In October 2002, Brazilian voters finally selected lifelong labour activist Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva as the country's president after his fourth attempt at the presidency. The election of a leftist to lead Latin America's largest country marked a watershed, not only for Brazil, but for the region as a whole. He was swiftly joined by Argentina's Néstor Kirchner and Uruguay's Tabaré Vázquez. In Chile, moderate Socialist Party (PS) member Ricardo Lagos held power under the centre-left Concertación ('Coalition'), as the electorate expressed its disillusionment with the Washington Consensus, the package of free-market economic policies introduced by almost all Latin American nations from the late 1980s onwards. Polls point to another Concertación victory for Chile under fellow PS activist and former defence minister Michelle Bachelet. Her social focus is more apparent than that of her right-leaning Alliance for Chile (APC) challenger Sebastián Piñera (National Renewal, RN), who has since been joined by former rival conservative Joaquín Lavín (Independent Democratic Union, UDI). However, there is little choice between the policies of Chile's moderate left and right; both pledge to leave the investor-friendly, open-market model intact. In Bolivia and - to a lesser extent - Mexico, the economic policy implications of a leftist victory are potentially more severe, and it is these two countries on which this article focuses. In Bolivia, Evo Morales - who champions the coca lobby that cultivates the raw material for cocaine - is awaiting confirmation of his apparently historic victory. In Mexico, it is the populist former mayor of the capital, Andrés Manuel López Obrador, who is the narrow favourite to carry the presidency.

Bolivia's Electoral Battleground

A few months before Lula's 2002 victory in Brazil, Bolivia came close to inaugurating its first indigenous leftist president. Evo Morales, who heads the Movement Towards Socialism (MAS), took second place, just behind former president Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada, an architect of Bolivia's neo-liberal economic model. Morales was denied the presidency by a pact between Sánchez de Lozada's centre-right Nationalist Revolutionary Movement (MNR) and Jaime Paz Zamora's left-leaning Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR) in a congressional run-off. This time round, Morales appears to have pulled off an unprecedented first-round triumph in the 18 December presidential vote. If, on the final count, he falls short of the absolute majority required, his fortunes will be decided by Congress. The strong performance of the MAS in parallel legislative elections, combined with the fact that rightist challenger Jorge Quiroga has conceded defeat, means that Morales is poised to take the presidency. His apparent success, probably in the first round, signifies an important step for Bolivian democracy whose leaders have traditionally lacked a strong mandate. Concerns remain regarding the policy framework of the incipient head of state. Another democratic milestone for Bolivia was passed in the form of democratic selection of provincial leaders for the first time in a parallel vote. Previously they were appointed by the president. 

The December 2004 municipal contest - in which the MAS became Bolivia's largest political party - offered an early indication that Morales had the capacities to assume the presidency, but his performance at the ballot box this time has exceeded expectations. Morales's key challenger, rightist former president Jorge Quiroga, known locally by his childhood nickname 'Tuto', withdrew himself from the race early on polling day when exit polls predicted a first-round victory for the leftist contender. The two candidates are symbolic of the polarised political blocs that make up the bulk of the country. Divisions are drawn on both geographic and racial lines. Morales finds his support base among the impoverished - and predominantly indigenous - highland areas in which coca is cultivated. By contrast, Quiroga, a neo-liberal entrepreneur of white European descent, enjoys support in wealthy central areas such as Santa Cruz and in the south of the capital, La Paz. Support in separatist Santa Cruz province is also afforded to third-place presidential contender and businessman Samuel Doria Medina. Another shock development in the 18 December vote was Morales's respectable performance in Quiroga's Santa Cruz heartland. Santa Cruz is set to be the centre of political tensions if the MAS chief is sworn in as expected. Bolivia's indigenous, predominantly Aymara Indian, majority appears to have capitalised on its strength in numbers to choose a president from amongst its ranks; rejecting the runner-up who ostensibly represents the interests of white elites and is remembered for his tenure as vice-president under former dictator Hugo Banzer. Difficulties do not end here, however.Polarised interest groups meant that powerful sections of the population would be left under- or un-represented, whoever was elected. Political instability is a long-term reality for Bolivia, and risks are set to remain high.

AMLO: Champion of the Poor or Mexico's Menace?

Mexicans have been eyeing the 2006 elections for the past two years, disillusioned by the unfulfilled promises of President Vicente Fox's 'Government of Change'. Offering an 'Alternative Project' for the nation, the former Mexico City mayor and left-leaning López Obrador (known as 'AMLO' after his initials) took the lead from the start and has remained in front. However, there are indications that he has slipped back recently, and a nail-biter is possible. The emergence of Felipe Calderón - a charismatic and credible politician - as the ruling National Action Party (PAN) candidate has introduced a viable alternative to the capital's one-time head of government, which was lacking in the premature campaign period. A recent poll recorded a seven-point dip in AMLO's popularity, made more credible by the fact that it was commissioned by the party of the leftist contender (the Democratic Revolution Party, PRD). The source of the survey forced AMLO's campaign team to acknowledge that his support levels were receding, which it had previously denied. The PRD-backed poll granted 35% of support to its leftist candidate while affording 24% to the PAN's Calderón at the cost of both AMLO and Roberto Madrazo of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI). An earlier poll predicted a tie with governing PAN challenger Calderón, although the PRD has rebutted this assertion. Whether such surveys signify a temporary lull in AMLO's popularity or the beginning of its collapse remains to be seen.

