Representatives from Syria, Iran, Iraq, the United States and Turkey, and various Arab League and U.N Security Council members met in Damascus, Syria, on Aug. 9 for the second day of an international security meeting aimed at curbing the Iraqi insurgency. At a closed-door session of the meeting, the head of the Political Security branch of Syria's intelligence apparatus, Mohammad Mansoura, said Syria's border forces have come under attack 100 times from militants inside Iraq. Mansoura added that the Syrian security apparatus is engaged in deadly operations to combat jihadists along the Iraqi border -- a blatant exaggeration to demonstrate that Syria, too, is a victim of Islamist militancy.

As Stratfor has long observed, Syria has been biding its time to exploit the situation in Iraq to break out of its diplomatic isolation. In addition to gaining U.S. recognition for its role in the Iraq negotiations, Syria expects its reward for cooperation in containing the Iraqi insurgency will involve regional and Western recognition of its position as Lebanon's main power broker.

To prove their worth, the Syrians have conducted a series of maneuvers to grab Washington's attention, including staged firefights against militants and a peculiar U.S. Embassy bombing in September 2006. The Syrians also repeatedly have claimed to have greatly reduced the amount of jihadist traffic flowing into Iraq, though this involved redirecting the bulk of the Islamist militants to Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon.

In addition to proving its usefulness with regard to Iraq, Damascus is looking for other creative options to provide Washington with an incentive to talk to Syria. Publicly flirting with the idea of allowing Russia to establish a full-fledged naval base in Latakia and Tartus off the Syrian coast is a case in point.

But by broadcasting its role in the Iraq security talks, Damascus will pay a heavy price. Syria has a special relationship with the jihadists funneling through its territory to fight in Iraq. In return for turning a blind eye to -- and in some cases facilitating -- the passage of foreign fighters into Iraq, the Alawite-Baathist regime in Damascus stays on the good side of the guys with the guns. While the Syrians exercise remarkable control over the jihadists on their side of the border, the government is taking a large risk by taking a prominent role in cooperating against its allies of convenience. Even if Syria's security and intelligence apparatus reassures the jihadist camp that the talk of cooperation over Iraq is all for show, it is unlikely to convince them, since they are seeing the gradual disappearance of their havens in Syria and Sunni areas in Iraq, such as Anbar province.

Thanks to these shows of cooperation, Syria is probably going to fall into the jihadist pit. The intensity of these prospective jihadist attacks most likely will be within Syria's well-trained security apparatus' ability to handle. To deal with them, President Bashar al Assad will have little choice but to follow in his father's footsteps and order his military to do whatever it takes to crack down on these militants and their supporters. Syria went through this in 1982 with the Hama massacre, which suppressed a revolt by the Muslim Brotherhood, killing more than 10,000 people in the process. Though the clashes probably will not be as severe this time around, they risk undermining the stability of al Assad's minority Alawite regime.