These reductions come on the heels of the Iraq Study Group's (ISG) call for more congressional scrutiny of the operational Iraq war budget. Given the budget cuts and the ISG recommendations, the Land Warrior and FCS programs -- which are at the core of the plan to transform the Army -- could become casualties of a very expensive war.


The U.S. Army's latest budget plan revealed deep cuts, including the complete termination of the Land Warrior program and billion-dollar reductions to the Future Combat Systems (FCS) program, the heart of the Army's planned transformation. The Iraq Study Group's (ISG) recently released findings are making the Army's uphill battle even tougher. The ISG's 79 recommendations saddle the next Congress -- which will have far more control over the Iraq war budget than does the current Congress -- with a dozen new funding needs and no guidance on how to prioritize them.

Andrew Marshall, the Pentagon's "futurist-in-chief," has been masterminding the U.S. military's long-term strategy since the Nixon administration. The current transformation involves pulling U.S. troops home from Cold War bases overseas and terminating many cutting-edge Cold War-era programs in order to bring about a generational leap, allowing the United States to be not one but two entire generations ahead of any potential competitors in terms of military hardware and capability. The end of the Comanche helicopter and Crusader howitzer, and the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iceland are successes under this philosophy.

However, the implementation of this transformation was stunted by the realities of 9/11 and the Iraq war. Part of former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld's problem was that he failed to take this into account as he sought to railroad Marshall's vision into reality, thus compromising the very transformation he had prioritized.

Nowhere is this clearer than in the U.S. Army. Long-term damage to manpower has already been caused by a fundamental disconnect between the mission and the force structure. Furthermore, the expenses of resetting units -- repairing and replacing damaged and lost equipment -- as they return from Iraq have yet to be addressed. The effects of this will be enormous.

Of course, the quality of personnel, training and doctrine make the U.S. Army what it is. This, in addition to the overwhelming and accurate firepower of artillery and close air support, gives the U.S. Army an edge over most other countries' forces. But this edge will continue to erode if the Army does not -- or cannot -- recruit and retain the best people possible and maintain a technological advantage by fielding advanced tools and equipment.

Currently, infantry companies are forced to rotate vehicles, radios and other equipment out of Iraq so the entire battalion can train back home. But the bulk of Army equipment is left in Iraq for the next unit to pick up. This simplifies logistics, but it also means that the equipment that stays is subject to massive wear and tear. This stress and loss is compounded by the transfer of equipment to the Iraqi military (though much of that gear is already aging). Thus, whereas the Army would normally have old equipment, it now has none. Consequently, the Army will need to enact comprehensive and expensive wholesale acquisitions programs in order to simply replace its equipment -- not to mention the cost of upgrading it.

This leaves U.S. Army Reserve and National Guard units out in the cold. The hand-me-downs from the active Army, on which they predominantly survive, are being run into the ground and given to the fledgling Iraqi army. It will take a large investment to re-equip the reserve and National Guard troops -- who are always on the back burner in terms of funding priorities. In the meantime, their lack of proper equipment represents a glaring weakness in U.S. strategic security.

Current demands -- such as resolving strategic weaknesses -- will necessarily overshadow future transformation priorities. The Land Warrior program was probably more valuable as a conceptual exercise than in actual combat. The first-generation program promised significant capabilities, such as "plugging" individual soldiers into the Army's network and a new multispectrum sight, but it also involved extra weight and awkward wires connecting the helmet, computer and rifle. We may never know its combat effectiveness. But more than a few soldiers whose experience in the field with wires involved cursing and frustration are breathing sighs of relief. Either way, this represents a meaningful and necessary budgetary sacrifice for the U.S. Army.

But in the face of these massive budgetary constraints, FCS -- the next step and the core of Marshall's transformation plan for the Army -- is now suffering billion-dollar cuts and five-year delays. Of course, a reduction in the number of fielded FCS systems is a solid financial reality check for a hitherto well-funded goal. But FCS nevertheless represents the path to the future -- the network-centric warfare that has given the Air Force and the Navy their newest edge.

The network links and autonomous assets FCS would provide would give the Army an enormous generational leap in terms of coordination and capability. Thus, implementing FCS would not be simply a matter of handing these new systems off to active Army units -- achieving these advances would require massive training and developing an entirely new operational doctrine. This is no short process; if the United States delays too long, the future will arrive first.

The British and the French have Land Warrior programs of their own. Russia and China already watch with envy the United States' ability to project power by deploying lighter, faster forces abroad, and they intend to catch up. Maintaining a generational advantage is a perpetual race. Marshall wanted to get ahead. However, Rumsfeld's insistence on moving the Army forward in spite of the realities of the Iraq war has already stunted the transformation. If the United States does not change course, any generational advantage it hoped to gain from the Army's transformation will be lost.