Although it is clear that Calderón's candidacy has granted a new credibility to his party's re-election campaign, substantial barriers to his ultimate victory remain. Standing in his way are apathy, attributed to President Fox's disappointing administration, and the populist appeal of AMLO. The latter boasts a loyal support base and has proved adept at generating popular support at the grassroots level. Overcoming impeachment proceedings against him in May 2005 was a prime example of this talent. Posters declaring 'No al Desafuero' ('No to [AMLO's] Impeachment') were posted all over the country, despite the PRD's minor presence in many states. In his Federal District (D.F.) heartland, hundreds of thousands marched through the streets of the capital less than a fortnight before the case against him was dropped. The former mayor has made a career of challenging presumed conspiracies against him, such as the much-publicised, and arguably well-founded, allegations that he was denied the Tabasco State governorship in 1994 through Madrazo's apparent electoral fraud. The lack of faith in Mexico's institutions means that conspiracy theories are received with relish, whether or not they are founded in fact. Fears remain that if AMLO is unsuccessful at the ballot box, he will deploy similar methods, stirring up widespread social unrest in the aftermath of the vote. AMLO's key challenge is to discredit allegations that he would misuse popular mobilisations and to discredit widespread claims emanating from the business community that a future PRD government would make Mexico a carbon copy of Venezuela under Chavez. Concurrently, the parties of AMLO and Calderón alike are competing against the PRI's powerful national party apparatus, a reminder that Madrazo's campaign cannot be overlooked.

Key Predictions

Changing Complexion of Latin America: With so many elections on the horizon, most with an unclear outcome, next year will be crucial in determining the future political direction of the Latin American bloc. This is in turn critical for evolving relations with the United States . To date, the new left in Latin America, with the obvious exception of Venezuela, has proved predominantly moderate. The neo-liberal economic model remains intact across the region. Left-leaning governments have placed greater emphasis on social programmes (arguably a necessity to make the system sustainable in the context of disappointing growth rates), persistent inequality and increasing public protests, as voters express their disappointment with the prevailing economic model. However, fiscal austerity and tight monetary policies have been maintained in Brazil, Chile and Peru, to name a few.

The Lula or Chavez Effect: The presidents of Brazil and Venezuela will continue to represent the respective models of the moderate or revolutionary left emerging in Latin America. In this context, populist rhetoric from Bolivia's Morales and Mexico's López Obrador has provoked questions as to the kind of left to which they would belong. As presidents, would they join moderate leaders such as Lula or Lagos in introducing a moderate social focus within the open-market model, or would they pursue a more radical socialist programme inspired by the likes of Chavez? Opponents will endeavour to convince voters of the latter scenario, but some evidence exists to undermine such claims. Whom they select as allies will be significant. The international community, including financial sectors, would be reassured by an expression of solidarity with the Brazilian president, who has managed to strike a balance between shoring up the investment environment and maintaining the support of poorer sectors. Lula's government still provides a source of reassurance to foreign investors, despite corruption scandals staining the administration. Like Lagos, he is a living example of an old-school leftist who learned to embrace the third way.

Reinventing the Radicals: The ability of Bolivia's apparent new president and Mexico's left-leaning frontrunner to convince voters of their potential pragmatism without deterring their traditional support base will be key in determining their future leadership prospects. Morales's Bolivia: Room for Morales to reinvent himself as a pragmatist is restricted by the radical nature of his core support. Morales is best known as the champion of his country's coca farmers and for his vocal admiration and 'solidarity' with Fidel Castro's authoritarian Cuba and Chavez's revolutionary Venezuela. Nevertheless, Morales's ability to portray himself as a pragmatist to certain congressional circles is vital as the MAS will likely need to seek alliances within the legislative branch to progress its political project. Laying out his electoral platform, the MAS chief emphasised the importance of the private sector, particularly small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), to national development. Yet, the message most business groups will take away is his pledge to return the hydrocarbons sector to state hands. Softening his position, Morales gave reassurances regarding the investments of Brazil's state petroleum company Petrobras in the Andean country, something he reiterated after the vote, but his nationalistic, anti-capitalist image will be difficult to erode.

AMLO's Mexico: In the coming months, Mexico's left-leaning frontrunner will tout an economic plan designed to reassure the private sector. This process began with the appointment of Rogelio Ramirez de la O. as his chief economic advisor, an expert who has been forthright in his calls for reforms in such areas as energy, tax and labour. AMLO's refusal to open the energy sector to foreign investment will continue to undermine such efforts, despite parallel pledges to promote foreign investment and work in partnership with the private sector. His minor party also brings with it concerns that, like President Fox, AMLO would also be hamstrung in the national Congress. Responding to this, AMLO and his Workers Party (PT) and Convergencia alliance colleagues will work on portraying the would-be president as a consensus-builder. Evidence for this will be taken from his first three years of Mexico City government, when the PRD lacked a majority. Meanwhile, AMLO will endeavour to promote the importance of U.S. relations in a tacit rejection of claims that he is a follower of Venezuela's anti-American leader. However, that comparison will be difficult to shift, forming part of mainstream political thought in the country. Even if such alleged similarities are well-founded, there are barriers to AMLO becoming another Chavez. The narrow reach of the PRD would make forging alliances in the legislature a necessity, which should dilute any latent radical tendencies. Mexico's economic model is far less vulnerable to change than that of Bolivia. It is enshrined in the North American Free-Trade Agreement (NAFTA) with Canada and the United States. These institutional safeguards and practical political constraints make the potential election of a leftist in Mexico a lesser threat to its business interests.

Contact: Raul Dary

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