Many Middle East experts pointed to unemployment and the rising price of food in Tunisia to explain that country's uprising. The same experts pointed to unemployment and mass poverty to explain the subsequent Egyptian uprising. 

But after Egyptians successfully ousted Hosni Mubarak, unrest subsequently spread to Libya, Algeria, Iran, Bahrain, Yemen and Jordan, countries with very diverse economic conditions. Standards of living in Bahrain and Libya, for example, are much higher than in Egypt and Yemen. Furthermore, the harsh economic conditions in Middle Eastern countries have existed for many years. How is it, then, that citizens of these countries have all suddenly decided to stage simultaneous mass demonstrations? 

Another force is at play here, one more powerful than economic discontent: democracy envy.

All Middle Eastern countries suffer to some degree from a lack of progress in democratic political reforms, which observers often refer to as a democracy deficit. Even in Africa, where many countries have lower per capita incomes and lower standards of living than in Arab countries, democratic reforms have been more successful than in the Middle East. This democracy deficit was identified as one of the three major development deficits of the Arab world -- along with knowledge deficit and female empowerment deficit -- in the 2002 Arab Human Development Report (.pdf). However, like economic discontent, the democracy deficit has been a persistent problem throughout the region. Whether coerced or co-opted, many Arabs and Iranians have lived under authoritarian rule all their lives. If discontent with dictatorship is a driving force behind the Arab uprisings, then, again, why now? 

A combination of economic hardship and a lack of political rights did drive the uprising in Tunisia, where mass discontent over these issues was transformed into outrage by the self-immolation of an unemployed university graduate turned street vendor. However, it was the swift victory of the Tunisian uprising that served as the catalyst for the Egyptian uprising. 

Tunisia's Jasmine Revolution evoked a feeling of unease in the hearts of Egyptians. Over the years, millions of Egyptians had become resigned to a status quo of economic hardship and Mubarak's repressive rule. Their passive acceptance of these conditions was not solely due to the Mubarak government's harsh response to political protests. Egyptians were also passive because they could see that authoritarian rule was the norm in all Arab countries. The lack of democratic institutions in other Middle Eastern countries somehow made it easier for Egyptians to accept their own democracy deficit. 

Then Tunisia happened.

When the Tunisian uprisings began, most Egyptians, like everyone else, believed that President Zine El-Abidine Ben Ali would eventually suppress the protests and restore the status quo. Then they woke up one morning to find that he had fled the country under the pressure of peaceful protests. Never mind that the refusal of the Tunisian army to fire on protesters was the key factor that forced Ben Ali to leave. What Egyptians saw -- or chose to see -- was that, by protesting for only a few days, ordinary Tunisians had forced their dictator to flee. A proud people that had always viewed itself as the cultural and political center of the Arab world watched the citizens of a small and, from their point of view, marginal Arab country liberate themselves from tyranny. 

What happened in Tunisia filled Egyptians with envy. For the average Egyptian, the emotional cost of living under Mubarak's authoritarian rule suddenly rose sky-high. "Are we less courageous than the Tunisians?" they asked one another. As this question echoed in their ears, envy turned to outrage, compelling them into the streets. The rest, of course, is history.

It took the Egyptians even less time to oust Hosni Mubarak than the Tunisians needed to oust Ben Ali, and the success of their revolution planted the seeds of democracy envy in the hearts of millions of Arabs and Iranians. Equally important, it gave them hope and confidence. Many who had initially looked at Tunisia's revolution as an exception now felt that what had transpired there and in Egypt could happen in their own country as well. This potent combination of envy and hope led to fresh uprisings within days of the Egyptian victory.

Mass protests and uprisings are now underway in Libya, Bahrain, Yemen and Iran. Further successes will strengthen the democracy envy in the hearts of other peoples in the region and will inspire new mass protests, regardless of levels of economic prosperity. Even the wealthy oil-exporting countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) might no longer be immune to demands for civil and political rights. Once democracy envy spreads, it will no longer be possible for rulers in these countries to appease their citizens with economic gifts and bribes. 

A success in Bahrain, in particular, that transforms the country into a democratic constitutional monarchy will have a strong effect throughout the Gulf. The resulting democracy envy is likely to be felt strongest among Saudi citizens, who view their country as the economic and spiritual leader of the GCC nations. "How can we allow a small country like Bahrain beat us in the race for political liberty?" they will likely say. 

Envy is a powerful force.

**Nader Habibi is the Henry J. Leir professor of economics of the Middle East in Brandeis University's Crown Center for Middle East Studies. He was the director of forecasting and risk analysis for the Middle East and Africa region in the economic consulting firm IHS Global Insight before joining the faculty of Brandies University in 2007.