Soon after Nigeria’s 2003 national elections, Rivers state Gov. Peter Odili sat back and assessed the situation. He had just been sworn in for his second term as governor of the leading oil-producing state in the Niger Delta, at the helm of a state government generating on the order of $100 million per month. It was not clear to Odili that a third gubernatorial term was even possible. Politicians were still charting their way in the new democratic Nigeria, which had just gone through its second election cycle. Although the constitution restricted elected officials to two terms, there was no guarantee that a strongman would not figure out a way around that. In any case, Odili had his sights on a higher office — either president or vice president — that would befit his growing stature as a political heavyweight in the Niger Delta.

Oil is Nigeria’s raison d’être, its only real form of wealth. The majority of Nigerian government revenues — and 95 percent of its export income — are generated by crude oil production. Ninety-five percent of Nigeria’s oil production comes from the Niger Delta; of that total, roughly 40 percent comes from Rivers state (Bayelsa and Delta states each contribute about 15 percent). Control over the oil provides tremendous advantages beyond short-term personal gain; oil-derived income finances a patronage network that ensures long-term loyalties upstream and down.

To achieve higher office, Odili — a member of the Igbo tribe, which is a minority in Rivers state but the dominant tribe in the neighboring south-east geopolitical zone — first had to break the political hold that Ijaw Chief Edwin Clark continued to have in the Niger Delta. Although Odili worked closely with Ijaw Youth Council (IYC) President Mujahid Dokubo-Asari during the 2003 elections (and had gotten Asari elected IYC president in 2001), Asari still had one foot in Clark’s camp. Asari’s divided loyalties weakened Odili’s grip on the levers of power in Rivers state — Asari could pass actionable intelligence on Odili to Clark for use against the Rivers governor. Maintaining a connection to Asari, and by extension Clark, was a price Odili could no longer afford to pay if he wanted to propel his own ascendancy within the dominant People’s Democratic Party (PDP).

Odili had to dump Asari and break from Clark without exposing himself to an Asari counterattack. To deal with Asari, Odili repeated a move from his 2001 IYC playbook (in which he had Asari elected president of the IYC in order to lure the group of marauding youth away from Clark and into his camp), this time luring away Asari’s deputy, Ateke Tom, in return for exclusive patronage.

When Asari held the IYC presidency from 2001 to 2003, Tom had been his deputy in charge of the Rivers state’s Okrika “axis” (a MEND term for the turf or territory it controls or is fighting to control). Tom’s gang was called the Icelanders and its turf stretched from Port Harcourt south to Bonny Island. Now Odili provided political protection to Tom while he waged war against Asari. For compensation, Tom was given free rein to take over illegal bunkering routes that Asari claimed for himself. Tom split from Asari and renamed his Icelanders the Niger Delta Vigilante (NDV), in part to improve his reputation following alleged Icelander atrocities. Based in the town of Okrika and the slums in and around Port Harcourt, the NDV hunted down Asari’s forces in Rivers state.

Neither Asari nor Clark took the news of Asari’s being dumped by Odili very well. For Clark to maintain his influence in the Niger Delta, he needed to keep Odili in check. Failure to respond to Odili could permit the Rivers state governor to become too politically powerful for Clark to contain. Odili had taken the gloves off, forcing Clark to respond in kind.

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By July 2003, Asari had transformed the IYC — an activist organization that had participated in some targeted violence — by adding a dedicated militant wing known as the Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force (NDPVF). The IYC remained an activist youth organization promoting Ijaw interests throughout the Niger Delta while its militant wing, led by Asari, battled Odili’s proxy militia, the Tom-led NDV.

Fallout from the April 2003 elections carried into the summer as the NDPVF fought running battles against the NDV. In October, the NDV assassinated Onengiye Ofori Terika (aka Occasion Boy), Asari’s deputy in charge of the Tombia axis, located about a half-hour’s boat ride southwest of Port Harcourt. In addition to battling each other, the two militias fought for control over bunkering routes, the proceeds from which were used by their respective political patrons.

Despite the fact that Odili provided political cover for Tom’s forces during their assaults — police and military forces would stand aside during NDV operations — Asari’s forces maintained their positions and effectively fought back throughout 2004. In June of that year, the Rivers state government was forced to raise the stakes, deploying a state-level contingent of army, navy and police forces against Asari units. Fighting intensified, with battles waged not only in the creeks and villages of Rivers state but in the streets and neighborhoods of Port Harcourt. Combined forces of the NDV and the state security apparatus were unable to defeat the NDPVF, forcing the Odili government to request federal assistance. In response, army personnel comprising the Joint Task Force (JTF) were deployed in September 2004 in support of the NDV and state security personnel.

These combined JTF, NDV and state security operations against the NDPVF in September triggered Asari to declare “all out war” against the Nigerian state. Asari adopted Ijaw nationalist slogans to defend his attacks, saying that the Ijaw tribe and Niger Delta had been exploited for decades by corrupt Nigerian governments and that his group was fighting to control the resources in the region.

