Reforming the UN Security Council stands as a key barometer for assessing the international system`s transition from a post-Cold War US hegemony to a more multipolar distribution of economic and military power.
The United Nations has proved itself to be an
important forum for resolving international conflict over the past 50 years,
and this is mainly because it has legitimacy in the eyes of the international
community- a characteristic that was markedly absent in the case of the
abortive League of Nations. In other words, the UN works because all parties
involved accept that it is, at least on some level, neutral and representative
of international society. However, as time goes on, the UN Security
Council has become less and less representative of the real economic and
military power dynamics that exist in the world of today. France and the United
Kingdom hardly enjoy enough global sway to warrant a permanent veto on the
Security Council, especially when nascent economic superpowers like Brazil and
India remain trapped on the outside looking in.
Thus, the legitimacy that has allowed the United
Nations to be effective over the past 50 years is now threatened because
the UN still reflects the post-WWII international power structure and not that
of the 21st century. This legitimacy crisis comes at a particularly sensitive
time, because the transition away from a US hegemonic international
order will require strong international institutions to mitigate conflict.
For example, when the US military pulls out of Iraq some kind of international
coordination will be needed to avoid the country spiralling back into chaos.
This is not an isolated example. The process of US military deployments being
pulled out and new regional powers moving in to fill their space will create
several volatile situations around the world.
The Security Council needs to be reformed if the United
Nations is to carry on as a central pillar of the international order, but
doing so is easier said than done. The present council only has five
veto-welding members, which is more than enough to persistently throw a monkey
wrench into resolving certain ‘sensitive’ international issues, such as the
Israel-Palestine conflict, Iran, and North Korea. An expanded base of
veto-welding states would serve to compound the policy deadlock that is so
often experienced in the halls of the Security Council. Just imagine if India
were to ascend as a permanent member. It’s almost certain that New Delhi’s
first order of business would be to make sure that Kashmir is permanently taken
off the table in the same way China keeps Xinjiang and Tibet out of the scope
of international institutions.
If the decision-making mechanism of a reformed Security
Council represents an enigma, then the actual composition of the council can be
considered a Gordian knot. It seems unlikely that France or the United Kingdom
will willingly relinquish the last symbol of their former great power status,
and their continued inclusion tilts the balance of influence in America`s
favour in the eyes of Beijing. Three other countries that would be involved in
any discussion on expansion- Japan, India, and Germany- are also close allies
of the United States. There’s going to be some huge wheeling and dealing going
on behind the scenes over the next few years, and the results of these
trade-offs will resonate in the international system for decades to come.
President Obama has already fired the first volley in Delhi with the
announcement of his support for the Indian bid for a permanent council seat.
The process of UN Security Council reform won’t
be starting immediately, and it will surely take an excruciatingly long time to
conclude, but the writing is on the wall and all players involved know that it
is something that absolutely must happen. Thus, it may be useful to keep in
mind that these are the likely goals of the current veto-welding members- all
of whose agreement is necessary for any reform to go through.
United Kingdom & France: Survive the reform
process with their permanent seat intact. Make bilateral gains around the
periphery (example- The UK’s public support of an obvious candidate in Brazil
as a way to improve relations with Latin America).
United States: Limit expansion of permanent
membership to bare minimum needed to maintain legitimacy of the United Nations.
Get Japan in, or at least appear to want to do so to create a fat bargaining
chip for the Chinese.
China: Limit expansion of permanent membership. It’s
likely that Beijing will try to swap its support for a permanent seat for India
in exchange for keeping Japan out.
Russia: Support India and Brazil as most obvious
choices for new permanent seats. Try and block Japan and Germany from ascending
to the council.