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20/01/2006 | China and Japan: East Asia's Rising Superpower Rivalry

WMRC Staff

The year 2006 is unlikely to see any improvement in relations between Japan and China, following the sustained deterioration that became a recurring theme during 2005. The scheduled departure of Japanese prime minister Junichiro Koizumi in September will usher in the elevation of a hawkish successor, further complicating relations with China and other Asian neighbours. Far from presenting an opportunity to rebuild relations that have been damaged by a succession of difficult episodes, the coming year will merely mark the next phase of an inexorable slide that will see persistent tensions intensify towards full-blown strategic competition.

 

The 'Calm' Before the Strategic Competition?

Long-standing historical grievances have combined with present and future points of contention to intensify the rivalry between Asia's two biggest economies. Critical issues have ranged from the whitewashing of history in Japanese school textbooks, to the contest over energy resources in the East China Sea, and from Japan's bid for permanent membership of the United Nations Security Council to the mainland's military build-up and its tacit support for anti-Japanese public demonstrations.

China has yet to acknowledge widely or show appreciation for Japan's substantial aid contributions over the years, and has encouraged anti-Japanese sentiment in school textbooks and public demonstrations. Japan, for its part, has continued to provoke Chinese suspicion through its gradual but unmistakable militarisation, sympathy for Taiwan and regular state visits to the Yasukuni war shrine, which commemorates Japan's war dead, including 14 'Class A' war criminals.

The accretion of mutual distrust as a result of these issues has accelerated the emergence of a distinctly zero-sum contest that colours official interactions on a range of issues. The real friction lies in the identification of future competition not only for resources, but also political influence in the region. Tokyo has pursued an increasingly assertive foreign policy, anchored on a more defined alignment with U.S. strategic interests in the region, in a bid to normalise its international status fully. As strategic and resource rivalries become ever more pronounced, bilateral tensions are set to become more visible and entrenched. This trend has been particularly evident over the past 12 months.

Strategic Competition Timeline

A series of government policy papers and statements during 2005 sent a strong message about shifting official perceptions of China, and of Japan's regional role:

In January, Japanese Foreign Minister Nobutaka Machimura asserted his country's unequivocal opposition to the lifting of the European Union (EU)'s arms ban on China.

Long-standing ambiguity about Japan's role in a possible conflict over the Taiwan Strait was cleared up in February, when the U.S. and Japanese governments released a joint agreement that the Strait is a 'common strategic objective' for both countries.

The cabinet approved the Japan Defense Agency's annual White Paper in August. The document declared that 'it is necessary…to carefully evaluate whether the modernisation of China's military forces exceeds the level necessary for national defence,' adding that Japan was 'closely monitoring' the operations of the PLA Navy.

A 'secret' Japanese defence plan, details of which emerged in September, raised the possibility that the Chinese military could forcefully take over the disputed Senkaku chain of islands.

In late November, Koizumi proposed constitutional revisions to create an official role for Japan's Self-Defence Forces (SDF) that would enable them to assist allies and take part in armed international peacekeeping efforts.

 

Public Opinion

Political tensions would provide sufficient cause for concern, but it is the downward spiral of opinion among each country's general population that signals the deepening intractability of their differences. A series of public surveys has ironically indicated that one area of agreement is heightened pessimism about both the present and future course of bilateral relations. A poll conducted in July 2005 by the Japanese think-tank Genron NPO, the China Daily newspaper and Beijing University found that 74% of the Japanese public and 85% of the intellectual and business elite thought relations with the mainland were 'not very good' or 'not good at all.' In China, meanwhile, 55% of the public and almost 80% of students held the same view. Tellingly, 90% of those students believed that Japanese actions were solely responsible for producing the current tensions.

Nascent nationalism partly explains the rising tide of mutual hostility. Without the overarching themes of Cold War ideological competition to mute long-standing historical animosity, both countries are in the process of rediscovering their respective national identities. In China's case, this translates into an eager desire to salvage wounded pride by playing a dominant global role in the future - and, in the process, avenging the historical humiliation of Japanese colonial oppression between 1931 and 1945. As Hannah Beech wrote in Time magazine: 'the fervour directed against Japan is the creature of official dogma - a deliberate attempt by the authorities to replace socialism as a guiding ideology with nationalism' ('Patriot Games', Time, 29 November 2004).

