The development of regional and global military cooperation is seen as one of the most important pillars of Estonia’s security strategy, while a concerted effort to domestic security focused on resilience and deterrence is seen as another. Considering Estonia’s defense plan mandates that country’s defense could no longer be restricted to military protection only, armed forces will then be merged with non-military competencies to provide a comprehensive collective defense. National security and the accompanying preparedness are believed to be the responsibility of a multitude of sectors and individuals from both the governmental and corporate sectors, as well as from civil society organizations.
Comparison
of the previous two National Security Policies shows that the convergence of
security domains alongside ministerial distribution of duties is being
substituted by a broad task-based strategy, which is likely the most apparent
manifestation of Estonia’s emerging comprehensive strategy. [1][2]The 2017
National Security Policy also presents the idea of resilience, which appears
significantly throughout the paper and is further explored in a distinct
sub-chapter for perhaps the first instance.
One of
the most important ideas on which Estonia’s national defense policy plans rely
is “whole of government” plus “whole of society,” which combine together the
two most important parts of the comprehensive strategy framework and the notion
of “resilience.” [3]Therefore, it is vital to recognize that such revamped
conceptual ideas have garnered a reasonably positive reception from the general
public. In addition, the notion that national security should be a shared
responsibility of the whole population is widely accepted in Estonia.
Consequently, Estonians have high expectations for a complete security and
defense architecture, indicating both the intentional robustness of the
majority of the people and its ability to adapt to changing circumstances. It
is possible to interpret such huge backing for national defense as a byproduct
of securitization. In this way, the notion that perhaps a comprehensive
strategy towards defense can ensure a country’s security is supported by a
large number of people who believe it.
Key
Elements
With
regard to Estonia, the comprehensive strategy was first embraced as aspect of a
progressive European security thought that was gaining popularity at the same
time that Estonia was actively integrating into the NATO and European Union.
During that time period, it was considered a viable alternative to the classic
territorial defense concept. Beginning in 2008, during the course of the August
War, incidents in Georgia’s national defense concepts began to take enormous
importance. But it was in 2014, following the invasion and occupation of Crimea
and the outbreak of violence in eastern Ukraine, until it became clear that
these two notions are not in competition with one another[4]. As an
alternative, a comprehensive strategy might be seen as an essential supplement
towards the territorial defense paradigm in order to achieve greater advantages
in terms of resilience as well as deterrence capabilities.
Accordingly,
Estonia has adopted a comprehensive strategy to national defense that emphasizes
the necessity for coordination and cooperation across multiple government
agencies in order to develop cohesive response in the event of a crisis. When
the breadth of cooperation across nearby but diverse domains is taken into
account, the relevance of defense strategy may be appreciated in detail. There
are also five other areas being evolved in contrast with military defense, like
civilian assistance for national defense, international operations, internal
stability, preservation of successive society and the political processes by
providing essential services, if not at least, proactive sharing of information
and psychological operations. [5]According to the Estonian government, the
following ministries are responsible for different tasks: the Defense ministry
is instrumental in the advancement of military protection and civil assistance
for military defense, the foreign ministry is central to global pursuits, the
Interior ministry is responsible for general and internal security as well as
the upkeep of the country’s and society’s sustained functions, and the Government
is concerned with strategy and psy-ops. These responsibilities are maintained
in the revised defense plan as well. It is worth highlighting that, rather than
three different laws governing the defense industry in peacetime and conflict,
as well as international collaboration, the revised national defense policy, in
accordance with the comprehensive strategy rationale, consolidates various
regulatory sectors into a single body.
Security
Environment & Threats
The
Estonian security environment is influenced by the country ‘s global
developments and cross-border risks. Estonia’s NSC for 2017 recognizes
asymmetric risks which do not respect national boundaries and whose origins are
impossible to discern. Simultaneously, they have an impact that is comparable
to that of conventional security risks. Islamist terrorism has been a
persistent concern in the West since the 9/11 bombings on the World Trade
center. Middle Eastern and North African countries with unstable governments
offer a continual terrorist danger to the West, harming Estonian security.
