It was the SICC's first such loss since it began scoring a string of victories in June, but it comes as the SICC is showing signs of recognizing other constraints and the need to expand its base of support in Somalia.

In southern and central Somalia, a variety of factors have kept the SICC and its influence boxed in. Geography is, of course, important: The Islamists are based in Mogadishu, while the seat of the interim government is Baidoa. Bur Hakaba, the town that SICC forces lost this weekend, is strategically situated on the road between the two. The Islamists are prevented from expanding their influence northward, toward the autonomous Puntland and Somaliland regions, by the Darood clan of Somalian President Abdullahi Yusuf. To the south and west, there are a combination of Kenyan, Ugandan and Ethiopian forces. The SICC's hold over portions of central and southern Somalia is less than assured as well, as it faces possible threats from ousted warlords and local clansmen.

Without having consolidated its hold in key areas, and with rivals and enemies on all sides, the SICC clearly cannot hold to a static position. Thus, leaders of the Islamist movement met Oct. 20 in Mogadishu with the country's Sufi religious leadership in hopes of broadening its support among Somalia's mainstream Muslim masses. Though it is significant that the meeting occurred, any support from the country's Sufi majority likely would be tenuous and brief.

The SICC leadership has said it seeks to unite all Somalian Muslims against foreign interference, and -- by engaging the Sufi leadership -- could portray itself as a unique force capable of overcoming clan and localized politics for the defense of the country. Ethiopian aggression in Somalia is the most obvious rallying point in this regard. The Sufi leadership likely would be attracted to this unifying rhetoric -- not to mention having a pragmatic interest in making sure it is on the winning side if the SICC should manage to defeat its secular and foreign foes.

At the same time, however, the SICC's fundamentalist approach to religion is out of step with the mainstream population. Though certainly religious, most Somalis do not subscribe to the Islamist and Wahhabist interpretations of Islam, and have misgivings about the strict form of Shariah the SICC would seek to impose. Recent manifestations of Shariah in Somalia have included bans against swimming for women, outlawing the popular qaat narcotic leaf and shutdowns of popular radio stations and cinemas. For all that the SICC's leaders speak of being a nationalistic force that provides law and order, these examples of hardline Shariah -- and fears of others -- tend to spark resentment from the masses whose support the Islamists now seek.

Attempts to attract more forces and support to break out of the SICC's political and geographic box, then, could prove very challenging indeed.