Although most Japanese express regret and remorse for the country's actions during the Second World War, an increasing number feel that they should not have to bear the burden of crimes committed by previous generations. As Japan's own body politic grows more comfortable with the idea of the country playing a more influential role in global affairs and regional security, it is unlikely to tolerate continued Chinese criticism. There are already indications that a subculture of xenophobic - or, at least, anti-Chinese - backlash is gaining traction. In November 2005, the New York Times newspaper reported on the runaway success of a highly nationalist manga-style comic book entitled 'Introduction to China'. The book's characters portray the Chinese as depraved and cannibalistic, and claim - without providing evidence - that 'most of the epidemics that broke out in Japan on a large scale' came from the mainland. Far from meeting with public outrage and condemnation, 'Introduction to China' sold 180,000 copies.

Business Impact

The interdependence of the two economies has thus far played a key role in keeping political tensions in check; in the first quarter of 2005, for example, China replaced the United States as Japan's top trade partner for the first time, snatching 20.1% of total Japanese trade turnover, compared with 18.6% for the United States. With around 16,000 Japanese companies operating in China, providing jobs for hundreds of thousands of Chinese workers, neither country has seen much of an upside to damaging the climate for bilateral business.

However, there are indications that the cloud cast by the ongoing political turmoil could darken the outlook for trade and investment. In April 2005, protesters in China carried out the largest anti-Japanese demonstrations since the two countries normalised relations in 1972, plunging the benchmark Nikkei-225 share index to a five-month low, and raising concern amongst Japanese businesses based in the country. Japanese firms - some of which were explicitly targeted for vandalism - responded with muted alarm to the protests, which occurred in a dozen or more Chinese cities over the course of three successive weekends. Japanese Foreign Ministry spokesman Hatsuhisa Takashima told reporters: 'Japanese businesspeople...are seriously wondering if the situation would affect their operations.'

Three months later, a Kyodo News poll of executives from Japan's top 100 companies found around 50% expressing concern that strained political ties could adversely affect business prospects in China. Honda Motors president Takeo Fukui was amongst those voicing apprehension about the anti-Japanese climate in China, and commenting on alternative destinations for investment. He told the Tokyo Shimbun newspaper that 'India has less risk than China. India has political transparency and a neutral sentiment toward Japan.' In its 2005 White Paper, the usually moderate Ministry for Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) urged Japanese firms to balance the risks of business operations in China by expanding within South-East Asia.

Outlook and Implications

A key date in 2006 will come in September, when Prime Minister Koizumi steps down from the presidency of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and hands over the reins to a chosen successor. Leading the pack to replace him are Chief Cabinet Secretary Shinzo Abe and Foreign Minister Taro Aso, who - as the descendants of former prime ministers themselves - both have the pedigree and profile to become even more influential national figures in the years ahead.

However, both are better known for the uncompromising stance they have taken on issues that directly influence the course of relations with China. As such, the fact that they were recently promoted to prominent cabinet posts signals the party's desire to elevate a fresh batch of leaders who are unlikely to compromise or be tolerant of Chinese criticism. As political analyst Minoru Morita told the Agence France-Presse (AFP) news agency: 'On the diplomatic front, the new cabinet is clearly a pro-U.S., anti-China government.'

Some observers have forecast that the demands of higher office would probably force both men to tone down their rhetoric as soon as it became apparent that their hardline views were damaging Japanese economic interests. However, even in the absence of shrill rhetoric, relations will continue to suffer the ill-effects of a substantial lack of mutual trust or goodwill. It is therefore difficult to envisage a future in which intensifying rivalry and underlying hostility do not characterise bilateral relations between East Asia's two economic superpowers.

Contact: Raul Dary

24 Hartwell Ave.
Lexington, MA 02421, USA
Tel: 781.301.9314
Cel: 857.222.0556
Fax: 781.301.9416
raul.dary@globalinsight.com

www.globalinsight.com and www.wmrc.com

 

WMRC (Reino Unido)

 



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