Terrorism is among the greatest security dangers confronting average citizens
throughout Europe. Estonia pays attention to European events. Numerous
incidents have occurred in Europe during the previous two decades, including
bombs in London and Madrid, shooting incident at Frankfurt airport, and Paris
terror attacks. As a result of this, Estonia has included global crises and
unequal socioeconomic progress as security risks in its policy paper. When
Hosni Mubarak was ousted in Egypt, Muammar Gaddafi was executed in Libya, while
civil war erupted in Syria and Yemen as a result of the Arab Spring movement,
Europe might have been the most adversely affected region. There was an
international flood of refugees that will continue for the next decade as a
result of the said incidents.[6]
It’s
been Russia that has posed the greatest external danger for Estonia during the
previous decade. The Russians have employed a variety of strategies to attain
their objectives. Additionally, Russia has boosted its troop involvement in the
Baltic Region and along the Baltic Countries’ borders. Confrontational and aggressive Russian acts
may be seen for instance in military drills and air boundary breaches as well
as threats to use nuclear weapons. As a result, Russia poses a danger to the
whole Euro-Atlantic area, as it has the potential and inclination to utilize a
wide range of non-military armaments: armed, economic, energy, or
informational. War, crises, and conflict have occurred in Russia and the
surrounding area on a regular basis. There were two direct transgressions: the
2008 conflict in Georgia and the current conflict between Russia and Ukraine,
which continues to this day. The rioting in April 2007 (including the assault
on the Estonian Embassy in Russia) and the kidnapping of an Estonian security
law enforcement officer in 2014[7] are examples of indirect confrontations that
have taken place since. Russia has also demonstrated its digital prowess in a
global setting. According to this paper, cyberattacks have indeed been taken
into account of factors that affect security because Russia launched a
cyberattack against Estonia in April 2007.[8]
While
the challenges to Estonia’s security environment have evolved over time, the
purpose of protecting the country has remained constant. Keeping Estonia’s
national sovereignty, territorial integrity, constitutional order, and national
security in tact is essential to the state’s mission. Human rights, basic
freedoms, and also the achievement of core human ideals are all intertwined in
a country’s security measures. By building civil society and enhancing the
country’s worldwide standing, democratic ideals assure the long-term viability
and sustainability of society.
Aiming
to create solutions that might benefit other nations in the face of global
crisis is becoming increasingly important as their impact on Estonia grows.
Rule-based world order must be maintained through adhering to international law
and the United Nations Charter. As a result, humanitarian assistance and human
rights protection are deemed essential. These initiatives have broad worldwide
backing. While other Baltic states are more concerned with protecting human
rights within virtual environment, Estonia stands out for its emphasis on
unfettered Internet access.
Collective
Security
Euro-Atlantic
collaboration has always been the most important factor in ensuring Estonia’s
security, especially prior and afterward entering the EU but also NATO. There
is no doubt that NATO is Estonia’s best defense against a potential attack, and
thus active participation is a national issue. As a member of NATO, Estonia
regards the United States as a vital ally in the country’s security because of
its foothold in Europe. [9]Additional collaboration with security-related organizations
is crucial to Estonia in order to maintain global and regional equilibrium.
There will be a lot of focus on conflict avoidance and the United Nations’
ability to handle global concerns. The Estonian government also endorses the
OSCE, which strengthens Estonia’s ability to engage in EU’s Common Foreign and
Security Policy. [10]Estonia, on the other hand, has not particularly emphasized
enhancing collaboration and actively participating in crafting the security
policy of the relevant organizations.
Estonia
believes it is critical to limit conventional firearms in Europe, therefore it
wishes to join international arms reduction treaties. It highlights the
critical role of the country in preventing the trafficking or unlawful movement
of weapons of mass destruction including their parts through their borders.
Estonia has cordial ties with the Nordic states, the NSC affirms. Close
collaboration with these nations has benefited Estonia’s economy and bolstered
the country’s defense capabilities. Estonia seems to be eager to develop
Nordic-Baltic military cooperation on a regional and global scale and also
desires an open discussion with Russia as well as practical collaboration.
Protecting
Living Environment
The
state of the natural environment and general wellbeing in Estonia, as well as
the socio-economic scenario, contingency planning, uninterrupted access to
essential services, food, and potable water, and the potential of societal
cohesion to effectively deal independently in the situation of a prolonged
disruption of essential services are the primary factors influencing the
security of the Estonia’s environment. Storms and floods are the most common
natural disasters that create crises in Estonia, with storms accounting for the
majority of incidents. Active civil assistance is being established in order to
cope with crises, which strengthens society’s preparedness to manage with
emergency situations that may be fairly expected and planned for. To do this,
it is necessary to improve public knowledge of possible threats as well as
available mitigation methods. Improved environmental conditions are encouraged
in Estonia by promoting environmentally sustainable principles and behavioral
habits among the population. This is accomplished through the management and
execution of pollution countermeasures, the efficient utilization of natural
resources, and waste minimization. Estonia is putting in place measures to
avoid the spread of ecologically dangerous chemicals as well as to detoxify
polluted land and water areas. Social and economic concerns have an impact on
the living environment as well. As early as 2004, the NSC stressed the need of
addressing labor market issues, implementing a viable social security structure
that incorporates at-risk populations, and training a qualified workforce in
significant numbers to assure sustained economic growth.[11]
Tracking,
controlling risk, and coping with the repercussions of climate change are all
examples of strategies for reducing the hazards associated with climate change.
