Among them is ensuring adequate water supply to its huge and continuously-expanding population. This problem – epitomized by the Chennai water crisis – is a real threat to India’s rise, as persistent water shortages risk undermining the country’s economic development and even sparking domestic and international conflicts over increasingly scarce resources.

BACKGROUND

Chennai’s water crisis

The problem of water security in India has recently hit the international news due to the severe water crisisaffecting the city of Chennai (previously known as Madras) in the southeastern state of Tamil Nadu. After several rainless weeks, the city’s four main reserves ran dry, forcing the authorities and ordinary citizens to take emergency measures. Many inhabitants temporarily left the city and moved to other states; many firms asked their employees to work from home; restaurants and hotels remained closed; schools were shut; and air conditioning in public areas such as the metro was switched off. The government sent trucks to distribute water to the population, forcing citizens to queue for hours in order to get their ration. The critical situation even resulted in clashes: in one instance, a man stabbed his neighbor during a fight over water-sharing. Finally, rain returned to Chennai, but only in the form of a 30 minutes-long shower.

The origin of the crisis can be traced back to decades of poor urban planning which, somehow ironically, left Chennai vulnerable to both floods and droughts. As a matter of fact, its water management infrastructure has been pushed aside in favor of residential and industrial areas. The city is located in a geographic region characterized by monsoons, which usually arrive in October-November and represent the main source of water. However, the monsoon is very unpredictable (and climate change is disrupting it even further), meaning that it is essential to have adequate infrastructure to divert water in case of excessive rainfalls and to store it for use during droughts. As strange as it may seem, pre-modern Tamil Nadu had a better water management infrastructure than today. There were numerous small reservoirs and large open fields that absorbed rain and transferred it into underground wells. But the situation gradually changed since the British rule (Raj) in the 17^th century. As the region became gradually industrialized and Chennai expanded, only large reservoirs located in the growing urban area survived. Houses, manufacturing centers, transportation networks, and power plants were built upon the existing open spaces. This urbanization and industrialization process surely made Chennai richer and more productive, but dramatically increased the stress on the local water resources. Moreover, water from neighboring villages was diverted to the city, thus causing shortages in the countryside as well. In the long run, this left Chennai in its present state of water insecurity.

Water (in)security in India

Water scarcity is a problem that is not limited to Tamil Nadu state, as it affects large swathes of India. In the decades to come, the problem could become a national issue that risks thwarting India’s economic rise. A reportpublished in 2016 already raised the alarm over the water crisis in the country. According to the available data, the areas experiencing “critical” groundwater stress or overexploitation are concentrated in the south and in the densely-populated northwest of India. Droughts are becoming more common, and even states that generally experience water surpluses are being impacted by acute scarcity. This in turn has raised awareness about the problem and has prompted the authorities to act, but solving the issue will require ambitious and long-term measures. If the current trend persists, India will have to face national water scarcity by 2050, when its population is projected to surpass China’s and reach 1.6 billion people.

Similar to the case of Chennai’s experience with industrialization, the root of the issue lays primarily in the mismanagement of hydric resources. Water infrastructure is insufficient on a national level; corresponding legislation is inadequate; farming (which remains an important sector in India’s economy) is inefficient in terms of water usage; existing water resources are overexploited; and sanitation is also problematic. Pollution caused by factories and other human activities only worsens the problem. Lastly, it should also be remembered that South Asia (along with Sub-Saharan Africa) is the world’s region most exposed to the effects of climate change, which will further distort annual rainfall cycles.

This, of course, will have deep implications for the country. Economically, the important agricultural sector will suffer. India’s cereal-based (and therefore water-intensive) primary sector consumes around 85-90% of its hydric resources and will thus be harmed by water scarcity. If agricultural output declines, the food security of millions will be threatened. In addition, this may also force India to import food from abroad, thus negatively affecting its trade balance; and the manufacturing sector will be damaged as well. The daily life of Indians will also be impacted, since hampered availability of water affects sanitation and air-conditioning. The latter is not a trivial issue in the densely-populated urban areas during the hot season.

