Sawt Al Jihad (or "Voice of the Jihad") was published as al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula's biweekly electronic magazine from October 2003 until November 2004.

At the time the magazine was launched, the Saudi al Qaeda node was on the rise. The magazine was actively published during the time al Qaeda 's operations in Saudi Arabia were at their peak. For example, during 2004, the group conducted attacks against Western housing compounds such as the Oasis compound in Khobar, as well as attacks against Western facilities that included ABB Lummus Global Engineering in Yanbu, the U.S. Consulate in Jeddah and the Saudi Interior Ministry in Riyadh.

In retrospect, Sawt Al Jihad seems to have functioned as a barometer of the Saudi node's strength. When it was published regularly, the group was very active operationally; shortly after the regular publishing ceased, the group's activity level dramatically declined.

The emergence of a new edition of Sawt Al Jihad should therefore be carefully watched, as it could be a harbinger of things to come.

About Sawt Al Jihad

Sawt Al Jihad was a propaganda magazine dedicated to "issues concerning the mujahideen in the Arabian Peninsula." It featured a wide variety of articles -- including interviews with the group's leaders, accounts of the group's attacks, criticism of the Saudi royal family (which it refused to call by name but rather referred to as "the infiltrated family," meaning it is infiltrated and controlled by the infidels), religious justification for terrorist attacks and calls to increase military operations and propaganda efforts. The magazine also contained book reviews of such blockbuster titles as "39 Ways to Assist the Jihad and the Mujahideen in the Name of Allah" and analysis of the statements of al Qaeda leaders Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, describing how those statements pertained to militants in Saudi Arabia.

Sawt Al Jihad also contained advertisements for the group's other publication, Maaskar al-Bataar, which was designed to be an online training manual for militants. Maaskar al-Bataar provided tactical advice for jihadist recruits, tips on operational security, surveillance, target selection and instructions for using small-arms systems such as assault rifles, pistols and rocket-propelled grenade launchers.

Sawt Al Jihad was one of the first jihadist publications to show a high degree of professionalism in its production. It was published in Adobe PDF format and used slick, professional-looking Arabic fonts, footnotes and graphics. At the time it was first published, it stood out from the e-mails and Web postings of other jihadist groups, including the main al Qaeda organization. (This was before As-Sahab productions brought a similar level of professionalism to al Qaeda recordings.) Together with Maaskar al-Bataar, the magazine demonstrated that the Saudi al Qaeda group had a cadre of individuals with excellent computer skills and writing abilities and an understanding of effective propaganda.

Issues 1-28 of the magazine were published biweekly from October 2003 until November 2004. Issue 29 was not issued until April 2005, and the forthcoming issue, 30, will be appearing after a nearly two-year hiatus.

Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula

What makes news of its appearance particularly important is that al Qaeda's branch in Saudi Arabia has a tumultuous history, and has appeared relatively quiet for some time. The story of the Saudi branch is a tale of attacks and government crackdowns -- which frequently involve a series of raids, arrests and shootouts -- a period of recovery and then a fresh attack, in cyclical patterns.

The al Qaeda branch in Saudi Arabia burst onto stage May 12, 2003, with near-simultaneous suicide car bomb attacks at three residential  compounds in Riyadh. The group obviously had been active before that date -- primarily in training and exhorting new jihadists to fight coalition forces in Afghanistan -- but had abstained from conducting attacks in the kingdom up to that point.

The attacks provoked a government reaction that resulted in a number of arrests, but this did not prevent the group for organizing and launching Sawt Al Jihad magazine in October 2003. A few weeks later, on Nov. 8, the group struck another residential compound in Riyadh, an incident that resulted mostly in the deaths of expatriate Arab workers.

The al Qaeda node in the kingdom kicked off 2004 with the inaugural issue of Maaskar al-Bataar magazine. As noted, 2004 was the busiest year to date, operationally, for the group. On April 21, it staged a suicide car bomb attack against the government's General Security Services headquarters. On May 1, there was the attack in Yanbu, and on May 29, the residential compound in Khobar was struck. And throughout the summer -- as jihadist violence against Americans and others in Iraq was also beginning to make news -- a number of Westerners were assassinated in Saudi Arabia. Perhaps the most highly publicized case was the abduction and murder of Lockheed Martin employee Paul Johnson, who was beheaded on video.

On the day of Johnson's murder, Saudi security forces responded by killing Abdel Aziz al-Muqrin, effectively decapitating al Qaeda's Saudi branch. Following al-Muqrin's death, government counterstrikes significantly degraded the operational capabilities of the local al Qaeda branch. The group lost half a dozen military commanders, and nearly all of its known key operatives were removed in successive raids by security forces. In essence, the group was faced with a severe leadership deficit and has not conducted an attack that has achieved its objectives since.

It appears that one or more of these raids against key operatives also resulted in the arrest or the killing of the al Qaeda members responsible for running Sawt Al Jihad. If the magazine staff was not killed or arrested, they were at the very least severely disrupted, for the magazine ceased publishing its biweekly issues in November 2004, and published its last issue -- until now -- in April 2005.

