In the plans for 2006, the emphasis is again on agriculture, but there also is a clear impetus to accelerate international economic interactions -- and these could indicate Pyongyang's further intentions regarding the ongoing nuclear crisis.

The fourth session of the 11th Supreme People's Assembly (SPA) of North Korea met in Pyongyang on April 11 to review the Cabinet's work and the status of the economy, as well as to discuss plans for 2006 and the role of technology in North Korea's development. The annual meetings of the oft-described "rubber-stamp" parliament may not set policies, but they do provide insight into the most significant issues of interest to North Korea's leaders.

The underlying theme of the 2006 session was "stepping up the development of science and technology to give strong impetus to the building of a great prosperous powerful nation." While this sounds rather grandiose, it is no coincidence that much of leader Kim Jong Il's January visit to China focused on technology as the underpinning of economic development, from the traditional high-tech industries all the way down to more core sectors such as agriculture.

Two key high-tech initiatives were laid out in the SPA session. First was the "urgent [need] to build a nationwide information network and develop programming technology rapidly" in order to turn North Korea "into a power in software development." Pyongyang may intend to have foreign firms outsource to North Korea, as international animation studios already do. Second was the call for the establishment of science and technology hubs that bring together scientists for research, study and development of new ideas and technologies. These technology incubators will also try to draw on cooperation with foreign scientists.

As with many developing nations, and particularly with socialist ones, technology is seen as the path toward greatness. But it also is seen as a pragmatic necessity to leap over the various stages of development in order to catch up with the rest of the world.

Although technology got top billing as a theme, the most important tasks laid out related to agriculture, coal and metals. North Korea has seen five consecutive years of increased grain output following a terrible year in 2000, and at the end of 2005 negotiated an end to grain donations from the World Food Program in favor of assistance in growing its own foods. The larger crop yields were still insufficient, but the push on agriculture, which was the main focus of the April 2005 SPA session, apparently has begun to pay off. In the future, North Korea intends to increase research and development into bio-engineering better crops and into additional fertilizer production utilizing coal gasification as the feedstock.

Coal takes second billing, but only slightly so. North Korean coal production continues to climb, and Pyongyang not only uses it at home for energy but also exports it to China. Although coal remains a primary source of energy, Pyongyang also continues to expand the development and use of hydropower. The government also has recognized the critical state of the energy infrastructure and called for an increased focus on energy management, the development of renewable energy sources (such as wind and bio-mass) and energy-efficient devices, and the use of energy-saving practices. Given the huge increase in international oil prices, these are even more critical issues for North Korea than perhaps for its neighbors. Interestingly, Pyongyang also laid out the need to develop its oil exploration and production technology, perhaps with an eye on potential resources in the West Sea.

Metal is the final piece of the economic trinity. Pyongyang is looking to increase metal production, particularly steel, and divert that production to critical areas such as improving the energy infrastructure and the rail infrastructure. Both are in a particularly poor state (as the 2004 Ryongchon blast showed), though Pyongyang has over the past few years increased attention to rail as part of a regional push to connect South Korea by railroad to Russia and China (and eventually on to Europe), all via North Korea. In addition, rail remains the most effective way of moving coal and other energy resources, as well as grain, through the country.

As Pyongyang lays out its 2006 plans, it sees the six-party nuclear talks languishing, and wonders if they are even necessary anymore. There is a clear impasse, and Pyongyang increasingly doubts whether Washington is either willing to make a deal or capable of enforcing any deal that might be made. Furthermore, South Korea continues to work economically with the North, and once again, international economic cooperation plays a prominent role in the SPA plans for the coming year. As such, the need for a settlement with Washington appears to be waning.

The initial intent of the 2003 nuclear crisis, after all, was to force a peace settlement with the United States, thus breaking the international taboo on doing business with North Korea and carefully managing the opening of special economic zones to take advantage of cheap North Korean labor -- all while bringing in cash and technology to North Korea to be re-distributed throughout the rest of the country by the central government. If Seoul continues to work with North Korea in Kaesong and elsewhere, and Pyongyang wants to retain a close hold over the pace and scope of economic experimentation, having Seoul on its side even without a peace accord with Washington is not a bad position.

For Pyongyang, however, there is a question of time. While it sees little potential progress from Washington any time soon (and is thus refraining from taking the necessary steps to satisfy Washington and restart the six-party talks), Pyongyang also sees its rapprochement with South Korea facing a troubling time as the South's December 2007 presidential election approaches. Pyongyang foresees the likely return of a more conservative government in Seoul, one not nearly as open to sharing money and technology with the North, making 2006 and the first half of 2007 critical years for North Korean economic developments. A deal with Washington would reduce the risk of a change in the South Korean government, but it also would be of questionable value until perhaps after the 2006 U.S. congressional elections -- but those are well beyond the spring deadline Washington has laid out for the potential continuation of six-party talks.

The ball is now clearly in North Korea's court. The ability to restart the six-party talks rests in Pyongyang's willingness, or lack thereof, to identify its nuclear sites for future dismantling. Pyongyang could easily accede, submit the sites and restart negotiations. But if it deems it unlikely that Washington will go so far as to sign a peace accord to replace the armistice or finally establish formal diplomatic relations, Pyongyang might look at the cost-vs.-benefit of continued drawn-out talks over an artificially created crisis and decide simply to focus on its economic ties with Seoul and a few other select states. It could then let the nuclear question remain unresolved until there is another opportunity -- or need -- to play the nuke card.