Cooperative efforts are created with the worldwide community, local
governments, the corporate and nonprofit sectors, as well as the scientific
community, in order to achieve this goal International collaboration also
involves marine traffic management and maritime pollution monitoring, among
other things.
Estonia,
like its surrounding countries, is cognizant of the potential dangers posed by
radiation. Nuclear power stations with in Baltic Sea region that are more than
a decade old are regarded to be potentially risky. Estonia engages in worldwide
efforts to improve radiation protection in the Baltic Region, being part of a
global effort. [12]Early warning systems are in place to identify radioactive
mishaps in adjacent nations at an early stage, allowing for faster response
times.
International
Conflicts and Crises Response
Engagement
in crisis response and peacekeeping operations is a significant component of
Estonia’s national security strategy. The goal was to design a crisis
management framework that would take into account military, regulatory, and
financial concerns, among other things. Involvement in international combat
operations and civilian initiatives provides the country with an excellent
chance to gather valuable expertise. Meanwhile, they represent vows to make a
positive contribution to the improvement of regional stability within the
immediate area and throughout the globe. When there is an internal emergency,
the first responsibility is to secure the survival of the populace.
Specifically, the state believes that emergencies may be avoided and their
repercussions minimized by collaboration with the general public, local
municipalities, government entities, corporate and non-profit organizations,
and other organizations and individuals. The duty of the state is to strengthen
the information management system of the people and to offer instructions for
appropriate conduct in emergency circumstances to the public through various
communication channels, including radio and television. All types of exercises
have already been extensively researched and designed with the goal of
incorporating the greatest number of people feasible. Aside from this,
assistance has been granted for voluntary initiatives that try to avoid dangers
and deal with the early indications of calamities.
The
functioning of critical services is tied to the occurrence of emergencies. The
state conducts a rigorous investigation into the interruptions of critical
services and the dangers that might result in the suspension of services. To
mitigate this, public awareness campaigns are created, and trainings
incorporating as many participants as feasible are carried out as a
preventative strategy. In order to assure the effective service delivery,
effective collaboration between the government with the private sector is
essential. Examples include electronic network infrastructure, services
supplied, and vital information platforms that are mostly owned and operated by
private companies.
The
government must be prepared to manage the humanitarian catastrophe while also
providing development assistance. In order to do so, it is critical for Estonia
to engage in NATO and EU emergency management operations, as well as the
activities of the NATO Response Force and its EU Battlegroups, among other
activities. Through development assistance, Estonia enables nations that create
a social structure that is tolerant of democracy and human rights, in
compliance with its skills and resources. According to the National Security
Council’s 2017 report, activity in the fields of development assistance and
human rights protection contributes to the creation of an atmosphere that minimizes
the possibility of conflict and promotes security. So the emphasis is placed on
the avoidance of global wars and crises, with the goal of reducing the negative
effects on Estonia with its allies as a result of these events. As a matter of
fact, Estonia endorses the expansion of the EU and NATO, that will contribute
to the strengthening of the Western value sphere both in Eastern and central
Europe. Because of the same rationale, Estonia is committed to maintaining
positive ties with all of its neighbors.
Energy
Security
A tiny
yet open economy, Estonia’s economy is strongly reliant on global economic
growth. National security, according to the 2004 NSC, relies on effective
development and accountability of economic connections as well as a stable
influx of foreign investments. As a result of its deep ties to the global
economy, the state is very vulnerable to downturns and volatility in other
economies. The high reliance on non-Estonian (Russian) monopolized energy
systems and sources poses a significant risk to the country as a whole.[13]
Estonia’s
energy security depends on the safety of its supply chain and its
infrastructure. To break free of energy monopolies, countries in the EU must
link their energy grids and increase the variety of energy sources they use.
Improving domestic energy efficiency is critical to reducing reliance on
foreign energy imports. According to NSC 2017, Europe’s energy policy, which
seeks to make the most of available resources inside the EU, will be heavily
relied upon in the next years. Estonia intends to increase its use of renewable
energy sources for power and heating in the far future.[14]
With the
ongoing Ukraine-Russian crisis which has resulted in an altered security
scenario for Estonia, ceasing to finance Russia’s military complex will require
the state to develop a replacement to Russian gas. The construction of a
floating LNG import facility, which has been in the works for more than a
decade, might help Estonia lessen its reliance on Russian gas imports. A pier
plus an additional LNG ship is part of Alexela’s (energy firm) proposal for the
Paldiski harbour on the Baltic Shoreline. The Estonian proposal would
ultimately need a state assurance and financial support.[15]
Conclusion
Estonian
security policy is rife with ambiguity, both conceptually and practically. Two
parallel conceptions of comprehensive security and unified defense have emerged
in Estonia, a departure from the typical comprehensive approach. Estonia is
able to maintain its well-trodden course of complete defense because to the
split among these two terms. Even the decision makers of defense policy
generally define Integrated Defense in this manner.
