Turkmen President Saparmurat Niyazov, the former Soviet bureaucrat who ruled his desolate Central Asian country since 1985, died Dec. 21 of a cardiac arrest at the age of 66. Constitutionally, power should pass to the figurehead leader of the pseudo parliament, National Assembly President Avesgeldy Atayev, but since he is currently under investigation, the National Security Council has instead named Deputy Prime Minister Gurbanguly Berdimukhammedov interim president.

Although elections must be held within two months under the country's constitution, Turkmenistan's fate will be determined by forces that have nothing to do with the ballot box.

Niyazov was among the most bizarre leaders in human history, renaming himself Turkmenbashi (Father of the Turkmen) only because the Turkish government threatened to cut off relations if he went with his first choice: Ataturk. In the years since the Soviet dissolution, he crafted a cult of personality that included erecting an army of golden statues of himself in the capital, Ashgabat. He also used his new appellation to rename everything from a port to a meteorite, altered the months of the year to more accurately reflect his "central role in human history," created a spiritual guidebook of his personal wisdom that has largely replaced all other texts in the country's educational system, had a self-styled theme park built and produced a line of household products bearing his name that includes a Turkmenbashi vodka in his ostensibly Muslim nation.

To rule in this way, he had to rid his country of anyone who might have been willing to oppose him -- or even question him. While his violent tendencies could hardly be compared to those of Josef Stalin, Niyazov instituted purge after purge to remove any semblance of opposition -- indeed, independent thought -- from his domain. His sense of irony often showed in his actions, such as when a railroad minister was "accidentally" run over by a train. At other times he was just creative, such as his use of the (likely fictitious) assassination attempt against him as a pretext to banish or arrest the few opposition politicians who remained in the country.

The result of his strong-arm tactics is that, aside from a small cadre of loyalists whose sole duty it was to ensure Niyazov's physical safety, there is no one left in the country who possesses the mix of competence and charisma needed to step into Turkmenbashi's shoes. Elections are constitutionally required to be held within two months, but they will be as pointless in Niyazov's absence as they were in his presence.

So what is up for grabs?

Turkmenistan is a desert state slightly smaller than Texas located north of Iran in Central Asia. Its biggest claim to fame (aside from Turkmenbashi himself) is that it is believed to be the home of the world's fifth-largest natural gas supply. Currently, its existing infrastructure is Soviet-era and creaking (Niyazov's purges extended to all facets of society), and it sends nearly all of its natural gas exports -- about 67 billion cubic meters per year -- north and west to Russia. Without those shipments, Russian state energy firm Gazprom would find it impossible to both satisfy domestic Russian natural gas demand and fulfill its export contracts with Europe and Turkey.

Turkmenistan's natural gas fields -- the ones that are currently being exploited and those that have never been touched -- are often pointed to as sources for potential energy infrastructure projects that could send natural gas to South Asia via Afghanistan, or to Europe via a sub-sea Caspian pipeline. If Gazprom, the world's largest producer, shipper and exporter of natural gas, thinks Turkmenistan is of critical importance, one gets an idea of just how big the economic fallout from a presidential death in a country with no real leaders could be.

But the economic implications of Niyazov's demise are merely the tip of the geopolitical iceberg. What will soon begin is a free-for-all over the future of the territory.

Russia must have Turkmen natural gas to keep its policy of using energy as a foreign policy hammer going; replacing Turkmen supplies would take a decade and tens of billions of dollars in cash that Gazprom simply does not have. This policy is the foundation of Russia's grand strategy, and there is little Moscow would not do to ensure that it gets its way.

For Iran, Turkmenbashi's death presents an opportunity. Turkmenistan is the borderland between the Persians on one hand and the Central Asian tribes and the Russians on the other. Historically, invasions of Persia have come from two directions: west and north. Iranian policy vis-à-vis Iraq to the west is something Stratfor has discussed at length, and in order to secure that border, Tehran has masterminded events to turn Iraq into a quagmire for the United States. To secure its north, Tehran is very likely to contemplate measures of a similar scope. Indeed, the majority of Turkmenistan's 5 million people live within a few miles of the Iranian border. An invasion would be logistically simple, strategically sound and impossible for any power to counter.

Notably absent from this game is the West. The United States has a handful of troops outside of Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, about 1,000 miles away, and its forces in Afghanistan cannot even think of being redeployed. It has tried to secure base rights in Turkmenistan to support its Afghan operations only to be rebuffed by Niyazov himself. The Europeans might like the idea of accessing Turkmen energy, but they utterly lack the ability to project power into the heart of the Asian landmass. Similarly, the former Turkmen opposition -- while eager to return home -- lacks the gravitas, following and unity to play a significant role.

Optimistic Americans or Europeans might think Niyazov's death provides them an opening, and indeed they could secure some provisional deals. But the Iranians and Russians -- who have far more tools at their disposal in Turkmenistan -- would likely wipe away those deals, and the Turkmen dealmakers behind them, within days.

This means that all eyes should be on Moscow and Tehran for the next few months. For the past two years, the geopolitical strategies of these two countries -- to tie down the Americans -- have been relatively in sync. But now there is a prize that both desperately want, and one that cannot be easily shared. With former Russian spies being poisoned in London and militants raging in Iraq, the world should know full well that these powers do not play softly when the stakes are high.

And this merely sets the stage. Three other Central Asian leaders -- Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev, Tajik President Emomali Rakhmonov and Uzbek President Islam Karimov -- are all de facto despots who have gutted the opposition and, as of yet, have not fashioned a clear line of succession. The battle to follow Niyazov's death is just the beginning.