Though nuclear power would be Europe's most Kyoto-friendly and viable long-term energy source, the nuclear option could present different security concerns as certain Central European states respond to Russian pressure.

The European Union needs to keep nuclear power an option for electricity generation, EU Energy Commissioner Andris Piebalgs said Aug. 23. Pielbags noted that nuclear power can help lower greenhouse emissions and that uranium-supplying countries pose less geopolitical risk than countries that supply fossil fuels. Though nuclear power can indeed provide Europe's most Kyoto-friendly and viable long-term energy source, the nuclear option could present different security concerns as certain Central European states respond to Russian pressure.

Europe started turning to natural gas from traditional fuel sources such as oil and coal after the Arab oil embargo of 1973 and the more-recent Kyoto Protocol, which calls for a reduction of carbon emissions. Initially, this meant resorting to the Soviet Union as a supplier. Now, roughly 40 percent of Europe's natural gas imports come from or through Russia. The Russian cutoff in January of natural gas transiting Ukraine to Europe shocked Europe into realizing just how dependent it is on Russia for energy and how the Kremlin is willing to use that dependence to manipulate Europe.

Europe has been exploring its options to expand and diversify its energy infrastructure and supply to guard against any recurrences of the January cutoff. These options are few, expensive and time-consuming, however. They fall into four broad categories.

The first is to diversify natural gas suppliers, but not much can come of that one. The North Sea reserves have peaked, Algeria cannot expand its production and new natural gas producer Libya would need an entire infrastructure built to supply Europe -- which would take years.

Another option is receiving natural gas not through a pipeline but as liquefied natural gas (LNG). LNG is produced by cooling natural gas to minus 300 F at liquefaction facilities, loaded onto specially designed tankers and heated and fed into a standard natural gas pipeline upon reaching re-gasification facilities. Though an expensive choice, due in large part to the cost of the liquefaction and re-gasification facilities, LNG means any country with a coastline can import natural gas. Currently, Belgium, France, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom have LNG facilities; facilities are also planned in Germany and Poland.

The third option for Europe would be to reduce its natural gas use, and the fourth option would be to turn to other energy sources. The fourth option would mean either going back to the pre-oil embargo and Kyoto Protocol energy sources -- oil and coal -- or to Piebalgs' politically incorrect suggestion: nuclear power. Increasing oil consumption, however, creates the same issue of dependence on third parties, and increased coal use carries large environmental implications. Nuclear power, however, has been taboo in Europe in the wake of power plant disasters and near disasters elsewhere, such as the 1986 Chernobyl disaster the 1979 Three Mile Island incident.

In terms of reducing carbon emissions in line with Kyoto, nuclear power is actually more environmentally friendly than natural gas, which, though cleaner-burning, still generates carbon dioxide. Turning to nuclear power could cut Europe's dependence on natural gas for electrical generation altogether.

Nuclear fuel for reactors can be bought from a variety of sources, such as Australia and Canada, on the international market. For some more advanced nations, it also can be developed domestically, allowing a state to remain independent of energy geopolitics.

As good as aspects of nuclear power are, the prospect of having a nuclear plant in one's own backyard causes most green-minded Europeans to steer clear of the option. Thus, most of Western Europe distrusts nuclear energy, and the 10 EU members who joined the bloc in 2004 had to give up their nuclear facilities as part of their accession.

The large exception to anti-nuclear sentiment in Western Europe is France, a nation that has shown what can be achieved when a country embraces nuclear energy. France receives roughly 80 percent of its electricity from nuclear reactors, and is working on a new generation of reactors. Unlike the rest of the European Union, France took the lesson from the 1973 oil embargo that it needed to establish the most independent energy supply possible. Paris thus divorced itself as much as it could from natural gas dependence by turning to nuclear power; the little natural gas it does import is diversified, coming in equal amounts from Algeria, the North Sea and Russia.

A great many European states are now beginning to mutter about following the French example and embracing nuclear power. Finland, Italy, Switzerland and the United Kingdom are all preparing to expand their own infrastructure of nuclear power plants -- though these countries already have the technological expertise and popular acceptance necessary for the expansions.

The situation for other states, such as Sweden and Germany, is more muddled. A Swedish referendum vote after Three Mile Island requires the country to phase out nuclear power. Over the past decade though, anti-nuclear sentiment has faded, and with 83 percent of Swedes supporting nuclear power, it is only a matter of time before the economics of energy persuade Swedish politics to embrace nuclear power.

The previous German government, which consisted of a coalition including the Greens, committed Germany to a full phaseout of its nuclear capacity, and was able to bind the current ruling coalition to that commitment. Berlin might be able to reverse that decision in time, but its current government is too fractured to address the issue.

Some European states, such as Austria, Cyprus, Denmark, Ireland and Norway, will remain unalterably opposed to nuclear power on environmental grounds. Portugal can avoid the nuclear option thanks to its distance from Russia and a favorable environment for solar, wind and tidal power.

The situation in Central Europe is more complex, since those nations depend on Russian energy more than any other. The Czech Republic, Lithuania, Romania and Slovakia already have nuclear power facilities. Lithuania is phasing its facilities out as agreed upon in its EU accession deal, and Romania, set to join the European Union in 2007, will similarly phase out nuclear power. With energy tensions rising, these agreements will be revisited and renegotiated. This is especially true for Lithuania, whose tensions with Russia have been raised over the past month because of other energy-supply cuts. Lithuania's Ignalina nuclear plant, which is planned to shut down in 2009, produces 85 percent of Lithuania's electricity and exports electricity to Estonia and Latvia. Lithuania appealed in January to the European for a renegotiation of the plant's closure. Other nations, such as Estonia, Latvia and the nations that emerged from the former Yugoslavia, may want nuclear power but do not have the resources to develop it alone.

The debate over nuclear power in Poland became fiercer after the Polish Council of Ministers adopted a new energy strategy at the end of 2005 -- the same time as the natural gas dispute between Ukraine and Russia -- that called for the development of nuclear energy in Poland. Poland has a great deal of experience in the area, as it currently operates the MARIA nuclear research reactor under the control of the International Institute of Atomic Energy. In July, the political scene in Poland changed when Polish President Lech Kaczynski named his twin brother, Jaroslaw Kaczynski, prime minister. The move eliminated any pragmatic elements in the government, resulting in a more nationalistic, belligerently anti-Russia stance.

The potential shift to nuclear power in Central Europe raises a new concern, however. Though these states see nuclear power as a partial solution to the Russian economic threat, as Russian pressure on its former territories rises, it is only a matter of time before they see nuclear programs as a means to guarantee physical security as well via nuclear weapons. These former Soviet satellites all possess sufficient technical expertise to initiate nuclear weapons programs, though it would take political will to go down that path.

The more the European states develop nuclear weapons, the more the international security paradigm will shift -- threatening the long-standing U.S. policy of combating nuclear proliferation. Washington will want to pick and choose the states that should have nuclear power. Though most Central European states will not follow this path, the most U.S.-friendly nations -- Poland and Baltic states, which are the most exposed to Russia -- might. Poland and the Baltics could see this as a solution that allows them to break energy ties with Russia while providing them with a powerful deterrent against their neighbor to the east.