That’s quite a legacy for a president sworn to keep the world’s most dangerous weapons out of the hands of the world’s most dangerous regimes.

Even if the United States were not tied down in Iraq, military action would be a disaster. Besides, American analysts don’t know where North Korea has stashed its plutonium nor what technology Iran might have hidden. Its huge centrifuge plant at Natanz is still nearly empty, and the more threatened Iran feels, the more reason it has to hide its program.

If Mr. Bush has any hope of avoiding this legacy, he will have to give up his dreams of regime change, persuade his battling inner circle he means it and direct Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice to do some real diplomatic horse trading — starting with a clear pledge that the United States will not try to overthrow their governments as long as they give up their nuclear ambitions.

Only in Mr. Bush’s go-it-alone world would Ms. Rice get so much outside credit — and so much inside criticism — for her clenched-teeth approach to these negotiations. It’s also not working.

Iran defied the Security Council’s demand that it stop enriching uranium. The good news is that it is making only slow progress. It is also restricting inspectors’ access and refusing to answer questions.

The Bush administration was right to bring Iran before the Security Council. It will have to work even harder to convince Russia and China to impose some punishment. The threat of isolation might have some effect on Iranian politics. But unless the council agrees to cut off Iran’s oil exports — not even a tough-talking White House seems ready to pay the political price for even higher gas prices — its leaders are unlikely to be quickly swayed.

It has been months since North Korea and the other members of the six-party talks even sat at the table. When Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill proposed going to North Korea to try to jump-start the process, he was told no by his bosses.

The only approach with even the remotest chance of success is to persuade these regimes that they do not need nuclear weapons to ensure their survival, and that there will be real rewards for good behavior.

This doesn’t mean ignoring all their other misdeeds. If anything, it should allow the United States to open a wider discussion with them about their mistreatment of their citizens or sponsorship of terrorism or sales of illicit technology.

There is no guarantee that Tehran or Pyongyang will accept such an offer. A serious try by Washington would certainly make it harder for Russia and China and skittish Europeans to oppose sanctions. In Iran’s case, it might also start the internal political debate that Mr. Bush has been hoping for — and that his paeans to democracy and saber rattling have failed to produce.