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15/05/2024 | Opinion -. The Proxies and Militias of Middle East Geopolitics

Antonio Graceffo

The Middle East has always been a battleground for power competition between external and regional forces, often employing local proxy armies. Today, the primary backers of these proxy forces include Iran, the United States, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Russia. Other, less prominent sponsors include Israel, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Qatar, Egypt, Pakistan, and select European Union (EU) member states.

 

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is also becoming a major player in the region and is heavily invested in the outcomes of conflicts and wars in the Middle East. Its engagement tends to be economic and diplomatic. At present, there do not appear to be any direct connections between the PRC and regional proxy armies. China does indirectly support militias through its diplomatic backing and economic engagements with Iran, as well as other third-party supporters of militias in the area.

Proxy armies commonly emerge from marginalized local factions, comprising ethnic or religious minorities that have endured repression or disadvantages imposed by the dominant majority or local authorities wielding political or military control within a nation. Consequently, these factions forge alliances with foreign powers, viewing such alliances as essential for their survival or to attain various objectives, whether military, political, or diplomatic.

The analysis below examines several of the most prominent proxy armies within the Middle East, covering their operational areas, motivations, and, where feasible, an estimate of their size. Yet, accurately determining personnel figures is difficult due to the lack of detailed information maintained or disclosed by these groups. Moreover, many of these forces operate irregularly, with fighters joining or departing as required or at their own discretion. (For details on the state patrons backstopping many of these proxies, refer to the first article in this series).

Regional

Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC): The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) is one of the region’s most significant and influential groups. While it doesn’t precisely fit the conventional definition of a “proxy army” due to its status as an official state entity, it operates independently of the military chain of command, directly answering to Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Notably, the IRGC’s Quds Force extends its operations beyond Iran’s borders, providing funding, training, guidance, and weaponry to various terrorist organizations.

One of the reasons major powers utilize proxy armies is to maintain plausible deniability, enabling them to strike adversaries without deploying uniformed troops and potentially inciting broader conflict. The IRGC operates within this ambiguous space: while its members do not don the uniform of the Iranian armed forces, their actions are under the direction of the Supreme Leader.

The United States has designated the IRGC as a terrorist organization due to its human rights abuses both within and outside of Iran, as well as its support of terrorism. Notably, the IRGC is the only official government entity to have received such a designation to date.

Wagner Group and Russian Private Military Companies: The Wagner Group and other Russian private military companies (PMCs) are significant forces in the region. However, similar to Iran’s IRGC, PMCs don’t precisely fit the traditional definition of a proxy force. While nominally private, these companies operate under Moscow’s direction, advancing Russian foreign policy objectives.

The Wagner Group and other PMCs have participated in numerous conflicts, spanning Libya, Syria, Yemen, Iraq, and the Sahel region in sub-Saharan Africa, known as the “coup belt.” The Wagner Group provides military assistance to Russia-aligned governments, and helps dictators remain in power.

In Libya, the Wagner Group supports Khalifa Haftar, Field Marshal of the Libyan National Army (LNA). Essentially, Wagner is providing training and security in exchange for natural resources, which seems to be Moscow’s playbook now. Among the foreign policy objectives Wagner is tasked with is ensuring the flow of natural resources back to Russia. To this end, Wagner utilizes its military prowess to keep friendly regimes like that of Khalifa Haftar in power and in control of resource extraction contracts.

The interesting thing about Moscow’s use of PMCs, particularly in Libya, is that the PMCs are a form of proxy, which is tasked with supporting other proxies. Effectively, whichever government or army Moscow assigns the PMC to becomes an arm’s-length tool of the Kremlin.

In Syria, the Wagner Group supports the Assad regime. Unlike the United States or other sponsors that may provide funding, training, and weapons, Wagner also deploys military personnel for combat operations, combat support, and static security.

Wagner mercenaries have been deployed to Yemen, where they are playing a very different role than they do in Syria or elsewhere. In addition to maintaining close relations with Iran and their proxy, the Houthis, it appears that Moscow is engaging with a number of militias and factions, some of which are supported by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. By engaging with both sides, Moscow is attempting to present itself as the neutral peacekeeper. At the same time, the Kremlin is hedging its bets to ensure its place at the table, no matter which side wins the war.

In Iraq, the Wagner Group and other Russian PMCs, such as Redoubt and Moran Security Group, provide static security, maritime security, and training. The extent of Wagner’s operations in Iraq is less well-known than its operations in other countries. It is a safe bet, however, that whichever army or faction Wagner or Russian PMCs are working for is friendly with Moscow.

Following the demise of Wagner’s founder and leader, Yevgeny Prigozhin in August 2023, certain elements of Wagner have been integrated into various state security services. Besides Wagner, several other Russian PMCs have emerged, with many under the direct control of Russian military units. They continue to operate across the Middle East, Ukraine, and around the globe. But now, their association with the Kremlin significantly diminishes plausible deniability.

