The recent wave of horizontal and leaderless demonstrations that have engulfed Cuba was certainly unexpected, but not surprising. After all, various forecasts had predicted that the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic could encourage turmoil in fragile states. In this particular case, discontent is the combined result of the inability of the country’s healthcare system to effectively deal with the ongoing sanitary crisis, worsening economic hardship due to declining tourism ‒ a crucial source of hard currency for the island ‒ and a growing sense of overall political dissatisfaction with Cuba’s current state of affairs. Furthermore, social media platforms played an initial role catalyzing the protests.
The
Cuban government and its supporters explicitly claim that these events are
being masterminded by the United States for the purpose of provoking the
implosion of the Cuban regime. Considering that such clandestine action, which
would involve components like covert influence and/or destabilizing
psychological operations, is usually carried out under a thick cloak of
secrecy, it is impossible to determine if such accusations are accurate based
on what is available in open sources. However, it is no secret that mutual
animosity between the United States and Cuba has not diminished, even after
diplomatic bilateral relations were restored less than a decade ago. Moreover,
the coercive economic sanctions imposed by the Trump administration have
certainly increased tensions in the relationship.
On the
other hand, covert intervention can be instrumental so that great powers can
influence the course of events in accordance with their agendas. Nevertheless,
it has its limits. Specifically, such ‘active measures’ ‒ like the instigation of uprisings ‒ can seldom be successful unless
legitimate popular discontent reaches a critical boiling point. Therefore,
although the prospect of subtle American interference behind-the-scenes cannot
possibly be discarded (especially considering historical precedents), the facts
on the ground strongly suggest that this situation is mostly triggered by
internal factors.
That
does not mean that the crisis cannot be taken advantage of by external players,
though.
In order
to keep things in perspective, it is essential to emphasize that, after the
Cuban Revolution that took place in 1959, the Caribbean nation has not managed
to achieve industrialization, development, or shared prosperity. During the
Cold War, Cuba relied heavily on generous subsidies from Moscow and the
exchange of Cuban sugar for Soviet oil. After the fateful fall of the Soviet
Union itself, Cuba found a new benefactor in Venezuela under the rule of Hugo
Chávez and it cultivated key tourism and remittance flows.
Nonetheless,
the Cuban economy remains largely outdated, vulnerable, underdeveloped, and
stagnant. Its underlying structure is focused on commodities ‒ sugar, metallic minerals,
shellfish, and honey, amongst others ‒ and products with little added value, such as
cigars and alcoholic beverages. Although minor reforms have been implemented
since the 90s and some foreign investments have been authorized, this
fundamental economic reality has not changed in a meaningful way.
On the
other hand, it is important to keep in mind that the significance of recent
events is underscored by Cuba’s pivotal geostrategic position. Even though it
lacks the critical mass to shape the course of global events, its location has
been historically coveted by great powers. For instance, for the Spanish Empire
Cuba was a navigational gateway for the military conquest and administrative
management of its colonies in the American hemisphere, as well as a crucial
geoeconomic bridge for transatlantic trade.
In turn,
as a rising power, the United States military took Cuba from Spain in the late
19th century to consolidate its sphere of influence through the exclusion of
the last European power with a significant presence in the region. It must be
noted that, in American geopolitical thinking, the Caribbean is the equivalent
of the Mediterranean because it operates as an interconnected and dynamic
maritime corridor. Likewise, during the Cold War the Soviet Union courted the
Cuban communist regime in order to secure a position from which the American
soft underbelly ‒ including the mouth of the Mississippi river, the core of the US oil
industry, important ports and transited shipping lanes ‒ could be threatened.
Moreover,
Cuba itself is an important and discreet geopolitical player that often punches
far above its weight. In fact, Havana’s diplomatic skills have fostered the
development of collaborative ties with extra-regional states interested in a
foothold in the American hemisphere, such as China, Russia, and Iran. Moreover,
its formidable foreign intelligence capabilities and its network of assets have
projected Cuban state influence abroad, particularly through Latin America.
Finally,
the relevance of Cuba’s natural resources cannot be overlooked. Its location is
suitable for growing tropical crops like sugarcane, coffee, and tobacco.
Likewise, its deposits of metals like nickel, zinc, lead, and gold are valuable
resources for several processes of industrial transformation. More importantly,
the island’s untapped potential in terms of fossil fuels has attracted the
active involvement of Chinese and Russian state-owned energy companies.