Ceasefire and Simmering Conflict

Asari’s declaration of war, igniting a conflict that threatened to spread beyond the control of Niger Delta politicians, caused global crude prices to hit $50 per barrel for the first time ever and brought Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo into the mix. In October 2004, Obasanjo called Asari and Tom to the Nigerian capital and negotiated a ceasefire. In return for disarming their militias and turning in their weapons, the federal government would pay militant leaders the equivalent of $1,000 per weapon and grant amnesty for any crimes committed. The Rivers state government promised to pay an additional $1,800 per weapon surrendered. It is not clear how many weapons were given up or how much money Asari received, but he returned from Abuja and proceeded to live an extravagant lifestyle in Port Harcourt, complete with mansions and the freedom to travel about in luxury SUVs, while still maintaining control of his militant group.

Political pressure was also exerted to rein in Tom’s forces. Tom himself was charged with murder in connection with a November 2004 attack on the member of an NDPVF-allied gang called the Greenlanders. Rather than give himself up, Tom pinned the blame on his deputy, Soboma George. In November 2004, George was arrested for murder and jailed in Port Harcourt. Tom’s betrayal of George would have repercussions. George was broken out of jail in June 2005 by a force led by then-NDPVF deputy Farah Dagogo. George went on to form his own gang, called the Outlaws, and joined Asari’s side in the struggle.

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Meanwhile, pipeline sabotage and bunkering by the NDPVF and the NDV was becoming more common in the oil-producing states, and more burdensome for the oil companies. They would patch up critical pipelines and abandon those that were less critical, which reinforced grievances among grassroots supporters of militants that the foreign oil companies did little more than pollute the local communities. Oil companies also would continue to pay protection money to local chiefs and youth organizations, which would reinforce the perception of a corrupt relationship between the companies and authorities at all levels, which in turn would justify the militancy and violence.

By 2005, President Obasanjo still had his sights on amending the country’s constitution so that he could be allowed a third term in office. Obasanjo’s efforts were blocked, however, by the Nigerian senate in May 2006. Vice President Atiku Abubakar had been instrumental in mobilizing politicians to defeat the Obasanjo amendment. Atiku, a Muslim from the northeastern Adamawa state, had ambitions himself for the presidency, and Obasanjo interpreted his maneuvering as a betrayal, which led to Atiku’s being marginalized within the ruling PDP.

Atiku did not abandon his presidential aspirations, however. The Nigerian vice president sent out feelers to the opposition Action Congress (AC) party to gauge his chances of becoming its presidential candidate. Knowing that running a successful presidential campaign requires a deep network of supporters and funds, Atiku then turned his eyes toward the Niger Delta.

While Atiku was looking for routes to a presidential nomination, he reached an agreement with Bayelsa state Gov. Diepreye Alamieyeseigha. The governor had been a pro-Obasanjo member of the PDP since winning office in 1999, but the lure of a possible vice presidential slot on Atiku’s ticket was an offer too good to refuse. Alamieyeseigha ran his state as a personal bank account and the corruption was ignored — until his switch to Atiku. The federal Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) began to investigate Alamieyeseigha, and in September 2005 he was detained in London on money-laundering charges. In December 2005, Alamieyeseigha was impeached, imprisoned and replaced by his deputy, Goodluck Jonathan. As a result of the Atiku/Alamieyeseigha saga, the EFCC became a useful tool for the ruling PDP to destroy its own as well as opposition politicians who run afoul of the established hierarchy.

Government authorities also pursued Asari, who was arrested in September 2005 on treason charges following statements he made at a conference, calling for the disintegration of the Nigerian state. Asari’s trial lasted two months, and in November 2005 the NDPVF leader was sentenced to prison, where he served 18 months (even though he was never technically convicted of treason).

Looking Ahead to 2007

Although Obasanjo failed to gain a third term as president, he was not about to back down easily. The two-time civilian president (Obasanjo also ruled Nigeria as military dictator from 1976 to 1979) needed to ensure that he would be safe from prosecution for any crimes committed during his administrations (accusations leveled at Obasanjo included economic malfeasance and human rights violations) and to ensure a financially comfortable retirement. Obasanjo needed a successor who would be beholden to him so that Obasanjo could continue to play a kingmaker role in the ruling PDP.

In 2005, looking ahead to the 2007 national elections, state politicians began jockeying for the presidency. With a rival (though junior) governor — Alamieyeseigha — sidelined after being imprisoned and with militia leader Asari imprisoned, Odili could make a serious run for the office. But having Odili ensconced at the Aso Rock presidential compound in Abuja would be too much of a threat to Ijaw Chief Clark. Odili was already a powerful politician in the Niger Delta as governor of the leading oil-producing state, but he was not an Ijaw, and Clark considered him a usurper. As president, with even more money and patronage at his finger tips, Odili would become too powerful for Clark to control. In a region (and country) where turf and influence are matters of life and death, seeing Odili at Aso Rock was a vision that Clark simply could not bear.

It is not clear whether Clark himself had ambitions for the office. He probably did not, given his age (he would be 75 in 2007) and preference for working behind the scenes. In any case, Clark soon envisioned a politician of his own at Aso Rock. The Niger Delta was too important a region not to have a secure stake at the highest levels of government. As one of the country’s six official geopolitical regions, the south-south zone, encompassing the Delta and its Ijaw majority, had never produced a Nigerian president, and Clark believed the time to do so was now.