Due to their egregious human rights violations, the United States has designated the Wagner Group as a terrorist organization.

Libya

The conflict in Libya features multiple factions receiving support from various international actors. The primary factions include the internationally recognized Government of National Accord (GNA), headquartered in Tripoli and endorsed by the United Nations and Western nations, and the Libyan National Army (LNA), commanded by General Khalifa Haftar and supported by countries such as Russia, Egypt, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). As usual, Russia’s support includes the deployment of Wagner personnel, setting up a dynamic where the U.S. and Russia support opposing sides in the conflict.

Both Saudi Arabia and Turkey have participated in the Libyan conflict, but on opposite sides. Saudi Arabia provided millions of dollars to the LNA and supported several factions aligned with General Haftar, while Turkey deployed thousands of Syrian mercenaries to fight alongside the GNA.

Israel and Palestine

Hamas: The IRGC supports Hamas in Gaza by providing weapons, including rockets and missiles, as well as financial aid and training.

Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ): The IRGC has provided support to PIJ, a militant organization primarily active in the Gaza Strip and known for its attacks against Israel.

Yemen

Houthi Rebels (Ansar Allah): The Houthi rebels are a Zaidi Shia militia controlling much of northern Yemen. Engaged in a civil war, the Houthis are opposed to the Saudi-backed Yemeni government. The United States has provided military support to the Saudi-led coalition, while the Houthis receive support, weapons, and training from Iran. The size of the Houthi faction is unknown, with estimates ranging from 30,000 to 100,000 fighters. The Houthis are currently active and disrupting shipping in the Red Sea. It has been reported that the Houthis have agreed not to attack Chinese or Russian ships. This should give China a price advantage on exports, as other countries’ vessels will have to take longer routes and pay higher insurance premiums. In this sense, the Houthis are acting as a proxy for Beijing, albeit indirectly.

Iraq

Popular Mobilization Units (PMU) / Hashd al-Shaabi: This umbrella organization consists of various Shiite militias, including some Sunni and Christian groups, in Iraq. Estimates of the size of PMU vary widely, ranging from 50,000 to 160,000 fighters. While not all PMF factions are directly supported by Iran, many have close ties to Tehran. Some PMF factions have also received support from Russia. While instrumental in defeating Islamic State, they have faced accusations of human rights abuses and corruption. The group is active in both Iraq and Syria.

Kata’ib Hezbollah: This Iraqi Shia militia has received support from the IRGC and is active in Iraq. It is known for its anti-American activities and involvement in the Iraqi insurgency.

Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq: Another Iraqi Shia militia that has received backing from the IRGC. It has been involved in attacks against US and coalition forces in Iraq.

Syria

National Defense Forces (NDF): A Syrian government auxiliary force backed by both Russia and Iran. The NDF upholds Assad’s regime and counter opposition groups. The religious composition is largely Sunni Muslim majority, with minorities like Alawites (a Shia offshoot), Christians, and Druze. Size estimates range from tens of thousands to over 100,000.

Liwa Fatemiyoun (Fatemiyoun Division): This Afghan militia fights alongside Syrian government forces and is primarily composed of Shia Muslims. They receive support from Iran and are believed to have tens of thousands of fighters.

Free Syrian Army (FSA) (also known as the Turkish-Backed Free Syrian Army): An umbrella term for various Syrian opposition groups that fought against the Assad regime during the Syrian Civil War. The FSA comprises various rebel factions, including Sunni Muslims, with some presence of Christians, Druze, and other religious minorities. The size of the FSA has fluctuated over time and is difficult to ascertain due to its decentralized nature. At its peak, it was estimated to have tens of thousands of fighters. The FSA initially received support from the United States and its allies during the early stages of the Syrian Civil War. It has also received backing from Turkey, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia.

Syrian Arab Army (SAA): The primary ground force of the Syrian government. While not a militia in the traditional sense, the SAA has received aid from Tehran and Moscow, including Russian military equipment and air support.

Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF): Primarily located in Syria’s northeast, the SDF is a multi-ethnic coalition composed mostly of Kurdish forces, alongside Arab, Assyrian, and other minority groups. While the exact size of the SDF is hard to determine, estimates suggest tens of thousands of fighters. The SDF receives support from the United States-led coalition against Islamic State. Additionally, it has cooperated with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), a Kurdish militant group based in Turkey.

Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF): The PMF is predominantly composed of Shiite Muslims, with various militias representing different factions, including Iraqi Arabs, Turkmen, and others. The PMF swears allegiance to the Supreme Leader of Iran. The size of the PMF is estimated to be tens of thousands to over a hundred thousand fighters, spread across different factions. While the PMF operates under the umbrella of the Iraqi government, many of its factions have close ties to Iran and receive support from Tehran. Some factions also have relationships with Russia, particularly in the context of the Syrian conflict.