Needless
to say, heated and controversial opinions about Cuba are common in mainstream
media outlets. Both the regime’s ardent supporters and its staunchest critics
are equally vocal. Accordingly, most forecasts are filtered through the
observers’ ideological preferences. In this regard, although it is hard to
envisage precisely how the situation will unfold in the following weeks and
months based on a dispassionate perspective, several conceivable scenarios have
to be examined. Interestingly, all of them entail far-reaching implications
that pose meaningful challenges for statecraft, security, strategic
intelligence, and foreign policy.
Scenario
1: Abrupt Regime Change
Unless
the protests reach a critical mass that undermines the effective control of the
state’s coercive instruments or acts of indiscriminate repressive violence
weaken its legitimacy, the opposition’s attempt to carry out a color revolution
does not represent enough political firepower to bring down the Cuban
government. At least for the time being,
this outcome does not seem likely.
Moreover,
the sudden fall of the Cuban regime would probably provoke tectonic
geopolitical ramifications beyond the island itself. A new government won’t
necessarily be willing to undertake internal political reforms, let alone
reshuffle geopolitical alignments, particularly when it comes to Cuba’s US
policy.
Besides,
the course of events might not proceed so smoothly. A transition that is not
carefully managed according to sound political criteria could lead to a chaotic
failed state in which dysfunctional governments are endlessly replaced by even
more dysfunctional successors – a vicious cycle resembling what Haiti has gone
through for decades. In this case, coups, power struggles, and instability
could become the norm.
Another
concern related to this scenario is that it is unclear what would happen if
personnel of the Cuban security services were to suddenly become unemployed.
The internationally competitive quality of their tradecraft would make them
valuable assets as hitmen, spies, and fighters for organized crime rings,
terrorist networks, paramilitary squads, private security companies, and
insurgent forces in the American hemisphere and elsewhere.
Nevertheless,
this scenario could unfold in different ways. If top military commanders
believe that the position of the civilian national leadership is ultimately
unsustainable, even through the use of force, there will be a temptation to
simply abandon the regime and hasten its relatively nonviolent dismissal, just
like the Bolivian military withdrew its support for Evo Morales in 2019.
Should
this scenario come to pass, the military would take over in order to manage an
orderly transition, preserve its structures, negotiate under favorable
conditions, make sure that its interests are taken into consideration in the
ensuing political process, and maybe even establish a new stronger government
in which they hold all the cards. In other words, the Cuban military might seek
to replicate what their Egyptian counterparts did when the Muslim Brotherhood
started losing power and control.
Thus, it
is mistaken to assume that a regime change would automatically lead to
democratic change.
Scenario
2: Civil War
One of
the most instructive lessons of the so-called ‘Arab Spring’ is that popular
discontent directed against an authoritarian government does not necessarily
bring harmony, stability, democracy, or prosperity. In fact, an escalating
political clash under circumstances in which none of the contenders is willing
to concede or find a mutually acceptable compromise might unleash violent
forces that cannot be stopped. In this
case, the example of the Syrian war ‒ originally ignited by the rise of food prices
and water scarcity ‒ should be seen as an ominous reminder of how things can easily spiral
out of control if an effective political solution is not promptly formulated.
This is
by far the most dangerous scenario. Considering Cuba’s geopolitical
significance, a civil conflict would likely attract external stakeholders in
one way or another, including the US government, the Cuban-American community,
China, Russia, and even Latin American states aligned with or hostile to the
Bolivarian axis. With so many overlapping strategic interests, this situation
would create a major diplomatic crisis in the American hemisphere. The most
troublesome aspect of this possibility is that there is no certain way to
predict how and when it will end once Pandora’s box has been opened.
Another
consequence would be a large exodus of refugees to nearby countries. This
development would pose complex political, economic, and humanitarian challenges
for the United States and Mexico, but also for other states located in the
Caribbean, the Central American isthmus, and South America. The resulting
dynamics might act as a vortex of regional tensions.
Scenario
3: Direct Foreign Intervention
In a
dramatic statement, Miami mayor Francis Suarez claimed that US military strikes
against Cuba should be seriously contemplated by the Pentagon. However, such
incendiary rhetoric is mostly for the domestic consumption of local
constituents. In fact, if Washington wanted to remove the Cuban regime through
military power, it could have easily accomplished said objective shortly after
the collapse of the Soviet Union. After all, it is widely known that the US
Defense Department has designed contingency plans to intervene in Cuba.
However, not even the neoconservative crusade launched by President George W.
