalia's interim government and the ICU discussed relations and power-sharing agreements during the third quarter -- as we forecast -- but the failed assassination attempt on Somalia's president Sept. 18 effectively negated any progress made in the talks.

Cote d'Ivoire simmered in conflict during the third quarter, as we thought it would, because of issues surrounding national elections and the disarmament of the country's militias.

The theme of the fourth quarter in sub-Saharan Africa is that impatient nationalistic forces, aiming for political change, will display their frustration with slow political progress with violence. From Somalia to Nigeria and from Cote d'Ivoire to South Africa, the possibility of future political change will be threatened by violence aimed at forcing change immediately. South Africa's government will expend considerable political capital to prevent political discontent from becoming violent. The government in Cote d'Ivoire, on the other hand, will avoid making political concessions and rely on the United Nations to prevent conflict with its opponents. Nigeria will see renewed national-level violence against candidates and their supporters as the country gears up for elections slated for April 2007.

In Somalia, the Islamists will struggle among themselves -- with significant geopolitical repercussions -- over whether to eject the country's secular interim government. Somalia is still guided by shifting family and clan interests, despite the international attention the country's interim government and ICU received during the third quarter as each fought for political supremacy. Amid this continuing struggle is the concern that the ICU will turn to Islamist militants to impose its will on the rest of Somalia, and therefore make Somalia a training ground for these transnational fighters.

As the ICU consolidated its position in southern and central Somalia in the third quarter, it largely ignored the interim government in Baidoa. However, the interim government remains weak and without its own security force. Fearing that the ICU would threaten its territory and security, Ethiopia got involved, as we expected, and maintained a buffer zone between the interim government and the Islamists. This move, however, is part of a split within the interim government; some members are opposed to Ethiopian involvement and others -- like Somalian President Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed-- need Ethiopia's security guarantees.

The ICU appears undecided on how to handle the interim government; at times, the Islamists talk of negotiating a power-sharing agreement, but at other times they refuse to talk with an Ethiopian-backed government. The Sept. 18 failed assassination attempt on Yusuf in Baidoa reveals these divisions within the ICU. The attack will embolden Yusuf to expose the ICU as extremists who have al Qaeda support and to reinforce his calls for security forces. The ICU, which clearly gained power and legitimacy over the interim government in the third quarter, will lose its momentum as a result of the attack on the president. Khartoum-moderated peace talks, scheduled for Oct. 30, will not be held.

The AU will propose an intervention via peacekeeping force in Somalia, but it lacks the funds and manpower to deploy such a force -- and the Islamists and their domestic and international backers would oppose the plan. A public stalemate will continue, but the conflict in Somalia will quietly intensify. Ethiopia and other regional actors will reinforce their defense of the interim government, causing Somalia's Islamists to beef up their military capabilities.

Sudan will face increasing international pressure, particularly from the United States, to accept a U.N. peacekeeping force in the country's Darfur region. However, Sudanese President Omar al Bashir will continue rejecting the U.N. force because of domestic constraints -- mainly Sudanese Islamists, who have threatened to fight both a U.N. force and the Sudanese government if it accepts such a force. Al Bashir will only accept peacekeepers if their presence does not threaten his regime or Sudan's Islamists. An AU force comprising troops from Muslim African countries could fit this bill.

Delays will continue in Cote d'Ivoire's peace process. Elections scheduled for Oct. 30 will not be held then. President Laurent Gbagbo will continue thwarting the political process, knowing that he will likely lose national elections. Opposition parties will increase pressure on the United Nations to get involved in the country's critical political issues -- national identity and the disarmament of pro- and anti-government militias -- which must be solved to pave the way for national elections. New Forces rebels opposed to the extension of Gbagbo's mandate beyond Oct. 30 will threaten to act against the government, and U.N. and French peacekeepers will be pushed to keep the New Forces in the north, away from Gbagbo's regime in the south.

South Africa will continue to be paralyzed by Zuma's now-dismissed corruption trial. The country will be forced to devote its attention to a Zuma candidacy for president following the South African judge's Sept. 20 decision to throw out the charges against Zuma. Supporters of South African President Thabo Mbeki and pro-Zuma left-wing factions within the African National Congress (ANC) will stake out their positions, with Zuma's supporters becoming increasingly vocal in attempts to secure for Zuma a bid for the leadership of the ANC party.

To stave off protests from Zuma's supporters within the South African Communist Party and the Congress of South African Trade Unions, Mbeki will be forced to move to the left in order to demonstrate that the ANC under his leadership can deliver essential services to its core base -- the country's impoverished majority. Mbeki will not be able to budge on the recent land reform policy changes that require prompt negotiations to speed up the sale of white-owned farmland to black farmers.

The DRC will hold its presidential runoff election Oct. 29, since no candidate secured an outright majority in the July 30 election. The incumbent Kabila, who carried 45 percent of the vote, is expected to win. Opposition presidential candidate Jean-Pierre Bemba, who came in second with 20 percent of the vote, will be strongly encouraged to accept the vice presidency. Bemba and his supporters will want to protest the outcome of the elections violently, but the international donor community, the 1,500 EU peacekeepers and the 17,000 U.N. peacekeepers will maintain a heavy presence to quell any violence that occurs following the runoff election.

Political pressure against Zimbabwe's Mugabe will grow. The economy will continue to deteriorate, giving further ammunition to a civil society already angry at poor wages, spiraling inflation and high taxes. Amid the heightened political and economic tension, and with cracks showing in the country's security infrastructure, the masses will become emboldened to challenge the Mugabe regime. The opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) party will slowly recover from its earlier fractioning and will join the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions to more effectively challenge the ruling Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front. Mugabe will open negotiations along nonthreatening socio-economic lines while avoiding political issues, using the country's security forces as part of the negotiations to attempt to divide the MDC from the labor unions.

Nigeria will face intense political violence on a national level that will overshadow the violence in the Niger Delta region. Obasanjo will privately insist that the Sept. 18 plane crash that killed several senior members of the country's armed forces was a deliberate attack to topple his government. Obasanjo will launch a purge within the armed forces and seek reprisals against his political opponents. Further animosity between Obasanjo and Atiku will develop. Obasanjo will try -- but fail -- to have Atiku tried for corruption, an impeachable offense, in order to deny Atiku the opportunity to run for president in the April 2007 national elections. Violence against foreign oil interests will continue in the Niger Delta region as simmering criticisms from his political opponents and his own post-presidency worries distract Obasanjo.

Uganda will slowly reach a peace agreement with the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA). President Yoweri Museveni will convince the International Criminal Court to drop its indictment against LRA leader Joseph Kony, who will then accept a permanent settlement with the Ugandan government.

Skirmishes between the Senegalese army and Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance (MFDC) rebels that have been confined to the country's Casamance region will spread south toward Guinea Bissau. The MFDC, which has been leading an armed insurgency against the Senegalese government since the early 1980's, will carry out more raids in the region to capture materiel to support their fight. This will result in a security crackdown throughout the Casamance region and larger clashes will ensue.

Stratfor (Estados Unidos)

 


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12/01/2006|
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20/12/2005|
01/08/2005|
06/01/2005|

ver + notas
 
Center for the Study of the Presidency
Freedom House