On Dec. 6, 2004, Saudi al Qaeda launched an armed assault against the U.S. Consulate in Jeddah. The attackers, who apparently failed to achieve their objectives (in that they were not able to gain entry to the consulate or kill any Americans), all died in the attack. This incident was followed on Dec. 29 by simultaneous suicide car bomb attacks at the Saudi Interior Ministry and the Special Emergency Force Training Center. These attacks likewise failed to meet their objectives; they did not cause substantial damage to the targets or generate mass casualties.

The last significant attack by al Qaeda's Saudi branch occurred Feb. 24, 2006 -- when militants carried out a car bomb attack against an oil processing center in Abqaiq. This attack was an attempt to strike at the heart of the Saudi oil infrastructure, and demonstrated a tactical shift away from attacking Western targets and the Saudi government. Sources have told Stratfor that there were some critical nodes at the Abqaiq facility that could have been destroyed by the attack, and that al Qaeda nearly succeeded in reaching them -- but since it did not, the Abqaiq strike rates as a failed attack. The string of security raids that ensued resulted in the seizure of -- among other things -- two vehicles bearing the insignia of Saudi Aramco that were being fashioned into vehicle bombs. This seemed to confirm that al Qaeda's Saudi node had followed Ayman al-Zawahiri's call in December 2005 to "concentrate … attacks on Muslims' stolen oil, from which most of the revenues go to the enemies of Islam, while most of what they leave is seized by the thieves who rule our countries."

Riyadh's Two-Pronged Strategy

In battling its domestic terrorism problem, the Saudi government did not limit itself to direct engagement and disruption activities. In parallel, it also moved to drain the problem from the kingdom by exporting militants who were threatening the regime: Riyadh provided encouragement, and at least tacit approval, for radical Saudis seeking to fight against coalition forces in Iraq. Studies of the composition of foreign militants in Iraq have revealed that Saudis have made up a large portion of the foreign militants engaged in the insurgency in Iraq, as well as a very large percentage of the suicide bombers there.

Though this policy might have provided an avenue for Saudi militants to let off steam for a time, and might in fact have resulted in many of them being killed by coalition forces, it seemed inevitable that the chickens eventually would come home to roost for the Saudis. As Stratfor long has argued, the young men and boys who left the kingdom with little training and combat experience at that point would be returning home trained and battle-hardened -- much like Osama bin Laden and others among the first wave of jihadists who returned home following the Soviet Union's defeat in Afghanistan.

The situation in Iraq has changed considerably over the past several months, as has the character of the insurgency there. Whereas the insurgency in Iraq last January was embodied by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and his al Qaeda in Iraq organization, the violence now -- months after al-Zarqawi's death -- is much more accurately described as Sunni-Shiite sectarian violence. This change in the situation on the ground could result in Saudi and other foreign militants being less welcome than they previously were, and prompt many to return to their home countries.

If -- or more likely, when -- these militants return to Saudi Arabia, they will bring with them a host of important skills acquired in Iraq -- which, along with Afghanistan, currently serves as a de facto graduate school of jihadist studies. Fighting against the advanced weaponry and tactics of Western coalition forces is an effective means of winnowing out many of the stupid and inept militants. As Darwinian logic dictates, those who survive the crucible of Iraq and return to Saudi Arabia will be the smartest, strongest and perhaps even a few of the luckiest who traveled there to fight. Their exposure to the ideological environment of "active jihad" and living and fighting with veteran al Qaeda troops also will leave its mark on these men.

Certainly, the ability of these returnees to use light weapons effectively and fabricate improvised explosive devices will be important, but some of the most important skills they bring back will be less obvious: leadership, expertise in running a clandestine organization and operational security. From the successes of the Saudi security forces over the past few years, it became apparent that these are the skills Saudi Arabia's al Qaeda node has lacked the most.

Watching for Signals

Believing it is only a matter of time before a fresh influx of militants returns to the kingdom -- assuming they have not done so already -- it is important to watch for signs that they are reconstituting their network prior to resuming an active campaign of attacks. Though many indicators -- travel, establishing safe-houses and smuggling and caching arms -- will be difficult to detect, one readily visible sign would be resumption of their propaganda efforts. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula placed a great deal of emphasis on propaganda when it was a vibrant organization, as did its sister node in Iraq. Therefore, it is highly likely that propaganda will resume as the Peninsula organization is reinvigorated.

Though it is possible that the forthcoming issue of Sawt Al Jihad will be a one-off event, like the 29th issue published in April 2005, it also could mark the return to a regular publishing schedule -- a signal that the group is getting its act together.

Of course, that would not be a definitive indicator of strength. Publishing an online magazine is much easier than planning and executing a successful insurgency. In fact, al Qaeda's core group has done far more of the former than the latter over the past few years. It is also possible that the magazine is being revived by jihadist propagandists who are not even connected to the actual organization, and who perhaps live in other countries. Therefore, the content of the new issue will need to be carefully scrutinized for continuity with that of past editions -- which provided al Qaeda's enemies with valuable insight into the militants' identities, military backgrounds, desired targets and tactical plans.