A U.S. official, speaking on condition of anonymity, confirmed a report printed in The Washington Times that the United States has switched the system from testing status to operational status. Realistically, the BMD system becoming "operational" is less likely than an actual North Korean missile launch -- but like the North Korean launch preparations, perception is more important than reality.

The BMD system consists of an integrated series of early warning and tracking radars and interceptor missiles. If a missile launch against the continental United States (CONUS) is detected, interceptors fitted with "kill vehicles" -- based at Fort Greely and Kodiak Island, Alaska, and Vandenberg Air Force Base in California -- can be launched to intercept the hostile missiles midway to their targets. Once in the path of the re-entry vehicle, the kill vehicle (which carries no explosive) hits it at a combined speed of over 15,000 miles per hour, destroying them both. This process has been described as analogous to shooting down a .22 caliber bullet, fired from one end of a football field, with another .22 caliber bullet fired from the other end.

The U.S. BMD program has been plagued by cost overruns (Washington has spent more than $97 billion on it so far), delays and poor test performance since development began in earnest in 1999. The program has had no shortage of critics doubting its political and technical feasibility.

Many high-profile flight tests were conducted in which target missiles simulating incoming intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) were launched from Vandenberg. These targets were then supposed to be intercepted by missiles launched from a U.S. Army range on Kwajalein Atoll in the Pacific Ocean or from Kodiak Island. Of the 10 intercept tests conducted since 1999, five failed due to technical reasons: failure of the interceptor's tracking sensors, failure of the interceptor missile's stages to properly separate, or failure of the interceptor to launch at all. The five successful intercepts were conducted either under ideal conditions, or under conditions that made it very easy for the interceptor to locate and intercept the target. The last successful test intercept was in October 2002, and the idealized test conditions were almost exactly the same as the previous test seven months earlier.

If the BMD system is truly operational, that means that the system is on 24-hour alert, with early warning and tracking sensors constantly searching the skies for incoming hostile missiles and interceptor missiles ready to launch at a moment's notice. Given the system's poor track record under testing conditions, it may not be prudent to expect the system to be 100 percent reliable under operational conditions. From a tactical standpoint, there is probably very little real change in the BMD system's status.

Historically, ballistic missiles have been far more effective weapons in the political arena than on the battlefield. During the Cold War, U.S. and Soviet ICBMs affected geopolitics for 40 years without ever being fired in anger. The North Koreans have already gained significant political capital with their "impending" missile test, and at the time of this writing, the missile has not even been launched yet. By revealing that its BMD system is currently operational, Washington is hoping to change the political stakes in its favor.

Given the BMD program's track record, the contractors, military personnel and government officials from Alaska to Washington are probably praying that they never have to test the system in a real-world scenario. If the North Koreans were to launch a missile toward the CONUS, it would be the ultimate test for the BMD system. If the system fails operationally after burning through so many billions of dollars, its opponents will be sure to raise a deafening storm of criticism.

The North Koreans also would have a lot riding on an actual launch of a missile or a satellite from their country. If it is successful, they can claim a great propaganda victory. However, if it fails, Pyongyang may have overplayed its hand in the ongoing six-party talks, as well as its overall negotiating position, which relies on strategic ambiguity. A successful satellite launch works because the accuracy of a North Korean ballistic missile guidance system would remain an unknown. A partially effective launch like the 1998 test, for example, also leaves this ambiguity intact. A failed launch, however, undermines Pyongyang's propaganda and could jeopardize its finances from missile-development sales to other nations.

It is, therefore, quite possible that politicians, military personnel, technicians and operators in North Korea and the United States are all privately hoping that they will not have to actually test the systems they have been cultivating for so long.