Bush targeted the island.
Nevertheless,
in the last few decades, the United States has tolerated Cuba’s communist
regime despite its firm opposition to American regional and global interests.
Said position is a recognition that, without the strong presence of a hostile
great power from Eurasia, Cuba by itself represents little more than an
irritant for American national security.
Yet, the
aforementioned perspective might change if the situation triggers dangerous
shockwaves for regional security. Under such circumstances, the US military
might be inclined to intervene in order to avoid the prospect of contagious
chaos or a political vacuum that could be filled by the Sino-Russian emerging
bloc.
In the
grand scheme of things, a US military invasion of Cuba would be relatively
easy. However, the ensuing occupation would bedeeply problematic. Hostile great
powers might exploit the opportunity to instigate a bloody quagmire that drains
and weakens US power. Even if that does not take place, as the examples of Iraq
and Afghanistan demonstrate, efforts to export liberal democracy and implement
ambitious nation-building projects can be counterproductive as they elicit a
strong nationalist backlash from the local populace against what as seen as
imperialist endeavors motivated by foreign interests.
Scenario
4: Preservation of the Status Quo
Journalists
and pundits from various countries are already declaring the imminent demise of
the Cuban government. Nevertheless, it must be borne in mind that the Cuban
regime is exceedingly resilient. After all, it has not been undermined by
dangerous problems like the Cuban Missile Crisis, strong geopolitical tensions
during the Cold War, devastating natural disasters, the constant threat of
American military intervention, the collapse of the Soviet bloc, chronic
bureaucratic mismanagement, widespread poverty and sharp economic downturns.
Thus, it is too early to ascertain if a dramatic change in the correlation of forces
in underway.
Moreover,
the balance of power overwhelmingly favors the regime. Its control of the
military, intelligence, security and law enforcement agencies ‒ all of which are highly skillful
and disciplined ‒ remains unshaken. It also has the power to mobilize its political
agents and supporters in the streets to counter dissident demonstrations. In
contrast, the eruption of protests does not seem to be organized and there is
no clear political or tactical leadership. Moreover, it looks like the opposition
does not have access to weapons, intelligence, or substantial financial
resources.
On the
other hand, although it is too soon to tell, the public expressions of
self-criticism ‒ something traditionally unheard of in Cuba ‒ made by President Miguel Díaz-Canel
could be a subtle hint that there is a certain political willingness to find a
negotiated solution, even if the resulting settlement is temporary rather than
definitive. At the very least, the most pressing concerns formulated by the
public (i.e. those related to the availability of vaccines and satisfying
essential economic needs in the short term) would have to be convincingly
addressed.
Therefore,
it seems the Cuban government is going to resort to a combination of carrots
(incentives such as policy adjustment, the implementation of emergency measures
to alleviate the crisis, and perhaps even some sort of dialog) and sticks ‒ arrest of key opposition figures,
internet restrictions, censorship, etc. ‒ in order to restore governance and
make the protests subside. However, time is a crucial factor in the equation
and the risk of failure would be catastrophic. After all, patience is limited
when essential human needs are not being covered.
It must
be borne in mind that one of the reasons why the Cuban nomenklatura is
terrified of granting political concessions is because they believe that such
course of action might lead to the disintegration of the regime. In other
words, they are not eager to follow Mikhail Gorbachev’s footsteps. Hence, they would
prefer to emulate the example of Deng Xiaoping: an ambitious program of
structural economic modernization, carried out in the context of politically
authoritarian conditions. After all, prosperity can provide legitimacy, even
under undemocratic circumstances.
In case
the regime manages to survive, then it would have powerful incentives to
strengthen its strategic, security, diplomatic, economic, commercial and
financial links with Both Moscow and Beijing. Such an alliance might provide a
protective shield for Havana from both internal and external rivals. In this
regard, it is pertinent to remember that the Eurasian powers have supported
regimes which tend to oppose Western interests, not out of ideological
sympathy, but because this serves their strategic ambitions.
Concluding
Thoughts
Cuba is
a small nation whose recent history and current internal situation elicit a
great deal of ideological controversy. However, a deeper analysis reveals that
even if it is impossible to accurately predict the country’s path in the near
future, the impersonal influence of geopolitical realities will be
consequential regardless.
The
stakes are much larger than a mere domestic political shift, and events are
doubtlessly being closely monitored by great and regional powers. Sooner or
later, they will start moving their pieces, assuming their involvement on the
Cuban chessboard has not already begun.