With this deal, India will assume roughly the same position as Israel in the nuclear club. Though India is not a signatory of the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), the U.S. Congress has made a rare exception for it to bypass some key elements of the U.S. Atomic Energy Act. Thus, in exchange for placing its civilian nuclear reactors under international safeguards, India will be given access to civilian nuclear fuel and technology from the 45-member Nuclear Suppliers Group -- and sales to India can technically begin.

Nonproliferation lobbyists in Washington have been vocal in their protestations that making such extraordinary exceptions for a nonsignatory sets a dangerous precedent for rival nuclear powers, like China, to sign similar deals with countries like Pakistan -- whose reputation was badly tarnished by the discovery of A.Q. Khan's peddling of nuclear secrets.

Opponents also assert that by allowing India to import uranium for its civilian reactors, the deal indirectly contributes to the advancement of India's military reactors -- which, significantly, are not under international safeguards. Simply stated, the argument is that India, at its current rate of domestic uranium production, could not sustain the production of weapons-grade plutonium and enriched uranium for both military and civilian use. Under the nuclear deal, however, India will be able to import uranium for its civilian reactors and, therefore, could divert more of its domestic uranium production toward its military reactors.

Despite such concerns, the Bush administration is determined to forge ahead with this deal. Below the surface lies Washington's goal of developing India as a strategic proxy in the Indian Ocean basin. During the Cold War, such a close partnership was nearly impossible: India, despite its socialist tendencies, gravitated toward the Soviet orbit even though it publicly was committed to nonalignment. In that environment, the United States was compelled to throw its support to Pakistan, seeking to counter Soviet expansion on the subcontinent. However, the dissipation of the U.S.-Soviet rivalry provided an opening for Washington to re-examine its South Asia policy and pursue a strategic alliance with India. The economic and military strengthening of a secular, democratic power in the region was seen as a way to help safeguard the United States' energy interests in the Gulf and deal with a growing threat from China. And, following the 9/11 attacks, the relationship with India was seen as a way to sustain pressure on Pakistan, forcing its compliance in helping to contain transnational jihadists.

Though the strategic underpinnings of the nuclear agreement are well-defined, the actual legislation has taken a beating over the past year and a half -- and there doubtless will be grumblings from India when the revised agreement goes before the Indian Parliament for debate. For instance, the latest version of the legislation contains a clause mandating that the U.S. president "must terminate all export and re-export of U.S.-origin nuclear materials" to India, and discourage other suppliers from continuing nuclear exports to India should India test a nuclear device, as it did in 1998. Indian atomic scientists and military officials are wholly opposed to a moratorium on nuclear testing, and likely will declare this provision a deal-breaker.

The other big sticking point for India is a provision on securing its cooperation in containing Iran, which U.S. lawmakers have stressed is a necessary condition. The original Senate bill contained a binding clause, stating the need for a presidential determination that India is "fully and actively participating in U.S. and international efforts to dissuade, sanction, and contain Iran for its nuclear program consistent with United Nations Security Council resolutions." The revised bill, however, includes a non-binding provision that calls for the president to give a "description and assessment" of India's compliance in dealing with Iran. Though the requirement has been watered down, the mere inclusion of an Iran clause will be cause for protest by India's vocal leftist parties. These parties provide needed support for the ruling Congress-led coalition, and they use their growing political clout as a means of pressure to keep the Singh government from getting too friendly with the United States and thereby alienating long-standing allies like Iran.

Prime Minister Manmohan Singh will have his challenges ahead, to be sure, but in presenting the deal to Parliament, he can be expected to emphasize that it does not embody the final form of the nuclear agreement. Rather, the first major hurdle has been cleared: for the U.S. Congress to change existing laws on selling nuclear supplies to a nonsignatory of the NPT. Washington and New Delhi now must enter a new phase of negotiations to draft a binding bilateral treaty, termed the "123 agreement." They will spend the next several months ironing out the remaining kinks in order to arrive at a final draft -- which again must go to the U.S. Congress for approval. During this treaty construction process, the more contentious, nonbinding aspects of the legislation will likely fall through the cracks, giving Singh more leeway to sell the deal at home.