Reports are surfacing that the July 2 Colombian hostage rescue was achieved through a complex plan involving the infiltration of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) guerrilla group, along with signals interference that tricked the FARC into turning over the hostages without a fight.

The U.S. military reportedly had decoded FARC communications and was intercepting its radio traffic. The Colombians then sent a series of coded messages to the FARC saying that the hostages were going to be transported by a friendly nongovernmental organization to the southern part of the country on the orders of FARC leader Alfonso Cano, who was considering a hostage swap. The Colombians then landed their helicopters in the FARC camp, picked up the hostages and flew off. The operation appears to have gone off without a single shot being fired.

Pulled from the FARC jungle hideout after years of captivity were Ingrid Betancourt, a French-Colombian citizen and former presidential candidate, three U.S. hostages and 11 captured Colombian soldiers.

The tactical success of the rescue mission speaks volumes for the progress the Colombian military has made in its operations against the FARC. U.S. forces did play a substantial role in aiding the Colombian forces by developing the signals and human intelligence used to locate the hostages and convince the FARC that the hostage move was legitimate. There are no outward indications that U.S. troops were involved in the mission’s execution, as their presence would have given away the ruse. However, the United States has been heavily involved in training and equipping the Colombian military, and U.S. military personnel have been known to participate in a wide variety of liaison and advisory activities.

Regardless of U.S. participation in the rescue mission, the operation has overwhelmingly beneficial implications for Colombian President Alvaro Uribe Velez. Without these high-level hostages, the FARC has lost its political bargaining chips, and Uribe has achieved a major goal — rescuing the hostages and debilitating the FARC. In achieving these goals, Uribe has gained considerable credibility at home. This will help him with domestic political difficulties and might enable him to push through a legal measure that would eliminate term limits. Halfway through his second four-year term, Uribe has asked for an extension of his leadership so he can continue pursuing his policies. This mission might give him the boost he needs.

The rescue mission might also make it possible for Uribe to negotiate a final settlement with the FARC. The information that will be gained from debriefing the hostages could very well help the Colombians make even greater strides toward neutralizing the rebel group. With its number of fighters greatly reduced and many of its leaders dead or deserted, the FARC is at a severe disadvantage. Cano is considered to be more of a soldier and less of an ideologue, and without a guiding ideological mission, it might be easier for him to come to a negotiated agreement with the government and lay down arms.

It must be remembered, however, that while the FARC is weakening, it is not dead. The group still holds some 700 hostages, and retaliatory strikes against the government and civilians can be expected. It is not out of the question that the FARC could seek to replenish its stock of high-profile hostages.

Nevertheless, the weakening of the FARC has Colombians looking ahead, and hopes are high throughout the country that they might finally be able to move beyond their decades-long war against leftist insurgents and drug traffickers. The demise of the FARC, however, should not be confused with the demise of the drug industry in Colombia.

Although the FARC would not exist without the financial support provided by the drug trade, the opposite is not true. Without the FARC, the drug trade would still flourish, since a host of smaller actors are actually responsible for the production and processing of Colombian cocaine. The U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency estimates that there might be up to 300 of these groups operating throughout Colombia.

For Uribe, taking down the drug trade is the next step, and the momentum and success he has maintained thus far will give him the political support he needs to push forward. Although Uribe could use such tools as subsidies for coca growers to encourage crop replacement, he will likely rely on a military strategy to regain control of the country.