Shiite Militias in Syria: Similar to the PMF, Shiite militias in Syria are predominantly composed of Shiite Muslims, including Iraqis, Lebanese (such as Hezbollah), and other nationalities. The size of these militias varies, but they are estimated to have thousands of fighters collectively. Shiite militias in Syria are closely aligned with the Syrian government of Bashar al-Assad and receive support from Iran, including funding, training, and weaponry. They have also received some support and coordination from Russia in the context of the Syrian Civil War.

Syrian National Army (SNA): Primarily Sunni Islam, with a significant Turkmen presence. Estimates suggest around 50,000 fighters. The SNA is backed by Turkey and has fought against Kurdish groups in northern Syria.

Lebanon

Hezbollah: A powerful Iran-backed Shia militant group and political party with close ties to Iran. Hezbollah maintains a strong military presence in Lebanon and is considered a terrorist organization by some countries. In addition to receiving significant financial, military, and political support from Tehran, it has also received training and weapons from Russia. Hezbollah has played a crucial role in supporting the Assad regime in Syria. Estimates suggest Hezbollah has several thousand active fighters with a larger reserve force.

Ethnic and Religious Minorities

These groups are typically religious minorities in the Middle East, facing various degrees of persecution and marginalization. They are not known to have widespread proxy militias of their own. However, some individuals from these communities may be recruited into existing militias, depending on the local context and who is in power. For example, some Yazidis have fought alongside Kurdish forces against Islamic State.

Druze: A religious minority comprising 1-2 million people, concentrated primarily in Lebanon, Syria, and Israel. They follow an Abrahamic faith and have been called heretics by Muslim extremists. By some estimations, they are the most persecuted people in the Middle East. The Druze community in Lebanon has largely stayed out of direct involvement in proxy conflicts. However, individual Druze fighters may align themselves with various factions based on personal or local allegiances. In Syria, some Druze militias have been formed to protect their communities, though they often maintain neutrality in the broader conflict. They are supported by the United States and Saudi Arabia. In Israel, Druze who hold an Israeli passport have served with distinction in the Israel Defense Force (IDF).

Chaldeans: A Christian (Catholic) minority numbering between half a million and one million people, predominantly located in Iraq, particularly in the Nineveh Plains and Baghdad. Chaldeans, along with other Christian minority groups in Iraq, have faced persecution from various actors, including Islamic State. Chaldeans have served in various militias fighting against Islamic State and defended their homeland.

Yazidis: Yazidis are an ethno-religious minority, numbering between half a million and one million members, living primarily in the Sinjar region of northern Iraq. They follow an ancient religion, Yazidism, with elements of Zoroastrianism, Islam, Christianity, and other belief systems.

The Yazidis have faced genocide and persecution at the hands of Islamic State, leading to the formation of self-defense forces like the Sinjar Resistance Units (YBS) and the Sinjar Protection Units (YJŞ). These groups have received support from various actors, including the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and, to a lesser extent, the United States. However, their involvement in broader proxy dynamics is limited, and they primarily focus on protecting Yazidi communities.

Kurds: The Kurds are a large ethnic minority with populations of about 40 million, spread across Turkey, Iraq, Syria, and Iran. They aspire to autonomy or even an independent state, Kurdistan. Currently, Kurdistan is a semi-autonomous region inside of Iraq. The Peshmerga are the military forces of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq.

Kurdish groups like the People’s Protection Units (YPG) in Syria have sometimes been seen as US allies against Islamic State, but the relationship is complex. Turkey views the YPG as an extension of the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK), a Kurdish separatist group it considers a terrorist organization.

Assyrian Christians: Similar to Chaldean Christians, Assyrian Christians have been supported by the U.S. in certain regions, particularly in Iraq, where they have faced persecution and displacement. They have served in ethnic-Assyrian Christian militias such as the Nineveh Plain Protection Units (NPU), which have received support from external actors, such as donors in the United States. However, they are not major players in the broader proxy conflicts.

Sunni Arab tribes: In both Iraq and Syria, Sunni Arab tribes have received support from the U.S. in the fight against Islamic State and other extremist groups. They have often been instrumental in local security efforts and stabilization initiatives.

Turkmen: In northern Iraq, Turkmen communities have received support from the U.S. and have been involved in efforts to combat Islamic State and maintain security in their areas.

Arab tribal militias: In areas of Syria and Iraq, various Arab tribal militias have received backing from Washington to fight against ISIS and other extremist groups, as well as Iran-backed militias.

Geopoliticalmonitor.com (Canada)

 



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