As a
result of this misunderstanding, Estonia’s strategic decisions prioritize
complete defense and asymmetric warfare. This has repercussions for Estonian
perceptions of and definitions of threats. Aside from that, the greatest danger
to Estonian security is conventional, which is one that Russia has been more
likely to influence in its actions in the post-Soviet realm, for example. A
parallel idea of resilience exists in Estonia as a result of this
misperception. It appears to mean various things for the Estonian defense
community’s uniformed and civilian members. This contrasts with how resilience
is understood by the military, which views the concept of resilience primarily
through the lens of total defense. Using the Estonian method of resilience in
conjunction with a comprehensive approach demonstrates how the military versus
civilian sides of the security debate focus on distinct areas of security. As a
result of Estonia’s current dual strategy, it is difficult to establish broad
societal agreement on the most probable levels of uncertainty, operational
methods in such conditions, and long-term investments for the country.
Creation
of domestic institutions which are adept in participating actively in
international security architecture, as well as mobilization of the regular
military force, are required. This includes clearly defining the
responsibilities and duties of all organizations in Estonia engaged in
comprehensive national security, as well as accurately analyzing the nation’s
defense capabilities and conveying the findings to Estonia’s military partners.
[1]
“National Security Concept of Estonia – Kaitseministeerium,” 2004. https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/156841/Estonia-2004.pdf.
[2]
“National Security Concept of Estonia – Kaitseministeerium,” 2010 https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/156839/Estonia%20-%20National%20security%20concept%20of%20estonia%202010.pdf
[3]
“National Security Concept of Estonia – Kaitseministeerium,” 2017. https://kaitseministeerium.ee/sites/default/files/elfinder/article_files/national_security_concept_2017.pdf
[4]
Raik, Kristi, Mika Aaltola, Katri Pynnöniemi, and Charly Salonius-Pasternak.
“Pushed Together by External Forces? the Foreign and Security … – FIIA.” The
Finnish Institute of International Affairs, 2015. https://www.fiia.fi/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/bp167.pdf.
[5]
“National Security Concept of Estonia – Kaitseministeerium,” 2017, p.3 https://kaitseministeerium.ee/sites/default/files/elfinder/article_files/national_security_concept_2017.pdf
[6]
Marnot, Diana. “Comparison of Security Policy Documents of the Baltic States,”
2020. https://digiriiul.sisekaitse.ee/bitstream/handle/123456789/2568/2020%2010%20julgeolekupoliitika%20ENG_WEB.PDF?sequence=1.
[7]
Fisher, Max. “This Is Bad: Russia ‘Abducts’ Estonian Officer after
Obama Says Us Will Defend Estonia.” Vox. Vox, September 5, 2014. https://www.vox.com/2014/9/5/6110037/estonia-russia-officer-kidnapped.
[8]
“2007 Cyberattacks on Estonia.” Wikipedia. Wikimedia Foundation, May 1, 2022. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2007_cyberattacks_on_Estonia.
[9]
“National Security Concept of Estonia – Kaitseministeerium,” 2017, p.3 https://kaitseministeerium.ee/sites/default/files/elfinder/article_files/national_security_concept_2017.pdf.
[11]
National Security Concept of Estonia – Kaitseministeerium,” 2004, p.19 https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/156841/Estonia-2004.pdf.
[12]
“National Security Concept of Estonia – Kaitseministeerium,” 2017, p.18 https://kaitseministeerium.ee/sites/default/files/elfinder/article_files/national_security_concept_2017.pdf.
[13]
National Security Concept of Estonia – Kaitseministeerium,” 2004, p.19 https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/156841/Estonia-2004.pdf.
[14]
“National Security Concept of Estonia – Kaitseministeerium,” 2017, p.16 https://kaitseministeerium.ee/sites/default/files/elfinder/article_files/national_security_concept_2017.pdf.
[15]
Tammik, Ott. “Estonia May Build LNG Terminal to Cut Russia Energy Dependence.”
BloombergQuint, March 23, 2022. https://www.bloombergquint.com/onweb/estonia-may-build-lng-terminal-to-cut-russia-energy-dependence.
***Divyanshu
Singh : Geopolitics enthusiast, pursuing Masters in Diplomacy, Law and Business
from Jindal School of International Affairs.Former student of B.Tech in
Electronics and Communications Engineering from Jaypee Institute of Information
Technology, Noida