Finally, deteriorating water security may also result in violent conflict at the domestic and international levels. Water scarcity may exacerbate or create tension inside local communities, pushing them toward clashes and possibly armed conflict. In an ethnically-fragmented country marked by serious economic inequality like India, this may have destabilizing effects and undermine national unity during a critical moment in its rise. At the same time, conflicts over control of the precious water basins of the north may erupt between India and its neighbors, notably Pakistan and China; and this would have serious consequences for regional stability.

The potential for “water wars” in South Asia

The fundamental dynamic driving potential conflicts over water is the fact that river basins in the region are shared between India, China, and Pakistan.

In the western sector, India may clash with Pakistan and China over the control of the Indus basin. Geographically, the river itself and the largest part of its basin lie in Pakistani territory; but the source of the river is located in Chinese-controlled Tibet. Moreover, it flows through the disputed Kashmir region; first in the Indian-administered part and then through the Pakistani-ruled section. In fact, control over the Indus basin is one of the factors at the base of the Indo-Pakistani conflict over Kashmir, in which both countries claim the territory in its entirety. From a legal point of view, the Indus Waters Treaty, concluded in 1960, regulates the rights and obligations of New Delhi and Islamabad in regards to the use of the Indus’ hydric resources. Basically, the agreement assigns the Indus proper and its western tributaries (representing roughly four-fifths of the basin’s water flow) to Pakistan, while the eastern ones (one-fifth of the flow) are given to India. Even though it has been a useful dispute management system, the Treaty is criticized as unfair by both parties, particularly in how it allocates the water. In any case, the geopolitical situation leaves Pakistan vulnerable with regards to India: being the downstream state, it is at the mercy of any action that India decides to take that will affect the flow if the Indus. In turn, New Delhi is to some degree dependent on Beijing’s goodwill, since the latter controls the source waters of the Indus. In a context of ever-close ties between China and Pakistan, the issue has already caused tensions: the Sino-Pakistani partnership plans to build dams in Pakistani-occupied Kashmir, which is driving concerns in India.

On the eastern side, the situation is equally complex. Here, the problem revolves mainly over the Brahmaputra river. It starts in China’s Tibet region and after a long course in Chinese territory, it turns southwards to cross the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh (which the PRC claims) before entering into Bangladesh and joining the Ganges, locally known as Padma. This means that China, another populous and water-hungry state, can affect the water flow in the Brahmaputra basin; again, because many of its northern tributaries are fed by glaciers and run-off in the PRC (some of them also crossing Bhutan before reaching the river). In addition, there is also some potential for conflict over the Ganges basin: while the river proper originates in India and flows through it for most of its course before entering into Bangladesh in its final section, several northern tributaries originate in China and reach the main river via Nepal. As it happens with Kashmir, water is another element at the base of the dispute over Arunachal Pradesh, since whoever controls the area also controls its significant water resources. This also explains why China is so determined to maintain its rule over Tibet. Apart from being a buffer zone in regards to India, the plateau is also the origin of important rivers that China can exploit for its own needs and whose control allows it to influence India and other downstream states. In this regard, there are again concerns that the PRC may build barrages that would disrupt the water flow in the basin.

Finally, there is also a potential for water conflict between India and Bangladesh. The Ganges River, which is vital for the latter’s agriculture-based economy, flows for the most part through India, and New Delhi’s various dam projects along the river’s course are worrying to Dhaka. A treaty has existed between the two states since 1996, but it has often been criticized in Bangladesh. Another problem revolves around the Teesta river, which starts in India and flows through Nepal before converging into the Brahmaputra in Bangladeshi territory. India has built a barrage on it, thus altering its flow and causing problems for Bangladesh.

Considering the current situation and factoring in the effect of climate change and demographic expansion, water stress in South Asia is set to intensify, with potentially destabilizing effects. Consequentially, the potential for inter-state war over the control of hydric resources will increase. In a region marked by nationalism and longstanding territorial disputes, where the three main powers (India, China and Pakistan) have nuclear weapons, conflict over water could easily escalate and destabilize the whole area, ultimately undermining India’s rise as a global power.