The four-month operation actually has led to an increase in U.S. troop deaths, he added. This deliberate statement is indicative of both the military reality in Iraq and political tensions in Iraq and the United States.


Operation Together Forward, the U.S. offensive that was supposed to stem the spiraling violence in the Iraqi capital, has failed to achieve its objectives, U.S. Army spokesman Maj. Gen. William Caldwell acknowledged Oct. 19. He attributed the recent increase in U.S. deaths in Iraq to the operation and said a new solution is necessary. The statement is indicative of military realities on the ground -- as well as political tensions in Iraq and within the U.S. Defense Department.

Launched June 14, Operation Together Forward began to wind down three weeks ago when the U.S. military curtailed major operations in the most-troubled neighborhoods of Baghdad -- precisely the areas that made the operation necessary in the first place. The fact is, however, that if Caldwell can make a statement of this nature now, the troops on the ground have been aware of the operation's failure for weeks -- at the very least. From a tactical perspective, this failure has been apparent for some time.

However, the United States has now publicly acknowledged that failure and signaled a change in strategy. Baghdad has always been the cornerstone of efforts to seek stability in Iraq, and security there remains the foremost concern for U.S. planners. But the reinforcement of forces, which already were attempting to clear out insurgents and clamp down on sectarian violence in the capital, did not bring about the desired effect.

In fact, quite the reverse occurred, as witnessed by the increase in violence and the deaths -- 74 in October so far -- among U.S. troops. Because of the increased death toll and uptick in violence, the United States had to offer an explanation, especially in the run-up to the Nov. 7 midterm congressional elections. The explanation, however, could easily have been made without announcing the failure of a major operation. While Caldwell did cite operational tempo as a direct contributor to the rise in U.S. deaths, and the Muslim holy month of Ramadan has brought a spike in violence since the war began, Caldwell's statement went well beyond providing the requisite explanation.

Caldwell, as spokesman for the Multinational Force-Iraq, does not make statements independent of the Pentagon. The question, then, is why the Pentagon would authorize him to declare Operation Together Forward a failure now when it could have done so weeks ago -- or even waited until after the elections. One possible answer is that the generals who orchestrated the announcement were hoping to take advantage of the politically sensitive election period to win the Bush administration's approval for more troops in Iraq.

Commanders in the field have long been clamoring for many more troops than they have received under Operation Together Forward. This clamor, the consistently negative response and the resulting tension between operational commanders and the Bush administration, including Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, is not new. The strained relations between the Joint Chiefs and Rumsfeld also suggest that the announcement was timed to hurt the administration. It is evident from the White House response, for example, that the Bush administration was not informed in advance that Caldwell's statement would question the strategy in Iraq. In its Oct. 20 response, the administration downplayed the strategy issue, saying instead that Bush is perfectly willing to accept a change in "tactics" in Iraq.

Regardless of the motive of Caldwell's statement, now is the most auspicious time to make such a statement without immediate repercussions. Right before the election, Bush could not be caught firing generals who offer pessimistic prognoses on the war efforts.

Together Forward might have had a chance at success if Iraqi leaders, especially those who exercise influence over Shiite death squads and militias, had done their part to rein in the violence. Instead, politicians loyal to Shiite leader Muqtada al-Sadr -- a full third of the ruling Shiite coalition -- failed to support U.S. efforts to rout Shiite death squads. The arrest and subsequent release of Shiite cleric Sheikh Mazen al-Saedi is a case in point. While U.S. forces escalated the operational tempo and exposed themselves in heavy patrolling operations and in manning additional checkpoints -- taking heavy casualties as a result -- key Iraqi groups have not played ball.

The new strategy Caldwell mentioned in his statement is yet to be determined, at least partially because administration officials and military planners are running out of ideas short of enormous influxes of U.S. troops. The statement, however, is a signal to the Iraqi government that the United States is finished fighting its battles. No change will be immediate, even after the results of the Nov. 7 election are in. But a new strategy is desperately needed -- and that shift has now officially begun.